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This study puts the spotlight on small states that has long been overlooked in the field 
of International Relations. The limited academic discussion is quite paradoxical, considering 
that the world is for the most part made up of small states. The few scholarly literature on 
small states has mostly focused on its definition and classification, vulnerabilities in the 
international system, or interactions with great powers, among others. This study therefore 
seeks to veer away from these themes and instead focus on the importance of small states, 
their power potential, and their engagement with fellow small states.    
 In particular, it examines the external behaviour of a small state towards its peers, and 
analyses the foreign policy that provides the rationale behind its behaviour. Essentially, its 
research questions shift focus away from the power disparity between small states and great 
or middle powers, towards the power dynamics between well-matched small states. Thus, 
this study addresses the following questions: How does a small state deal with its fellow small 
states amidst political conflicts or bilateral issues? What are the factors that shape its 
behaviour towards its counterparts? Why does a small state act ‘smaller’ or ‘weaker’ in 
relation to other small states? Or in some cases, why does it act ‘greater’ or stronger’ 
compared to its peers?     
 To answer these questions, this study features the Philippines as a small state since it 
shares common characteristics with others. It assesses it behaviour and policy, and evaluates 
whether it projected a weak or strong behaviour relative to other small states. In doing so, 
this paper presents case studies highlighting the Philippines’ interactions with Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Kuwait.  
This study’s focus on the Philippines and its relations with other small states, is 
considered to be an interesting analysis on the power play between states of approximate 
material capabilities. It is hoped that such analysis will provide substantive insights for other 
small states in managing their external behaviours and in formulating their foreign policies.  
These insights aim to be utilized as pertinent preliminary guidelines in forecasting and 
rationalizing a small state’s behaviour, which can be considered in understanding other small 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION  
The Case for Small States in International Relations:  
A Look at the Philippines as a Small State  
 
“The Philippines is afraid of China. It will invoke the “One China Policy” in order to 
appease the Chinese. Whatever problems the Philippines will have with Taiwan will be fixed 
later on, because it is just a small country.”1  
This statement by a Filipino government official refers to the Philippines’ deportation 
of Taiwanese nationals to mainland China. It essentially reveals the contrasting perceptions 
on the power and influence of the two countries. On the one hand, China is deemed as more 
superior, to which the Philippines is cautious of. On the other hand, Taiwan is viewed as less 
important in the scheme of the Philippines’ foreign policy priorities. These observations result 
in different behaviours of the Philippines--- with China, it acts ‘weak,’ but with Taiwan, it acts 
‘strong.’    
This provides an interesting case on how it interacts with a great power and a small 
state. Despite its relatively large geographic size as an archipelago, the Philippines as a small 
state is commonly viewed as weak, vulnerable, and defenceless because of its limited 
economic resources and weak military that generally highlight the common notion of 
‘smallness’ in International Relations.  This is especially evident in relations between great 
powers and small states with an apparent power asymmetry. But what about the power play 
between small states with approximately similar capabilities? Based on the Filipino officials’ 
statement, its perception on Taiwan seemingly evokes an impression of ‘strength’ for the 
Philippines.    
Using the case of the Philippines, this study seeks to expand and deepen 
understanding on the small states, which is generally overlooked in the field of International 
Relations. This is mainly because the focus in world politics is on a few “great powers”-- its 
authority and influence, and its rise and fall. There is also an increasing literature on “middle 
powers” described as politically and economically significant countries that seek their own 
                                                          
1 Statement by an anonymous insider from the Court of Appeals of the Philippines in Jomar Canlas, 
“Malacañang Hand Shows in Deportation of Taiwanese,” Manila Times, 18 February 2011.   
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role and advocacy on global issues (Jordaan 2003, 166). Interestingly, the limited academic 
discussion on the small state is quite paradoxical, considering that the international system is 
for the most part made up of small states. 
The minimal attention on small states are due to the fact that they are generally seen 
as lacking in conventional dimensions of power. According to Chong and Maass (2010, 381), 
they are deemed inconsequential in international relations--- hence the peculiar terminology 
of great powers, middle powers, and small states. There are few scholars that employ the 
term ‘small power’ (Rothstein 1968 and Kassimeris 2009), describing a political entity with a 
certain degree of influence that may impact world politics.  Yet most literatures commonly 
use ‘small state’ instead of ‘small power’ to emphasize its presumed deficiency in relative 
strength.   
Such reality affirms the general notions of the “inequality” of states in the 
international system. This is quite evident in spite of the universal principle that “all sovereign 
and independent states were in theory equal, whatever might be their responsibilities or 
physical strength” (Nicolson 1961, 137).  From a legal point of view, all sovereign states, great 
or small, are equal before the law. However, from a political stance, they are far from equal 
(Neumann & Gstöhl 2006, 5).  In fact, the presumed equality of all states did not prevent the 
great powers from subjugating and dominating the small states. As evidenced in several 
periods in modern history, the great powers generally ignored or treated them as “vassals 
rather than as equals” (Vandenbosch 1964, 294). 
Because of this inequality, most academic research on small states are focused mainly 
on small states’ political interactions and military vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the great powers 
(See Fox 1959 and Höll 1983).  In fact, small states are contrasted--- either explicitly or 
implicitly-- with the great powers and, to some extent, middle powers and not with other 
small states. This is the common theme in small state studies, which is regarded as a 
mismatch, considering that the disparity in capabilities between great power and small states 
is clearly evident.  According to Handel (1990, 36-37): “One should not compare apples and 
pears. Since the gap between the military capacities of weak states and great powers is so 




1.1 Research Questions and Objectives 
Therefore, analysing relations between well-matched states largely reduces such gap 
in academic literature. The questions worth exploring must then shift focus away from small 
state interactions with great powers, which may inadvertently overlook its other important 
relationships with fellow small states. This study then concentrates on the behaviours of small 
states towards each other and the logical reasons behind them, which provides a different 
angle in small state studies.  
Thus in studying the behaviour and interaction between states of relative power 
parity, how does a small state behave when in conflict with fellow small states? Does it project 
a ‘smaller’ or a ‘weak’ stance relative to its peers? Or does it display a ‘greater’ or ‘strong’ 
attitude towards it? Since this study focuses on the behaviour and interaction between small 
states, how does one evaluate its weak or strong behaviour compared to another? And upon 
evaluating its actions, could it possibly project a semi-weak or a semi-strong behaviour 
indicating its partial weakness or strength relative to others?  
 Aside from determining a small state’s weakness or strength, there is also an array of 
external behaviours that must be considered when dealing with its counterparts on important 
issues.  Because of this, it is difficult to establish a definitive dichotomy between weak or 
strong behaviours, since the various conduct of a small state present critical nuances that 
affect its weakness and strength. What then are these external behaviours? How do they 
affect a small state’s overall weak or strong behaviour? Identifying these behaviours 
essentially reveal the variety of a small state’s actions and their impact on its general conduct 
towards its fellow small states.     
Meanwhile in examining the behaviour of small states, it is also important to 
comprehend the reasons behind its actions. Thus when confronted with a bilateral conflict, 
why does a small state act the way it does? What is the underlying logic behind its external 
behaviour? And with an understanding of the rationale behind its actions, what are then the 
general characteristics of a weak behaviour or a strong behaviour of a small state? Essentially, 
this can be analysed by examining its foreign policy and the various factors that shape it. It 
provides the reasons behind certain behaviours at particular times. Hence, understanding a 
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small state’s foreign policy is necessary in examining the pattern of its behaviour, and 
eventually the typical features of a small state.     
In addressing these questions, the following research objectives are presented below 
using the Philippines as a case to understand a small state’s external behaviour and foreign 
policy during its interactions with fellow small states:  
First, this study proposes and employs an evaluative measure to determine whether 
the Philippines’ behaviour is weak or strong relative to other small states. This involves the 
issue power balance and the issue outcome between the Philippines and its counterpart. Such 
evaluation provides an approximate indication of either a complete or partial weakness and 
strength of the Philippines’ behaviour. 
 
Second, this study seeks to identify and analyse the external behaviours of the 
Philippines amidst issues or conflicts with other small states. These behaviours are based on 
the situation that the Philippines is involved in; and the actor that it has to deal with, which is 
its fellow small state. The analysis of these external behaviours contribute to the overall 
assessment of the potency of the Philippines’ conduct in its bilateral engagement.    
 
Lastly, this study examines the foreign policy of the Philippines as a small state that 
provides the basis of its external behaviour.  It discusses the leadership, political, and bilateral 
determinants in the country’s foreign policy. Each of these determinants has internal and 
external factors. These factors correspond to a particular state behaviour, which offers an 
explanation to the Philippines’ conduct on an issue with another small state.    
 
1.2 Focus of the Study 
To contribute to the scarce literature on small states, this study features the 
Philippines--- its external behaviour and foreign policy in the context of its interactions with 
fellow small states. Using the Philippines as the focus of this study can serve as a relevant 
reference for other small states since it possesses the following characteristics:    
One prominent characteristics of a small state that the Philippines possess is that it 
suffers from limited economic resources. Even with a growing population of about 106.5 
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million (ranking 13th largest in the world),2 the Philippines posted an estimated Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of USD 331.68 billion in 2018.3 It also ranks 126th out of 185 for its 
GDP per capita of USD 3,104 in 2018.4 This falls below the accepted minimum for developed 
country status, estimated to be at least USD 25,000.5  
And despite its massive arable land with its territory of 342,353 km² in land area 
(ranking 64th largest in the world),6 the Philippines has failed to fully develop its agricultural 
sector that accounts for 10 percent of its local economy. The sluggish development of its 
agriculture contributes to its worsening poverty in the country, with 21% of the population 
living below the national poverty line in 2015.7 This accounts for 22 million Filipinos or one-
fifth of the country's population. As a developing economy, these statistics effectively limit 
the policy options of the Philippines in its conduct in the international community.  
Secondly, the Philippines as a small state also possesses a weak military given its 
economic deficits. This proves the general notion that a country’s defence capability is 
dependent on its financial capacity (Dumas 1990).  Since the Philippine military has been 
underfunded for the past 50 years, it can mostly afford second-hand equipment from the US 
and Japan. Moreover, it possesses aging warships, inferior aircrafts, and archaic weaponry. 
Its firepower therefore pales in comparison with its neighbours, such as Vietnam, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, which already have submarines (Acosta 2015). Though there is already a 
significant increase in the defence budget for the country’s military modernization, the fact is 
that the Philippines is upgrading from a very low base. According to Parameswaran (2017), “it 
merely spends around 1 percent of its GDP on defence, which is less than the Southeast Asian 
average of over 2 percent of GDP.” These deficiencies render the Philippine military one of 
the weakest in Asia.  
                                                          
2 “Philippines Population 2018,” World Population Review, January 24, 2019, 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/philippines-population/.  
3 “Philippines Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2018 in Current Prices,” January 24, 2018, 
https://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2018-gdp-by-country-data-and-charts.  
4 “World GDP Per Capita Ranking 2018, Knoema, April 15, 2019, https://knoema.com/sijweyg/world-gdp-per-
capita-ranking-2017-data-and-charts-forecast.  
5 “Philippines GDP Per Capita,” CEIC 2018, viewed March 2, 2019, 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/philippines/gdp-per-capita.  
6 “Largest Countries in the World by Area 2019,” World Population Review, January 24, 2018, 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-in-world-by-area/.  
7 “Basic 2017 Statistics,” ADB, April 2017, https://www.adb.org/publications/basic-statistics-2017.  
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Such decrepit state of the Philippine military makes it difficult for the country to 
achieve security.  This is especially alarming considering that the country faces a range of 
internal and external challenges that includes local insurgencies, natural disasters, and 
unresolved territorial and sovereignty issues with neighbouring states. In particular, an urgent 
security priority is the protection and defence of the country’s territory in the West Philippine 
Sea (an area within the South China Sea), which requires a “minimum credible defence 
posture.” This entails the establishment of an “effective force presence inside the Philippines 
and its exclusive economic zone with exhibited competence to defend and protect its national 
interests if and when the need arises (Depasupil 2014).” But without modern military assets 
and high-tech equipment, the Philippines will have to contend with its modest defence 
capabilities to ward off threats in its maritime borders. 
Yet despite its economic deficiencies and inadequate military that are common 
features of a small state, the Philippines also fits other essential characteristics of a small 
state. Its ‘power’ exemplifies its derivative strength that goes beyond its underlying 
weaknesses.  In his study on the “European Union as a Small Power,” Toje (2010) outlines 
some of the important traits and behavioural patterns of small states, which the Philippines 
exhibits.    
As a small state, it utilizes its political capital in the international community, no matter 
how limited, to pursue its national interests. In its maritime claims in the South China Sea, the 
Philippines has consistently elevated its narrow security interests of territorial sovereignty as 
part of the global commons. Constrained by its limited resources and complex geographic 
location, the country has continually internationalized its maritime security issues to court 
attention and gain support. Doing so also reflects its strategic predisposition to constantly 
examine its hierarchy of risks and to set clear priorities in addressing the most critical through 
its policy actions (Baviera 2016).  
In addition, small states such as the Philippines are active participants of multilateral 
institutions that are used as venues to advance its interests. Cooper, et al. (1993, 19-20) 
describes them by “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, 
their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their 
tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy.” 
Generally, small states will often “seek to minimize the costs of conducting foreign policy and 
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will increase the weight behind its policies by engaging in concerted efforts with other actors 
(Toje 2010, 29).” This is particularly reflected in the Philippines’ regular engagement in 
multilateral institutions such as the UN and WTO, as well as its active involvement in regional 
organizations such as ASEAN and APEC.  
Moreover, its participation in international establishments enables it to adopt ‘moral’ 
or normative policy positions (Baviera 2016). The Philippines’ arbitration case against China 
over the South China Sea, filed in January 2013 under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), reveals its respect and application of international law. Eventually, 
the arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines declaring that it has exclusive sovereign 
rights over the West Philippine Sea, and that China’s “nine-dash line” (covering almost the 
entire sea) is invalid. The Philippine government’s adherence to international law is regarded 
as “the best equalizer among claimant nations, both big and small, in resolving the dispute 
(Del Rosario 2015).” As with other small states, the country’s high regard for the rule of law 
is pushed forward in order to strengthen their own positions and to reduce the dominance of 
great powers (Toje 2010, 30). 
The Philippines’ Bilateral Relations  
 Despite its derivative power and external influence (albeit limited), the Philippines 
exhibits a marked inferiority vis-à-vis other states, particularly compared with the US and 
China. Its behaviour and interactions with these great powers reflect the “smallness” of the 
Philippines because of the apparent power disparity.    
 As a small ally, the Philippines is perceived to be subservient to the US. This 
observation is reinforced by perceptions of a “mendicant” foreign policy that is largely pro-
American (Murfett 2012, 66). The 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty, for instance, is criticized for 
having ‘empty declarations’ without an automatic US military assistance in case the 
Philippines is attacked (Arcellana 1981, 67).  
 As a small claimant state, the Philippines is also seen as an inferior underdog that is 
‘bullied’ by China over its maritime claims in the South China Sea. Over the years, the country 
has been intimidated by the Chinese government with its superior naval forces patrolling the 
disputed waters, violating its sovereign rights within its exclusive economic zone. The Chinese 
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Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2010) justified such behaviour by declaring that: “China is a big 
country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.”8  
Yet despite its relative weakness, the Philippines capitalizes and exploits its relations 
with these great powers. Since it cannot obtain security by solely relying on their own 
capabilities, a small state makes the most of the benefits and the support it can get from 
them. For instance, the Philippines relies on the US for assistance to enhance its national 
security; while it also seeks China for trade and investments, and counts on Japan for loans 
and development assistance. 
But while the interactions between the Philippines and these great powers continue 
to generate robust academic and policy discussions, there is meagre attention regarding its 
relations with other small states. This is quite unfortunate considering that the Philippines 
also has frequent interactions with them regarding important economic and security matters. 
In particular, the country faces similar challenges with them such as terrorism, poverty, and 
climate change, among others.  This consequently encourages international cooperation 
especially with several countries in Southeast Asia.  
But the bilateral issues confronting the Philippines and other small states are worth 
noting, particularly the power dynamics between them. When analysed in comparison with 
their approximate power capabilities, it reveals which state behaves ‘smaller’ or ‘weaker.’  For 
instance, the perception of the Filipino official on Taiwan as a ‘small country’ reveals how the 
Philippines as a small state can view another as ‘smaller.’ Thus, the comparative ‘smallness’ 
of Taiwan (despite its large and more advanced economy) relative to the Philippines during 
their bilateral interactions, make for an interesting case for academic analysis. 
1.3 Significance of the Study  
Using the Philippines as its focus, this study seeks to contribute to the limited 
academic literature on small states. Focusing on them can enrich the field of International 
Relations as much as the great powers or middle powers. According to Neumann and Gstöhl 
(2006, 4): “The available case studies in International Relations heavily concentrate on great 
                                                          
8 Statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in the 2010 ASEAN Summit in Vietnam, Storey, I 2010, 
‘China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less Charm, More Offensive,’ China Brief, vol. 10, no. 25, pp. 1-13, viewed 




powers, and thus look at only one particular sample of states. By taking small states into 
account, International Relations would profit empirically by gaining new data. Studying states 
in all their diversity may well contribute to the advancement of the IR theory.” After all, small 
states may pursue different goals and policies worth studying.    
However, this academic work intends to go beyond discussions on small state 
interactions with great powers.  These have already been dealt with at length in a number of 
studies that are mostly written in the US and Europe (See De Raeymaeker et al. 1974; 
Rothstein 1977; and Reiter & Gärtner 2001). Instead, this study aims to provide a different 
angle in small state studies that highlights their behaviour and relations between each other.  
The preliminary step in studying small states is to evaluate their behaviour relative to 
another small state. An inquiry on its different actions and conduct in relation to other small 
states can provide an understanding on their power dynamics. Comprehending how a small 
state interacts with each other, particularly when confronted with political or security issues, 
has considerable utility in predicting its future behaviour and the issue outcome.  Moreover, 
examining small states in bilateral contexts reveal how they distinguish themselves, and how 
they project power relative to their counterparts with approximate economic and military 
capabilities. 
Following an analysis on its external behaviours, it is also important to examine a small 
state’s foreign policy that shape its conduct and relations with other small states. According 
to Ingebritsen (2006, 290): “Students of International Relations benefit from an ‘inside-out’ 
study of the foreign policy making of smaller states in the system.” Since most of the academic 
discussions on small states focused on their conduct in the international system, this study is 
relevant because it explores the different internal factors that explain their external 
behaviour. As argued by Kassimeris (2009, 85): “Understanding all the variables that factor 
into the decisions of governments of small states would, indeed, be a contribution to the core 
literature on foreign policy and international relations.”   
This academic analysis on the external behaviour and foreign policy of a small state is 
expected to provide practical utility and reference for policy makers and practitioners in the 
government. The use of the case studies in this paper aims to inform the various stakeholders 
in foreign policy and national defence. The important insights derived from the cases in this 
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study can serve as guidelines for the prediction of external behaviour and the assessment of 
foreign policy of a small state.     
With a focus on the Philippines, this study seeks to increase the samples of small states 
and the context wherein they are examined.  There are already several case studies of small 
industrialized nations such as Austria, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland, which are 
apparently confined in the European context. According to Ingebritsen (2006, 288), most of 
the existing literatures on small states are “Eurocentric,” reflecting the “path-dependent 
development of a unique group of well-situated states” in the international system. Thus, an 
analytical expansion to other regions in the developing world is necessary to widen 
understanding of small states. This study’s feature on the Philippines can be an insightful 
contribution to the literature, and can widen the field of inquiry as the country is situated in 
Asia, home to several small developing countries and the site of looming security flashpoints. 
This study’s emphasis on the small states’ behaviour and interactions from the 
Philippines’ perspective can also contribute to the field of International Relations. Analysing 
the power politics between the Philippines and other well-matched states will certainly have 
some resonance with other small states in different regions such as Africa, Europe, and Latin 
America. It is hoped that the analysis on the strength and weakness of the Philippines’ 
external behaviour will provide insights for others to effectively manage their bilateral 
relations with small states.  
Using the Philippines as a case study, an awareness of the conception and logic behind 
a small state’s foreign policy is also essential since it provides the fundamental basis of its 
external behaviour. An examination of the Philippines’ foreign policy can explain how its deals 
with other states amidst conflict situations. Doing so reveals important insights which may be 
relevant and similar to the foreign policies of other small states. These insights are also 
expected to be relevant in understanding the conduct of other small states in international 
affairs. 
 In general, the multifaceted yet fascinating nature of small states does not warrant 
the limited studies on them. There is no doubt that these states are worthy of scholarly 
attention, despite being underestimated and overlooked in world politics. This is because 
disregarding or neglecting them “not only reflects negatively on the relevant discipline, it 
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seriously undermines the dynamics of the international system and the kind of hierarchy that 
describes it” (Kassimeris 2009, 99). Essentially, the focus on small states should balance out 
the disparity in academic research between small and larger states. According to Ingebritsen 
(2006, 290): “The increasing field research outside the focus on great powers may well 
supplement our reading lists with examples of anomalies in power relations, which more 
effectively captures the day-to-day politics in our global world.” Studying states in all their 
diversity and how they operate in the international system may well contribute to the 
advancement of International Relations.  
1.4 Chapter Outline   
 The following is a brief overview of each chapter in this study:  
 Chapter 1 introduces the value in analysing small states in the field of International 
Relations. It highlights the main research questions and objectives with a focus on the 
Philippines. In addition, this chapter introduces the Philippines as the case for analysis on 
small states. It also promotes the significance of this study and its academic contributions on 
small state studies.   
 Chapter 2 features a review of related literature. It discusses the available scholarly 
works on small state studies, which emphasizes on the characterization and the approaches 
in examining small states. It also provides an overview of power in inter-state relations that 
is considered relevant in understanding a small state’s weak or strong behaviour compared 
to another. Moreover, it offers a review of the previous work on state behaviour and provides 
an examination on the significance of foreign policy analysis in understanding a state’s 
conduct in the international community. Based on this review of scholarly literature, this 
chapter identifies existing research gaps to which this study seeks to address.     
 Chapter 3 showcases the conceptual framework that organizes the analysis on the 
small state. This study presents an original framework featuring evaluative measures that 
determine whether a small state projects a weak or strong behaviour. It then identifies the 
various discrete external behaviours that influence the overall behavioural assessment of a 
small state. The framework also examines the small state’s foreign policy--- its determinants 
and the corresponding explanatory factors that provide the reasons behind its behaviours. 
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Moreover, it provides the theoretical perspectives that link each external behaviour to every 
explanatory factor in the small state’s foreign policy.   
 Chapter 4 highlights five important cases involving the Philippines’ behaviour and 
interactions with fellow small states. It first explains the method employed in the data 
gathering for these cases, which involves personal interviews (primary sources) and the use 
of published materials and references (secondary sources). It then discusses the 
operationalization of the concepts and theories in the conceptual framework and applies it in 
the cases between the Philippines and other small states. The discussion in each case 
concludes with an evaluation of the Philippines’ weak or strong behaviour relative to its 
counterpart.  
 Chapter 5 focuses on the analysis of the cases. It essentially describes the Philippines’ 
foreign policy---- its leadership, political and bilateral determinants, each of which has its 
explanatory factors. These factors provide the rationalization on why the Philippines projects 
certain behaviours in its interactions with other small states when confronted with a bilateral 
issue or dispute. 
 Chapter 6 concludes this study by reviewing the research questions and objectives 
raised in the first chapter, and specifically addressing them. Drawing from the analysis in the 
case of the Philippines, this chapter also offers relevant insights that can serve as guiding 
principles in understanding a small state’s policy and behaviour, and how these determine its 











REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
Studies on Small States in International Relations 
 
This chapter presents a review of the existing literature on small states to identify the 
gaps in academic discussion. Firstly, it describes the status of small state studies in 
International Relations, where there is limited research and less academic interests compared 
to the field’s fascination on great powers, and to some extent, middle powers. Secondly, it 
provides the varied characterizations of small states, to which there is no widely-accepted 
definition since identifying a small state is an exceptionally difficult endeavour.  
In relation, this chapter presents the various approaches in studying small states and 
emphasizes the need to go beyond utilizing objective and subjective methods in analysing 
them. Instead, it argues for a relational approach that examines small states in its engagement 
with other countries based on its power relations.   
Yet generally, the available scholarly works on small states mostly centres on their 
interactions with great or middle powers. This discrepancy in power relations has long been 
the focus in small state studies. Thus, this study aims to contribute to the academic literature 
on small states by focusing on their interactions and the power dynamics with fellow small 
states.  
 In addition, this chapter underscores the small state’s external behaviour as the 
manifestation of its relative power towards another. Meanwhile, its external behaviour is 
explained through the various factors that influence a small state’s foreign policy. While there 
are numerous academic resources on state behaviour and foreign policy in general, there are 
only a few scholarly discussion that relates them to small states.  Thus to address this 
deficiency in the field of International Relations, this study concentrates on the external 
behaviour and foreign policy of a small state and how these influence its weakness and 





2.1 History of Small State Studies  
Academic interests on the small states had featured various themes at different 
junctures in history. At the end of the First World War, a number of new small states emerged 
out of the ruins of the old territorial empires. Scholarly attention was then centred on their 
chances of economic and political survival, which seemed doubtful at the start (Höll 1983, 
14).  During the Second World War, the security of small states became the main focus of 
discussion as the war threatened their very existence. This was underscored in Annette Baker 
Fox’s (1959) book entitled The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II, which 
examined the behaviour of small states in Europe and how they conducted diplomacy during 
the war.  Her seminal work marked the beginning of a genuine school of small state studies.  
Eventually, small states attracted international attention during the 1960s and 1970s. 
By then, these nations grew in numbers after gaining their formal independence from their 
imperial rulers. During this period of decolonization, the importance of these former colonies 
became evident with the resurgence of nationalism among them. This trend was also 
reinforced by the principle of self-determination promoted by the United Nations (Kassimeris 
2009, 85-86). However, the fundamental question remained the survival of small states 
among the bigger powers, despite their emancipation from their colonial dependence and 
the fundamental changes in the international system after the two world wars (Höll 1983, 
15).   
Meanwhile during the Cold War, studies on the small states focused mainly on security 
interests and included discussions on their foreign policy options. Robert Rothstein’s (1968) 
book entitled Alliances and Small Powers examined the historical behaviour of small nations 
within alliances amidst great power politics. In addition, David Vital’s (1980) The Inequality of 
States explored the precarious situation of the isolated, unaligned small states in the 
international system. However, according to De Raeymaeker (1974, 15): “None of these 
studies exhaust all aspects of the small states’ foreign policy. Necessary analysis on the small 
states’ capabilities, determinants, motivations, and behavioural patterns during the Cold War 
and the era of peaceful coexistence were lacking.” 
Eventually, the 1980s saw a diversity of themes explored to further understand the 
small states. Literatures published during this period dealt with the economic development 
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of small states. Clark and Payne’s (1987) Politics, Security and Development in Small States, 
and Butter’s (1985) An Introduction to Mini-Economics analysed the economic issues faced by 
these states. In particular, Katzenstein's (1985) Small States in World Markets stood out as it 
discussed how small states cope with an increasingly interdependent economy. Yet these 
contributions concerned mainly on specific problems of small states in the European context.    
Gradually, small states in the developing world have gained academic attention. 
Scholars described them as having small domestic markets and scarce natural resources with 
high costs of production and low economies of scale (Höll 1983 and Handel 1990). Krasner’s 
(1981) article on Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why 
discussed how small developing countries operate in the international economy. Such 
analysis on how small states adapt to international regimes and institutions eventually 
became an essential platform for developing nations. This consequently renewed academic 
interests on small state studies in the 1980s.  
Meanwhile, the modern changes in the 1990s generated further interests in small 
states. During this period, the rise of information technologies and the gradual elimination of 
barriers to trade in the context of globalization and regional integration were evident. For 
Neumann and Gstöhl (2006, 11): “These improvements in communication and transportation, 
as well as the liberalization of the movement of goods, services, capital and even persons, 
rendered borders less meaningful to the benefit of small states.” At the same time, external 
security issues regained prominence during the Cold War as a result of the disintegration of 
several multi-ethnic countries that threatened the stability of small states (Zahariadis 1994 
and Jazbec 2001). This period saw the revival of small states studies as scholars seek to 
analyse how small states contend with the evolving economic and security environment.   
From the 1990s until the turn of the century, the focus on small states has included 
not only security and economic matters, but also norms and ideas in their foreign policies. In 
particular, Ingebritsen (2002) argued that small states can influence international affairs in 
her article Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics. Björkdahl (2002) also 
emphasized the preference of small states for globally-accepted norms in her work entitled 
From Idea to Norm: Promoting Conflict Prevention. She stressed that small states may not 
only engage in bargaining with larger nations, but they can also construct more favourable 
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identities based on international norms in their relationships with them. These scholars have 
essentially shifted their focus from previous academic discussion on small states regarding 
concerns on material power (or lack thereof) to approaches in employing global norms to 
advance their foreign policies.   
Yet despite existing literatures, there are still some deficiencies in the scope and issues 
in scholarly discussion on small states. Though there is general interest, academic attention 
on small states is rather sporadic, while systemic and in-depth studies are quite limited. 
Knudsen (2002, 182) poses the question of “where do small state studies find themselves at 
the present juncture?” and concludes with this reply to his own musing: “apparently, not at 
the forefront of world affairs.” This observation is likewise reinforced by Neumann and Gstöhl 
(2006, 12): “There has been no continuous flow of research on small states, which makes 
small state studies a relatively young discipline, occupying a niche position in International 
Relations.”    
2.2 The State of Small State Studies 
The few and inadequate academic studies on the small states is brought about by 
general perceptions of its limited impact in international affairs. Compared with great powers, 
small states are mostly seen as passive actors that cannot affect the configuration of the 
international system. The common assumption is that small states are much restrained by the 
nature of the systemic structure, while the great powers can alter the system without 
suffering grievously (Handel 1990, 45). In fact, these great powers continue “to take the 
initiative, make alliances, stand at the head of coalitions” (Aron 1967, 83). In some cases, small 
states are only noticed if they are perceived as useful or threatening to the great powers’ 
global interests. According to Rothstein (1968, 13): “In theory, and with a number of 
exceptions in practice, the formal operating principle was clear: the great powers, in concert, 
were to decide; the small powers were to obey.” 
 
 This resulted in the general bias towards the study of great powers in the field of 
International Relations at the expense of small states. This is because great powers are at the 
core around which international politics evolve, with less emphasis on the power politics of 
lesser states (De Raeymaeker 1974, 16). According to Christmas-Møller (1983, 39): “Small 
states have long suffered from benign neglect in International Relations” since great power 
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politics and their global impact are deemed to stimulate more academic interest. Evidently, 
“large states initiate considerably more events than do small states, reflecting a higher level 
of international activity overall” (East 1973, 165). In empirical terms, states may only be 
relevant if they have pertinence for major outcomes in the international system. Accordingly, 
this underscores the widespread idea that important events must have important causes, 
which results in an analytical bias for great powers that are widely-perceived as the only ones 
capable of causing great events in world history (Neumann & Gstöhl 2006, 23).   
 
The limited attention on the small states in International Relations is also brought 
about by the predominance of scholars coming from the “great powers.” The bias towards 
the great powers, particularly from American and British scholarship, has long been perceived 
as a deficit in the academic field. According to Neumann and Gstöhl (2006, 22): “The US is a 
great power, and so a great power perspective came to embed itself in the IR literature. 
Before the Second World War, IR was a British discipline, and Britain remains the second most 
important node. The next two states on the list of where to find IR scholars would probably 
be Germany and Japan, which also have a great power history.” For Höll (1983, 41): “This 
means that the production of political scientific knowledge and the consequent influence on 
the minds of the public is largely a prerogative of the scientific great powers.”  
 
Meanwhile, the few scholars who engage in small state studies typically come from 
small states. According to Knudsen (2002, 187): “Academics from small countries write about 
their own countries because that is where they have an advantage in knowledge, possibly also 
because that is where the demand is.” Moreover, most of their studies are published in their 
national languages and, when written or translated in English, are printed in journals based 
outside of key “IR countries” such as the US and the UK. Rather than “making a mark in 
mainstream debates, their work tends to remain unnoticed” (Neumann & Gstöhl 2006, 22). 
Therefore, the study of small states has little visibility in the field, which led to an “astonishing 







2.3 Categorizing the Small State   
Even with the few existing literature, small state studies are not well established, given 
the difficulty in identifying them as a distinct and separate category. According to Höll (1983, 
43): “To the same extent that nobody has denied the existence of small states, nobody has so 
far denied the validity of what one might call the ‘ideal types’ of the definition.” In effect, the 
constant challenge is to draw boundary lines to distinguish small states from other groups of 
states.    
This problem led to the introduction of the different categories of states. For Handel 
(1990: 10): “The traditional theories in International Relations take the unequal distribution 
of strength among states into account by recognizing the existence of a pecking order of 
states based upon five gradations: super powers, great power, middle powers, small powers 
(states), and mini-states.” For Höll (1983, 43), the relevant groupings are limited to four: great 
powers, middle powers, small states, and microstates, which are commonly used in the 
literature in International Relations. These categories essentially produced various nuisances 
in determining which class a state aptly belongs to.   
Because of these classifications, small states are generally defined by what they are 
not. Generally, they are identified by their alleged ‘non-greatness.’ Unlike the small state, a 
great power is a state “whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps 
decisive, impact on the international system” (Keohane 1969: 296). And according to 
Neumann and Gstöhl (2006, 8-9):  “Small states also border on two even more weakly-defined 
sub-categories: the middle powers and the microstates.  
While it is easy to separate great powers and small states, it is rather tricky to 
distinguish small states with the middle powers. Unlike the small states, middle powers are 
those that consistently insist on being referred to as such like Australia, Canada, or South 
Korea (Patience 2014). They may convincingly argue that they have achieved prominence in 
some other regard in international affairs. Essentially, middle powers have moderate 
influence and sufficient strength to stand on its own without the help from others unlike the 
small states (Jordaan 2003, 167).  
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Moreover, small states are different from microstates. If small states occasionally 
overlaps with the ‘middle power’ category, it also coincides with an equally vague category 
of ‘microstates.’ According to Neumann and Gstöhl (2006, 6): “Microstates are those 
countries whose claim to maintain effective sovereignty on a territory is in some degree 
questioned by other states, and that they cannot maintain what larger states define as the 
minimum required presence in the international society of states (membership in 
international organizations, embassies in key capitals, etc.).” Unlike the small states, 
microstates have fewer resources for their full representation and active participation in 
various international institutions.   
Though identifying groups of countries is necessary to distinguish a small state, placing 
it strictly in its category should not always be a permanent classification. Indeed, nobody 
doubted the existence of small states, and there seems to be a general idea of what might be 
considered their typical characteristics. However, it is important to note that “the political 
world is not clearly organized in distinct groups but on a continuum, with transition from one 
category to the next” (Höll 1983, 40).  
2.4 Defining the Small State 
The indefinite classification of states ultimately leads to the difficulties in clearly 
defining the small state. In fact, research on the small states has long been afflicted by the 
problem of definition of its own subject matter. The question ‘what is a small state?’ has 
generated various answers. Yet despite decades of study, scholars (Amstrup 1976, Pace 2000, 
and Henrikson 2001) have concluded that no internationally-established and academically-
standard definition has been found. Jazbec (2001, 36) effectively summed up this dilemma: 
“There is general agreement that there is no satisfactory and acceptable definition of small 
states.” 
Essentially, most of the literatures reveal that the ‘small state’ remains poorly defined. 
No unanimous definition of the small state has yet emerged, despite various characterizations 
and descriptions. For Mass (2009, 69), the root of this definitional problem is in determining 
the ‘smallness’ of states:  “While the existence of small states as a distinct category of states 
is generally accepted, no consensus exists about what characteristic(s) determine(s) state 
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size. In other words, how is one to define the small state, if its key qualities are not universally 
agreed upon?”  
Because of this issue, some scholars avoided any attempts to define the ‘small state.’ 
Scholars such as Sveics (1970) and Singer (1972) have also found the problem of size so 
complex that a definition should not be sought. Indeed, identifying small states was a very 
difficult task because there was a lot of different criteria used. According to Amstrup (1976, 
165): “Whatever scales of magnitude are employed seem arbitrary and it is difficult to pick 
out on them where smallness begins or ends.” As a result, several literatures on the small 
state (Fox 1969 and Mathisen 1971) opted not to address the various concerns regarding state 
size, perhaps because they deem it as irrelevant or difficult to solve. 
In fairness, many studies on the great and middle powers do not make an attempt at 
defining their subject first either. For Handel (1990, 48): “It is impossible to define any of the 
groups of states in the international hierarchy in one concise, precise, and elegant statement. 
In terms of strength, states are not static entities. Their position on the continuum is 
constantly being challenged, tested, and changed.” Even if certain key qualities were 
identified and seen as dominant features, the ranking of these characteristics of states may 
shift over time (Schou and Brundtland 1971).  
For some scholars, the different types of states may be deemed obvious enough 
without strictly classifying them based on rigorous definitions. According to Handel (1990, 
31): “Either a general consensus on the nature of the states has been assumed, or else the 
discussions included implicit definitions, expressed in the choice of states discussed and in 
the analysis of their various characteristics and problems.” Such approach of not providing 
exact definition might be justified, particularly in studying small states. For Eek (1971, 11), the 
term ‘small states’ is thus considered “a practical, conventional term useful as such but 
evades definition.”   
Such vague reference on the small states has eventually provoked criticisms against 
their relevance as an analytical concept. Baehr (1975, 459) even concluded that “the 
definitional problems were so great as to make the concept of smallness useless as a tool in 
understanding international relations.” However, Mass (2009, 66) firmly disagrees with the 
above statement: “Such universal dismissal of the small state as an analytical concept goes 
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too far. Not only is the small state a fact of international political life, but it has also proven 
to be a useful tool for analysis.” In fact, the lack of an agreed concrete definition of small 
states has marked “the body of literature that might be termed small state studies (Neumann 
and Gstöhl 2006, 8-9).” 
Given the absence of a common definition, a varied and flexible set of description and 
criteria can better describe the small state. As Mass (2009, 76) explains: “such flexibility 
certainly limits definitional precision, but it might be more conducive to describing the small 
state accurately.” Indeed, this lack of consensus resulting in the various definitions of small 
states both complicates and encourages small state studies. In any case, the unresolvable 
definitional dilemma of small states has not hindered scholarly research.  
Small states are therefore loosely characterized, not only to cope with this problem, 
but also to accommodate its diversity. Since they form the largest group of states in the 
international system, the small state category has the most diverse membership. Hey (2003) 
differentiates two types of small states: “those in the developed world such as Austria, 
Belgium, Luxemburg; and those small states in the so-called third world, including former 
colonies in Africa and Asia, many of which are larger in size than the former group.” Indeed, 
this diversity among small states is so great that scholars such as Vlekke (1958) question 
whether it is permissible at all to speak of the “average small state.”  
Yet according to Handel (1990), it is possible to describe small states on the basis of 
their common features prevalent among many of them. In fact, various scholars have 
attempted to describe the ‘small state’ in spite of the absence of consensus over its definition.   
Some of them like Vital (1967, 3) focuses on its lack of resources: “A small state is more 
vulnerable to pressure and more likely to give way under stress because the smaller the 
human and material means of a state, the greater are the difficulties it must surmount if it is 
to maintain any valid political options.”  
Others like Rothstein (1968, 29) underscores its inadequate capacity to achieve 
security: “A small state cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and 
that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or 
developments to do so.”  
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Meanwhile, Fox (1969, 751-752) emphasizes on its minimal influence and expendable 
interests in the international system: “Small states recognize that their own state’s political 
weight is limited to a local arena rather than a global one, and that their particular state’s 
interests may be dispensable in the eyes of one or more great powers.”  
These scholars essentially highlight a few common characteristics of a small state. 
Given their definitions, small states are depicted based on their weaknesses and inferior 
status in most academic literature. In quantitative terms, most of them possess small 
populations, undersized territories, and developing economies. They share common 
attributes highlighting their inadequate resources, limited capabilities, and low impact in 
international affairs. However, understanding these states involves more than focusing on 
their weaknesses, which are commonly viewed as permanent features of their existence.  
2.5 Approaches in Studying Small States  
Such characterization is based on measurable standards that reveal one of the 
approaches (and arguably the most conventional of all) in studying small states. According to 
Geser (2001), this approach uses an ‘objective’ criteria based on the size of its territory or 
population to indicate its substantial smallness (eg. Monaco). However, Rapaport et al (1971, 
29) claims that “a small state should not be described in terms of autonomy, territory, and 
population, as ‘smallness’ is almost impossible to define.” It is important to go beyond the 
apparent obsession with ‘size’ as a criteria based exclusively on physical attributes, which has 
earlier dominated small state studies. Instead, Mathisen (1971, 17) argues that a small state 
should be better analysed for its political bearings, rather than the objective qualities that it 
possesses (or lacks). With an emphasis on its limited political influence, it is therefore 
essential to recognize that in small state studies, there exist a “large” small state (based on 
its considerable geography but with less political sway) and a “small” small state (having a 
modest geographic size and various political constraints).   
Another approach that is less prominent in the analysis of small states uses the 
‘subjective’ perception. A small state is defined through the subjective perception of oneself 
or from others--- to establish its attributive smallness (eg. Croatia).  This implies that, if a 
state’s people and institutions generally perceive themselves as small, or if other countries 
view that state as small, it shall be so considered. According to Hey (2003, 3), “the research 
28 
 
on small states, despite its attempts at formal definitions, is best characterised by an ‘I know 
one when I see it’ approach to choosing its subjects of inquiry.” Hey’s approach in 
identification concurs with other scholars such as Rothstein (1968) and Keohane (1969), who 
have earlier argued that “the psychological dimension should complement any objective 
criterion by which to define smallness.” Yet such perception-based approach invokes even 
more varied interpretations of what a small state is, which are prone to further debates and 
questions.  
Due to the deficiencies in using either the objective or subjective standards, the 
‘relational’ approach is a better alternative, which this study shall employ. For Geser (2001), 
a small state can thus be identified through their relations with other states, which focuses 
on relative ‘smallness’ in comparison to another (eg. Malta-Belgium, Belgium-Germany). This 
reinforces Neumann and Gstöhl’s (2006, 6) argument that “smallness is a comparative 
concept.”  It implies going beyond the “limited understanding of state size based exclusively 
on physical attributes and capabilities” (Hänggi 1998, 81). According to Hey (2003, 186): 
“Since smallness as a relative phenomenon entails an initial comparison, this is the 
foundational beginning of the analysis.” Thus in studying small states “emphasis must shift 
from quantitative to qualitative criteria” (Mass 2009, 72). After all, in the study of 
International Relations, it is not the size of a state which matters but rather its relative 
strength or weakness (Aron 1967, 55).  
2.6 Power Dynamics in Small State’s Bilateral Relations 
The analysis on the disparity of strength and weakness between small states can be 
attributed to power. The discrepancy is particularly evident between small states and great 
powers (as well as middle powers) because of their substantial differences in material 
capabilities and aggregate resources. Since power can be examined in relative and reciprocal 
relationships, the general assumption is that great powers and middle powers are able to 
exercise power and their influence over a small state.  
However, there are some constructive insights in the limited literature on small states 
that contradicts this general assumption. It might be expected that the small state with 
inferior power capabilities would most often be ‘defeated’ in a dispute, but this has not always 
been the case for a variety of reasons. According to Jensen (1982, 216), a small state may be 
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able to “compensate for its limitations through superior strategy. Similarly, the willingness to 
sacrifice and suffer may enable it to ultimately prevail,” as in the case of Vietnam during its 
war with the US.  
Barston (1971, 46) also notes that, “if a small state occupies territory of strategic 
importance to a larger state, it may be able to exercise bargaining influence disproportionate 
to its ‘objective’ or limited capabilities.” This observation suggests that the ‘field of play’ may 
be as important in the bilateral relations, particularly during negotiations when both states 
consider their respective resources and capabilities.  
Bjøl (1971), meanwhile, argues that “a small state’s ability to resist doing what a great 
or middle power want it to do is also a critical source of small state power, even if it does not 
have the ability to persuade the more superior state to do something” (36). Thus, the small 
state’s ability to hold out, or to ignore a demand made by the stronger state, may allow it to 
achieve its preferred outcome.   
For Fox (1959 and 1969), small states can also outwit great or middle powers by 
concentrating their entire attention on the specific issue being negotiated. Since large states 
must generally spread their attention over the entire international system, small states are 
often able to concentrate on issues and can potentially achieve a more favourable outcome 
for them.  
These sources of power can result in a favourable outcome for small states when 
dealing with great or middle powers. This essentially reveals that they are by no means 
entirely weak and powerless. Despite their inherent weaknesses based on the objective 
criteria of ‘size’, small states possess internal and external sources of strength that they can 
use to advance their own national interests. According to Purnell (1973, 98): “Small states are 
great powers writ small. They behave as much like great powers as they can. They belong to 
an international order which requires them to exercise what power they have.” They also 
have the capacity to “steer their fortunes amidst a seemingly forbidding structure of 
international society” (Chong and Maass 2010, 381). Literature titles and catchy slogans such 
as the “power of the weak” (Wolfers 1962), “tyranny of the weak” (Suhrke 1973), “weak but 
not meek” (Fox 1969), and “the big influence of small allies” (Keohane 1971), all point to their 
power potential.  
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Although they are generally perceived as lacking in the material dimensions of power, 
small states also possess the capacity to influence. Over the years, the study on small states 
has focused on their increasing role in the international system. Although they are not the 
main actors, their roles are neither marginal nor irrelevant. In political interaction, small states 
are known “to play significant roles in multilateral negotiations” (Lindell & Persson 1986, 79). 
They are active participants in various international and regional organizations such as the 
United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), which put them on an equal legal and diplomatic footing with larger countries. They 
play important roles as norm advocates and norm entrepreneurs, particularly among small 
states in Europe (See Björkdahl 2013 and Crandall & Collin 2015). This is affirmed in several 
academic studies highlighting their complex voting behaviour and negotiation skills in 
institutionalized multilateral settings (See Vandenbosch 1964 and Thorhallsson 2012).   
Evidently, a small state in itself and with the cooperation of others, can project 
influence in international affairs and can derive power when dealing with more superior 
states. In particular, the manner in which a small state can utilize its power to achieve its 
preferred outcome in its relations with great powers generate interesting insights in their 
power dynamics. This can provide a stimulating discussion on small states, which has often 
been regarded as the underdogs constantly at the losing end in inter-state negotiations.   
But since this study employs the relational approach in analysing small states, it seeks 
to focus more on evaluating relations between small states rather than their interactions with 
great powers. Juxtaposing small states with great powers is considered to be a mismatch, 
which unfortunately has long been the common subject in small state studies. This study then 
seeks to fill in this gap in academic literature by focusing on the interactions between small 
states and its peers.  
Though they may possess approximate power in material resources, small states 
however are not equal, particularly when confronted with specific issues. Such inequality is 
exposed through their behaviour and relations toward each other. For Russett and Starr 
(1981, 124), this inequality concerns not only the attributes of power, but also focuses on 
power during the process of interaction, which can predict how one state will behave towards 
the other. Since small states are generally deemed as deficient in material capabilities and 
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aggregate resources, their power asymmetry can be evaluated through their actions, 
particularly in times of conflict with each other. Thus, this study veers away from focusing on 
a small state’s material power, which does not fully explain unexpected outcomes over issues 
between them. 
While material power is relevant in analysing states, it must not be viewed as the 
primary factor in examining state behaviour and interactions. Vital (1971) distinguishes power 
between “permanent and intrinsic” resources and “ephemeral and contingent” resources. 
The former represents a state’s fixed, material power that is deemed less important in 
determining conflict outcomes than the latter, which are those resources relevant to the 
specific issue at hand.    
This proves that the strength of one small state towards another may not be based on 
material power. According to Snyder and Diesing (1978, 190): “The military inferiority of one 
state may be compensated by its greater interests engaged, thus making it ‘more resolved’ 
during a crisis than its opponent. A military stronger opponent may be ‘less resolved’ if it does 
not value its interests as highly as the other.” Moreover, a small state may be more creative 
compared to the other in managing a conflict or bilateral negotiations. Lockhart (1979, 133) 
terms it as “resourcefulness,” which he defines as “recognizing options usable in the conflict 
episode at hand.” Both these behaviours suggest that “an asymmetry in the evaluation of 
stakes may offset an asymmetry in the national power of the participants in a struggle” (93). 
This essentially reveals that the potential behaviour of small states engaged in conflict may 
be somewhat unpredictable than the inherent inequality in their material power suggests.  
2.7 External Behaviour of a Small State 
There are numerous studies on state behaviour (small states and otherwise) that have 
long been published. Some of them are based on a collection of “events data,” involving a 
state’s behaviour during both peace and crisis situations. One of these pioneer studies can be 
attributed to Charles McClelland’s (1961) work entitled The Acute International Crisis, in 
which he advocated the “construction, in chronological sequence, of profiles of behaviour 
exchanged between countries over time… By analysing the full configuration of sequential 
behaviour in specific situations (acute international crisis), a more complete understanding of 
the complex processes of interaction would be gained.”  
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McClelland’s work was considered as the foundational basis for other event data 
analysis. According to Laurance (1990, 113), “the essence of these event data analysis process 
was the coding of discrete events and the aggregation of these events to depict trends and 
patters.” Long-term studies such as the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) 1966-1978, 
Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) 1948-1978, and Comparative Research on the Events 
of Nations (CREON) 1959-1968 were considered as useful references in identifying a state’s 
behaviour.  
The main purpose of these events data was to set up early warning systems that would 
alert policy makers to crises in the making around the world. However, interests waned as 
few truly unique theoretical findings emerged.  In hindsight, the purpose of these studies 
could never live up to their promise (Laurance 1990, 114). According to Hudson (2005, 10), 
“the collected events could be had from other sources, such as newspaper or other sources 
on international affairs, and so were nothing without the theory to explain and predict their 
occurrence.” Thus determining external behaviour, especially that of the small states when 
confronted with international issues or conflict situations with others, would be inadequate 
without the theories that account for their possible manifestations. This study then proposes 
relevant concepts that relate to a state’s external behaviour with emphasis on the small 
states.  
Moreover, while the events data analysis identifies the external behaviours of a state, 
there are only a few scholarly works that can evaluate the weakness or strength of its 
behaviours relative to another. The most relevant among these publications is typically 
related to inter-state negotiations. Some works in this area (See Habeeb 1988 and Pfetch 
2011) focused on cases in international negotiations with relative asymmetry between two 
states. However, there is a dearth of research on negotiations between small states based on 
relative symmetry in power capabilities.  
By borrowing the principles behind the dynamics in inter-state negotiations, this study 
can generate insights into the external behaviours of a small state when dealing with its 
counterparts in a bilateral dispute. Despite their approximate power capabilities, small states 
undergo “asymmetrical bargaining if only because their resources and individual attributes 
are unlikely to be identical (Habeeb 1989: 1).” Such inequality between small states can 
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determine its weak or strong behaviour relative to another, as will be discussed in full detail 
in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3 and in the Methodology and Operationalization of 
Case Studies in Chapter 4.  
2.8 Foreign Policy Explaining External Behaviour of Small States   
These external behaviours of a small state can be explained by examining its foreign 
policy and the factors that shape it. Wilkenfeld et al. (1980, 110) views foreign policy as those 
“official actions (and reactions) which sovereign states initiate (or receive and subsequently 
react to) for the purpose of altering or creating a condition (or problem) outside their 
territorial-sovereign boundaries.” Foreign policy provides the underlying logic behind the 
patterns of behaviour of a state. According to  Clarke and White (1989, 5), it also “enables the 
observer to make certain generalized statements about the goals that states pursue, the 
range of instruments that they use, who actually makes foreign policy as a result of what 
influences, and so on.”   
Understanding a state’s foreign policy provides the reasons behind certain behaviour 
at particular times. This is typically difficult to establish since a state’s foreign policy is 
“determined by hundreds of highly variable and idiosyncratic factors” (Fearon 1998). These 
factors that are internal to the state include the interior structure, institutional 
characteristics, and political forces in its bureaucracy. Meanwhile, other idiosyncratic factors 
also influence a state’s behaviour. According to Baviera (2012), some of these idiosyncrasies 
include the “amount of leverage one country has over another, personal rapport or enmity 
between their leaders, strong or weak domestic support for a party in power, information 
available to one side but not the other, the psychological state of the decision-maker at the 
time a foreign policy problem emerges, among others.”   
Moreover, a state’s power dynamics with another influence its behaviour. Generally, 
a state’s foreign policy towards a more superior state tends to be deferential and compliant; 
while its policy towards a less superior counterpart is inclined to be more overbearing. Both 
these policies are likely to result in particular state behaviour and certain patterns depending 
on its relative strength and weakness towards another. A noticeable power disparity between 
two states may have these predictable behaviours; however, a seeming power parity 
between both may be worth exploring as their behaviours may not be as predictable. This is 
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especially true of small state interactions with fellow small states, where their behaviours 
(shaped by their own foreign policies) can either be weak or strong relative to another.  
 Generally, comprehending a state’s foreign policy is largely a challenging endeavour, 
even in the analysis of a small state since it is subject to rich conceptualization and 
interpretation. While there are commonalities, there are also some factors in a small state’s 
foreign policy that may be different with great powers. As will be explained in the Case 
Analysis in Chapter 5, these prominent factors may be peculiar to small states such as their 
less-developed political institutions, emphasis in its unique national interests, or 
dependence/interdependence in its bilateral relations. They are all considered important in 
explaining the logic behind the behaviour of small states that this study aims to analyse.      
 The field of International Relations necessitates the expansion of scholarly discussions 
on small states, since they populate the global community. The nascent status of small state 
studies can be further developed by focusing on their interactions between each other. It can 
also benefit from an analysis of its external behaviour and foreign policy, which should 
generate relevant insights and produce important principles that may be relevant to other 
small states.  
 The theories, concepts, and hypothesis behind the external behaviour and foreign 
policy shall be discussed in the Conceptual Framework in the next chapter. These are 
expected to serve as scholarly tools to further understand the dynamics of small state 
interactions that would resonate with other small states.  This should thus contribute to the 









CHAPTER THREE  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
External Behaviours and Foreign Policy of a Small State  
 
This chapter provides an analytical guideline that examines the behaviour and policy 
of the small state. Though both are related, they are regarded as separate entities in this 
study. The ‘behaviour’ refers to a small state’s outward actions, while ‘policy’ denotes the 
underlying rationale behind the occurrence of these behaviours.  
 
This distinction between policy and behaviour consequently deviates from the 
common notion of ‘foreign policy,’ which is usually understood to include “both behaviour 
and the underlying purposes that give some coherence to it” (Callahan (1982: 293). This study 
also diverges from Joynt’s (1964, 189) definition of foreign policy that involved the “courses 
of action in pursuit of national objectives… and the specific goals, principles, or guides that 
are suitable to the attainment of the ends sought.” Moreover, it differs from Plano and Riggs’ 
(1973, 76) characterization of foreign policy, which merely focused on action, “claiming that 
a nation’s policy is what it does.” And most importantly, this study digresses from the more 
confounding concept of ‘foreign policy behaviour,’ which emphasizes on “behaviour as 
elements of a policy even if the goals and plans of that policy are unknown” (Hermann 1978, 
33).  
 
In this study, foreign policy is regarded mainly as the goals, intentions, and strategies 
of the state, while behaviour is the action that is treated as the unit of observation. Given this 
distinction, it then seeks to simplify the conceptual definition of behaviour in the context of 
foreign policy. Instead of using the term ‘foreign policy behaviour,’ this study employs the 
term ‘external behaviour,’ referring to the observable actions committed by individuals on 
behalf of the state. The term is an expedient reference underscoring the country’s actions, 
and setting it apart from the psychological constructs of goals and intentions associated with 
foreign policy. Its use is intended to give vocabulary simplicity and a more coherent dichotomy 




  Further, this study clarifies the distinction between evaluating a small state’s 
weakness or strength in its external behaviour, and assessing the characteristics of a weak or 
strong small state, which have different political connotations. In Political Science, a “weak 
state” or a “strong state” depends on an evaluation of the state’s capacity (or lack thereof) to 
penetrate the territory it governs, implement its policy autonomously from social groups, and 
professionalize or institutionalize its bureaucracy (Soifer and vom Hau 2008).  However this 
study does not refer to them and instead centres on analysing the strength and weakness of 
a small state’s “external behaviour” vis-à-vis other small states.  
 
After clarifying the important terms above, this study puts into theoretical context the 
concepts employed in the analysis of small state interactions. It recognizes the influence of 
neorealism or structural realism in the field of International Relations. This theory suggests 
that, because of the anarchic structure of the international system, small states are fearful of 
one another. They recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the 
better their chances of survival and the better they can protect their interests (Mearsheimer 
2014). Based on this neorealist/ structural realist’s school of thought, the issues and conflicts 
between small states point to the influence of relative power and varying capabilities. Both 
of these essentially affect a small state’s external behaviour and foreign policy towards 
another.        
 
With a neorealist/ structural realist theoretical background, this study uses the 
inductive approach in analysing small state interactions. According to Bernard (2011), such 
approach involves the search for pattern from observation and the development of 
explanations for those patterns through a series of hypotheses.” And based on this study’s 
inductive approach, this chapter organizes its discussion on small states based on the 
following order:  
 
The first half examines the external behaviour of the small state. As the main theme 
of this study, it initially evaluates the behaviour of a small state by proposing measures to 
determine its weakness or strength relative to another. It also identifies the various types of 
external behaviour that provide nuances in an otherwise simplified weak-strong dichotomy. 
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They are also regarded as important elements that influence the overall weakness and 
strength of the small state.   
 
The second part of this chapter features the foreign policy of the small state, which 
provides the logical reasons behind its external behaviours. Using the levels of analysis 
framework, a small state’s foreign policy is examined through its individual, state, and 
bilateral determinants and their corresponding explanatory factors, which account for its 
distinct behaviours.  
 
The last part of this chapter focuses on the theoretical perspectives that connect the 
external behaviours and foreign policy of the small state. These theoretical perspectives 
explain the occurrence of a small state’s external behaviours through its foreign policy. 
Essentially, they are the general orientation that provides the logic behind the causal link 
between policy and behaviour.  
 
3.1 Evaluative Measures Determining Weak or Strong Behaviour of a Small State  
 In understanding inter-state relations, it is deemed important to assess the weakness 
or strength of their behaviour relative to another. According to Hermann (1978, 34): “A 
behaviour is the discrete purposeful action viewed as the observable artefact of a political 
level decision of an individual or group. It is not the decision, but a product of the decision.” 
To determine a small state’s weak or strong behaviour in a given situation necessitates an 
evaluation of its attitude and actions towards another.  
   
Such evaluation requires borrowing from the field of international negotiations to 
understand the dynamics of power between states. This study therefore refers to William 
Habeeb’s scholarly work entitled Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak 
Nations Bargain with Strong Nations published in 1988. Essentially, his research analyses a 
state’s power and the tactics it employs. He argues that the basis of a state’s weak or strong 
behaviour is essentially analysed by looking at power on two levels: the aggregate and the 




Habeeb explains that aggregate power refers to a state’s resources and position in the 
external world as a whole (1988: 17). It is defined as the total (or aggregate) possessions in 
its economy, military, and demography. Since aggregate power is measureable, it can also 
determine the global position of the state. It basically recognizes the “power structure in the 
international system,” which provides a hierarchical definition that identifies great, middle, 
and small states.  
 
Such aggregate power is emphasized in the neorealist/ structural realist’s school of 
thought that seeks to attain ‘balance of power’ that shapes international relation. According 
to Waltz (2000), there are two ways in which states balance power: external and internal 
balancing. While external balancing arises when states enter into alliances to check the power 
of more dominant states, internal balancing occurs when states grow their own capabilities 
by increasing economic growth and/or military spending, pointing to an increase in aggregate 
power.  
 
However, Habeeb (1988: 18) argues that aggregate power should not be treated as 
the only politically relevant component in international relations. Though it is useful in 
providing an overall “picture” of the state’s global position, it has less weight in analysing the 
role of power in bilateral interactions in general, or international negotiations in particular. It 
does not fully describe the power structure of issues and relationships.    
     
Whereas aggregate power is concerned with a state’s capabilities and position vis-à-
vis the external environment as a whole, the issue-specific power is concerned with the state’s 
capabilities and position vis-à-vis another state in terms of a particular mutual issue. In his 
work, Habeeb (1988: 19) explains that issue-specific power focuses on the “power structure 
of a relationship,” and is most relevant in the analysis of international negotiations, “since 
negotiation presupposes at least two actors and at least one issue.” 
 
Issue Power Balance  
 
 Since the emphasis of this study is on small state interaction, it focuses on power at 
the issue-specific level. This is deemed as the basis of the evaluative measures used in this 
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study to assess the weakness or strength of the small state’s behaviour. It is essentially 
determined by a state’s “power balance” in an issue-specific relationship with another, 
instead of the “aggregate power balance,” which focuses on material resources (economy, 
military, and demography among others). Based on Habeeb’s (1988) scholarly contribution 
on international negotiations, the “issue power balance” highlights the following variables 
(21-22): 
  
A. Alternatives- denote a state’s ability to gain its preferred outcome from a 
relationship or from another source besides the other party. The availability of 
alternatives can increase a state’s issue power balance by decreasing its 
dependence on the other. Conversely, a lack of alternative may weaken a state’s 
position by increasing its dependence on the other party.    
  
B. Commitment- refers to the extent and degree to which an actor desires and/or 
needs its preferred outcome. With greater commitment, a state’s behaviour 
would be more directed and dedicated, thus increasing its issue power balance. 
However, a greater desire or need for a preferred outcome would also mean that 
the other party (the source of that outcome) would have more leverage.  
 
C. Control- points to the degree to which a state can unilaterally achieve its preferred 
outcome despite the costs involved in doing so. It speaks of the state’s ability to 
gain a greater share of its preferred outcome than the other party does, reflecting 
an increase in issue power balance. But if there is less ability for a state to achieve 
its preferred outcome, then the issue power balance decreases.   
  
Essentially, the issue power balance assesses a state’s dependence over the other. As 
explained by Habeeb (1988, 23): “the side with greater issue power in all or any of the above 
variables will be less dependent on the other party for outcomes. Meanwhile, the extent to 
which each side can alter its dependence depends on the extent to which it can compensate 
for any weaknesses in the above variables.” Therefore despite the seeming power parity 
between small states based on their aggregate power or material resources, their interaction 
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in a given bilateral issue or conflict may reveal dependence or weakness of one state relative 
to another.   
 
Issue Outcome  
 
 This study applies Habeeb’s (1988) variables of “issue power balance” as discussed 
above. And building on his suggested variables, this study formulates an original set of 
evaluative measures based on “issue outcome” to complement Habeeb’s “issue power 
balance.” By examining the ending or conclusion of a bilateral conflict, a small state’s 
behaviour can be deemed as weak or strong based on the following variables:  
 
A. Concession- posits that both states start at some point of stalemate and must 
make a choice to converge towards an outcome. A state that faces more costs if 
an issue prolongs, will likely concede faster relative to the other party. A state that 
faces less costs if an issue prolongs, will likely take longer to concede to the other.   
 
B. Position- identifies if there is an unchanged or altered stance regarding a specific 
issue than initially manifested by the state. A ‘position change’ reveals that the 
state has been influenced by the other party. A ‘no position change’ manifests the 
state’s ability to hold out, ignore, or resist doing what the other wants to do.  
 
C. Objective- describes the aim or goal of a state as the preferred outcome in an 
issue, and compares it with the eventual outcome. A state can either achieve or 
fail to reach its objective in an issue or conflict with the other party, depending on 
its ability, resources, and behaviour. 
 
Connecting Issue Power Balance and Issue Outcome 
 
Using Habeeb’s (1988) variables in issue power balance based on international 
negotiations, this study relates them with its own recommended variables in analysing a small 
state’s behaviour in an issue outcome. Whereas the issue power balance points to the course 
of a state’s bilateral interaction in a conflict, the issue outcome indicates the consequence or 
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impact to the state on such interaction or conflict.  This study then links the individual 
variables in both issue power balance and issue outcome. Since each variable is connected to 
the other, their correlation is presented in the following hypothesis that are originally-
conceived in this study:  
 
A. Alternative ↔ Concession  
If a small state can find or create more alternatives to achieve its preferred outcome, 
it will have few concessions to make with the other.  
If a small state has few or no alternative to achieve its preferred outcome, it will have 
more concessions to make with the other.  
 
B. Commitment ↔ Objective  
If a small state has high commitment in the pursuit of its preferred outcome, it will 
likely achieve its objective.    
If a small state has low commitment in the pursuit of its preferred outcome, it will 
likely miss its objective.  
 
 C. Control ↔ Position 
If a small state has strong control to push for its preferred outcome, it will not have a 
change in position in its policy or action towards the other.      
If a small state has weak control to push for its preferred outcome, it will have a change 
in position in its policy and action towards the other.      
 
The correlation of these variables between the issue power balance and issue 
outcome provides a general assessment of a small state’s weakness or strength in its bilateral 
interaction. This should serve as an “initial estimation” of its behaviour based on these 
evaluative measures at the conclusion of each case or issue with another small state.  
 
Combining Habeeb’s (1988) lists of variables on issue power balance and this study’s 
original set of variables on issue outcome, the table below presents a summary of the basic 
characteristics of a small state’s weak or strong behaviour. This study particularly arrived at 
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the following description of weak or strong behaviour as a result of the evaluation of the 
variables in issue power balance and issue outcome. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the characteristics of Weak or Strong Behaviour of a Small State based 
on Issue Power Balance and Issue Outcome9 
 
Weak Small State 
Behaviour 
Issue Power Balance Issue Outcome   
Few Alternative More Concession 
Low Commitment Missed Objective 
Weak Control Position Change 
Strong Small State 
Behaviour 
More Alternative Few Concession 
High Commitment Achieved Objective 
Strong Control No Position Change 
  
Meanwhile, the figure below is a visual representation of the evaluative measures 
composed of the issue power balance and issue outcome, which determines a small state’s 













                                                          
9 Variables from issue power balance are taken from Habeeb (1998). The variables from the issue outcome, 
and its combination with its counterparts from issue power balance, are the original conception by the author 
of this study.    
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Figure 1: Evaluative Measures that determines a Small State’s Weak or Strong Behaviour 




In this figure, the two small states are represented by two rhombus that are equal in 
size, symbolizing their approximate power parity in aggregate or material resources. The 
focus of this study is the behaviour between small states, particularly small state 1 (grey 
rhombus at the top) towards small state 2 (dark rhombus at the bottom). To understand the 
behaviour of small state 1 requires the evaluation of its issue power balance and issue 
outcome (represented in the two partitions inside the grey rhombus) in its interaction with 
small state 2 in the context of a bilateral issue. This evaluation eventually determines whether 
small state 1 displayed a weak (left small rhombus) or strong (right small rhombus) behaviour 
relative to small state 2.   
 
 
                                                          
10 The concept of issue power balance is based on Habeeb’s (1988) work on inter-state negotiations. Its 
consequent issue outcome is an original conception by the author of this study, which seeks to determine a 
small state’s weak or strong behaviour relative to another.     
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3.2 External Behaviours of a Small State 
 While the above measures can broadly determine a small state’s weak or strong 
behaviour, there are also other behaviours that affect its overall weakness or strength. These 
behaviours present nuances or gradations, which consequently blurs the clear-cut dichotomy 
of weak or strong behaviour of a small state as discussed earlier.  
 
 Identifying these behaviours are important to have a concrete and definable unit of 
observation that are comparable and can be operationalized when studying small states. 
According to Hermann (1978, 35): “Each separate behaviour is the result of some political- 
level decision within the national government that can produce new action. It has a basis for 
inferring the boundaries of behaviours. In effect, a behaviour is a concrete phenomenon in 
that it has a location in time and space; and has a beginning and an end.”   
 
 However, this study emphasizes more on discrete behaviour rather than patterns of 
behaviour. For Salmore and Hermann, et.al (1978, 196): “The basic distinction between the 
two is that the former explains a particular behaviour in a specific incident; while the latter 
explains behaviour aggregated across a period of time (number of years).” Basically, a discrete 
behaviour characterizes a single state action with no aggregation over time. Moreover, “any 
means of conceptualizing state behaviour that gives a distinct meaning to each occurrence of 
the action, is a discrete behaviour” (197).   
 
 Identifying these ‘discrete external behaviours’ of a small state is considered 
necessary in characterizing its government’s actual response and actions. This can be deemed 
insightful and beneficial for officials and policy makers concerned with specific events in 
international affairs. It can also be used in forecasting, “to the extent that a discrete behaviour 
is a function of certain identifiable and recurrent properties of relationships,” (Salmore and 
Hermann, et.al 1978, 196). Focusing on this type of behaviour is especially relevant since most 
of what goes on in international affairs is essentially the actions of one or more states. 
  
This study formulates two new categories of these discrete external behaviours based 
on a small state’s approaches and/or attitude towards a ‘situation,’ as well as its action and/or 
reaction towards an ‘actor.’ Each category presents a set of behavioural dyads to provide a 
45 
 
clear distinction between two possible behaviours of a small state. This study uniquely 
invented these behavioural dyads signifying a pair of opposing behaviours. However, the 
definitions of each behaviour are derived from general glossaries and dictionary. This study 
then highlights its original inventory of behavioural dyads identifying possible discrete 
external behaviours of a small state categorized as follows:   
 
Situation-based Approach/ Attitude  
 
These are the approaches or attitude of a small state towards a situation or an issue 
concerning another small state. These include: 
 
A. Compounded- Conclusive Approach 
Compounded- makes a problem or difficult situation worse by relating them to 
another issue 
Conclusive- settles a question, issue, or conflict with decisiveness and certainty  
 
B. Proactive- Reactive Approach  
Proactive: seeks to create or control a situation especially before it happens  
Reactive:  acts in response to a situation particularly after it has happened 
  
C. Impassioned- Impassive Attitude 
Impassioned: reacts on what happens or what other states do with strong fervour and 
high emotions 
Impassive: accepts or allows what happens or what other states do without active 
response or resistance. 
 
Actor-based Action/Reaction   
 
A.   Cooperative- Combative Action 
Cooperative: involves the concerted efforts and collaboration with others. 





B.   Persuasive- Coercive Action  
Persuasive- induces states to act or do something usually through reasoning   
Coercive- pressures states to act or do something they are unwilling to do usually 
through threats  
 
C. Acquiescent- Defiant Reaction  
Acquiescent: accepts the situation without protest, or carries out what other states 
demand  
Defiant: expresses disposition to fight, challenge, or resist what other states demand   
 
 Both the situation-based approach/attitude and actor-based action/reaction provide 
nuances in a small state’s behaviour, which essentially influence its general weakness or 
strength. While the variables in the issue power balance and issue outcome can provide an 
‘initial estimation’ of a small state’s behaviour, these discrete behaviours provide the specifics 
on how and to what extent it is weak or strong.  
 
For instance, the general assumption is that a small state is deemed to be exhibiting a 
‘weak’ behaviour if it reflects a reactive approach in a given situation, or displays an 
acquiescent reaction to another small state. Whereas a small state is considered to be 
manifesting a ‘strong’ behaviour if it shows an impassioned attitude towards a specific 
situation or displays a defiant reaction towards another. These are some of the probable 
behaviours that may influence the weakness or strength of the state.  
 
However this study argues that this is not always the case, as revealed in the next 
chapter. Though there is a general tendency to easily view each external behaviour at its face 
value and judge it as “weak” or “strong” based on the nature of its action, the reality is that 
its evaluation is dependent on a case-by-case basis.  
 
For instance, a proactive approach of a small state in a given issue does not always 
result in a strong behaviour, while a cooperative attitude towards another small state may 
actually represent a weak behaviour. Thus, examining each external behaviour requires more 
attentive analysis that should essentially determine its impact and outcome during the case, 
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and should take into account the perceptions of case actors and external observers.  A 
detailed discussion of this is presented in the “Methodology and Operationalization of Case 
Analysis” in Chapter Four.  
  
 Yet what is certain is that these discrete external behaviours have considerable 
impact. In particular, they can generate gradations on each initial estimation of a small state’s 
weakness or strength. They may eventually produce an overall assessment of a semi-weak or 
a semi-strong behaviour, which indicates partial or some degree of weakness or strength. This 
implies the realistic probability that a small state may not consistently project a completely 
weak nor a fully strong overall behaviour.  
 
The figure on the next page provides an illustration on how these discrete external 






















Figure 2: The Impact of Discrete External Behaviours to the  




In this figure, the two rhombus on the left part illustrates the interactions between 
two small states. Both the issue power balance and the issue outcome serve as the evaluative 
measures in determining small state 1’s weak (small dark rhombus) or strong (small white 
rhombus) behaviour relative to small state 2.  
 
While these evaluative measures can initially determine the weakness or strength of 
small state 1’s behaviour, they are also influenced by its discrete external behaviours. 
Represented by the rhombus on the right, these external behaviours are composed of 
situation-based approach/attitude and its actor-based action/reaction. They essentially 
influence the weakness or strength of small state 1’s behaviour (represented by the dotted 
arrow). As a result, these external behaviours may produce a partial degree of weakness or 
strength, considered as semi-weak (smaller dark rhombus with dotted outline) or semi-strong 
(smaller white rhombus with dotted outline) respectively. This reduced degree of weakness 
                                                          
11 See the reference details on the left figure illustrating “bilateral interactions” on footnote 2.  The right figure 
illustrating “external behaviours of small state 1 is an original conception by the author of this study as 
mentioned earlier.       
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or strength of small state 1 is a valid behavioural probability towards small state 2. The 
succeeding chapter further explains this in more detail.    
 
3.3 Foreign Policy: Determinants and their Explanatory Factors 
 
After focusing on external behaviours, this study then discusses the foreign policy of 
the small state. In defining foreign policy, scholars tend to delimit the field and identify the 
subject matter. According to Wallace (1971, 7): “foreign policy is that area of politics which 
bridges the all-important boundary between the nation-state and its international 
environment.” Meanwhile, Levi (1970, 3) regards foreign policy as a “government’s definition 
of a state’s international objectives combined with a plan to reach them.” Thus, foreign policy 
involves relevant terms such as goals, objectives, values, preferences, and intentions---- which 
identify the reasons for state conduct.   
 
 Since foreign policy provides the logic behind a state’s external behaviour, this study 
underscores the connection between the two as separate entities. In fact, several scholars 
define foreign policy based on ‘action properties.’ This also reinforces Frankel’s (1963) 
description of foreign policy, which emphasizes “a government’s decisions and actions that 
involve relations between one state and others.” By taking conscious note of ‘action,’ 
Hermann (1972, 61) contends that “foreign policy’s major concern is the state’s behavioural 
output.” For Callahan (1982: 299): “policy is conceived as a standard used in making decisions. 
Its existence makes some kinds of behaviour more likely and other kinds of behaviour less 
likely.”    
 
 This study therefore discusses the foreign policy of a small state that should give 
coherence to its external behaviours. Understanding its foreign policy provides the answers 
behind the “why” questions of its conduct in international affairs. Such “why” question is 
usually difficult to resolve since foreign policy is determined by multiple variables and 
idiosyncratic factors (Fearon 1998). However, several scholars have previously described and 
explained why states make certain foreign policy moves at particular times by looking at 




  Hence, this study examines foreign policy determinants arranged according to the 
“levels of analysis” framework. It highlights relevant determinants (leadership, political, and 
bilateral) that are organized based on the three basic levels of analysis respectively 
(individual, state, and interstate). Doing so effectively delineates the scope of inquiry and 
seeks to go beyond “a description of policy past and present to investigating how foreign 
policy is made” (Clarke and White 1989, 5). 
 
 Each of these determinants provide several explanatory factors that offer a logical 
basis behind a state’s foreign policy. Hermann and East (1978) point to two approaches in 
analysing the explanatory factors in each of the foreign policy determinant. The single-factor 
approach focuses on specified elements such as power, leadership personality, and national 
interest, among others. However, its explanation may be unsatisfactory and “limited to those 
foreign policy occasions when the emphasized factor predominates” (16). Meanwhile, the 
multiple-factor approach offers an indiscriminate “shopping” list of numerous factors with 
less emphasis on how they theoretically affect foreign policy. Though it greatly enlarged the 
number of possible variables, it has minimal contribution to improve foreign policy analysis. 
 
 Because of the apparent inadequacies of using either one of these approaches, this 
study therefore combines the efficacy of the two--- considering the applicability of all related 
factors (multiple approach) and giving adequate attention to each of them (single approach). 
Essentially, it will neither use one over the other. Instead, this study will concentrate on 
analysing several yet relevant factors to explain a small state’s foreign policy. Because of this, 
it nominates the following foreign policy determinants and their corresponding explanatory 
factors that are most relevant in examining small states (particularly applying it in the 
Philippines’ case as the focus of this study):  
 
3.3.1 Leadership Determinants: Personal Characteristics and Global Perceptions 
 
The leadership determinant in a state’s foreign policy examines a leader’s policy 
choices as a decision maker and to what extent these make a difference in the state’s 
behaviour. Since foreign policy is the product of human agency, such determinant discusses 
the “individuals shaping the course of history, because it is their choices and decisions that 
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drive the course of events” (Breuning 2007, 11). Culling from studies of political psychology 
and cognitive theory, Alden and Aran (2012, 19) argues that it is important to “focus on the 
mind of the decision maker, its powerful effect on the framing of particular foreign policy 
issues, and the consequent impact on the formulation and selection of policy options.” 
Generally, these leaders acting in the name of the state significantly influence the actions of 
a state. Snyder et al (1962, 65) asserts that: “It is one of our basic methodological choices to 
define the state as its official decision makers – those whose authoritative acts are, to all 
intents and purposes, the acts of the state.” Thus, comprehending a state’s foreign policy and 
external behaviour require an awareness of its leaders’ idiosyncratic characteristics. 
 
Personal Characteristics of Leaders   
 
 State leaders can be examined based on their personal characteristics brought about 
by the following factors (among many others) that influence the policy choices and decisions 
they make:  
 
A. The ‘personality’ of a leader is regarded as predictors of his/her pronouncements 
and decisions and is also used as a basis on how the world sees them. It is essential 
to understand the personalities of leaders particularly in democratic societies. This 
is because they are forced to rely on their interpersonal skills and arts of 
persuasion to carry out their policies due to the inherent limitations on their 
institutional powers (Preston 2001). 
 
B. The ‘leadership style’ is also a significant element in the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy. Based on their personalities, leaders cultivate 
various styles in managing state affairs. While there are several studies identifying 
leadership styles, the Human Resource Development Quarterly (HRDQ) offers four 
simple and concise categories. These include ‘direct’ (envisioning the future), 
‘spirited’  (engaging others), ‘considerate’ (encouraging others), and ‘systematic’ 





Global Perceptions of Leaders 
 
 In addition, a state’s foreign policy can be examined based on the global perceptions 
of its leaders. These perceptions generally serve as a guide in their foreign policy choices. How 
situations are assessed will be based on a leader’s perceptions of reality that seeks to simplify 
and organize the external environment. Departing from ‘strict rationality,’ these perceptions 
provide insights into why a state behaves the way it does based on the way its decision makers 
defined their situation (Snyder et al 1962, 65). Based on their ‘definition of the situation,’ the 
leaders’ perception influence the decisions and implementation of their state’s foreign policy. 
It also introduces distortions in how leaders perceive reality based on three associated 
elements: 
 
A. ‘Belief’ refers to a leader’s fundamental assumptions about the world. Holsti 
 (1967)  and Verba (1969) argue that ‘beliefs’ affect a leader’s interpretation of  
 his environment and consequently the strategies that the leader employs;  
 
B. ‘Ideology’ involves a set of values and principles that determine and guide 
 his/her behaviour;  
 
C. ‘Images’ affect how a leader views international events as well as other 
 countries and  leaders. Such images are rooted in a leader’s stereotypes, biases, and 
 other subjective sources that are often shaped by the media (Boulding 1959). They 
 serve as a set of lenses through which information is received and are regarded as 
 personal assessment of the larger operational context (Brodin 1972, 99). Leaders 
 generally make judgments about the present on the basis of their images of the past 
 and their views on the consequences of previous decisions. 
 
Challenges in Examining State Leadership 
 
While it is important to analyse leaders in understanding foreign policy, such venture 
is generally considered a challenging task. Acquiring information about them is complicated 
because of what Arnold Wolfers (1962) called the “minds of men” problem. This requires 
getting ‘inside’ the minds of leaders to understand their attitudes and beliefs with respect to 
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a particular issue. And this is further complicated by the fact that the “individuals themselves 
may have difficulty in explaining why they pursued one course of action rather than another” 
(Clarke and White, 1989, 8). This is the reason why Wilkenfeld at al. (1980, 42) concludes that 
this “psychological domain is the most elusive and least amenable to systematic empirical 
analysis.” Hence, this dilemma impedes the explanation of a leader’s decisions and behaviour 
regarding his/her country’s international affairs. 
 
Yet despite the difficulties of direct observation, it is still possible to obtain data and 
make some fairly accurate judgments on state leadership. Indirect means will have to be 
utilized, which may include analysing speeches and public statements, drawing insights from 
public interviews or biographies, making inferences about traits and motivations from 
behaviour, evaluating his/her public reputation, or relating previous foreign policy decisions 
and actions to suggest a particular inclination. This indirect information should provide clues 
in understanding state leadership and an estimation of his/her foreign policy.  
 
3.3.2 Political Determinants: Political Institutions and National Interests 
 
Aside from individual leaders, the political determinants of a state are also vital in 
understanding its policies. This is to prevent “losing sight of the larger context in which the 
individual decision-maker operates” (Brodin 1972, 102). Thus, the political determinants 
present the internal dynamics that influence the decision-making process and 
implementation of foreign policy. The political regime in which a state operates, the 
institutional arrangements where policies are made, the domestic actors who make the 
decisions, the national interest and public opinion that motivate such decisions--- these are 
the important political determinants that shape the content and conduct of its foreign policy.   
  
Political Institutions of the State 
 
 The political institutions of a country serve as the organizational context in which 
policies are formulated. They essentially feature the political actors and the bureaucracy that 




In a democratic regime with a presidential system of government, these political 
actors serve within the three branches of government, each with distinct and independent 
powers and areas of responsibility. Though they are all separate and equal, members of the 
legislative and judicial branches of government have minimal roles in the making and 
implementation of foreign policy. For the most part, it is the executive branch and its 
extensive bureaucracy that assumes the primary role in the foreign policy process. 
 
Political Actors  
        
The executive branch of government is typically headed by the president. As the chief 
executive, he/she is allotted substantial power as the top decision maker, whose role is 
regarded as the focal point in foreign policy. According to Putnam (1988), the president has 
to operate within two competing frameworks with different rules and several operational 
logics – the external environment which is anarchic, and the domestic environment which 
operates under recognized rules. This essentially underscores that, while the president has 
substantial power in the pursuit of the nation’s foreign policy, he/she is simultaneously 
confronted with the challenges of addressing external forces and internal constraints such as 
domestic politics and institutional restrictions.  
 
Aside from the president, the bureaucrats also comprise the executive branch of 
government. In the field of foreign policy, most of these bureaucrats serve as Foreign Service 
Officers or diplomats. They are largely consulted regarding foreign policy matters and provide 
outputs that structure situations in which state leaders make decisions. For Alden and Aran 
(2012, 46), these outputs include “the information and foreign policy alternatives presented 
to the president; as well as the routine responses or the standard operating procedures 
(SOPs), which shape how foreign policy decisions of the president should be implemented.” 
 
These bureaucrats also serve as record keepers and the vanguards of institutional 
memory. They “provide a collective memorial of past actions, making current problem-solving 
simpler and more rational” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1979, 339). It is therefore expected that the 
president and the “central decision makers trust the expertise, predetermined preferences, 
and contingency plans already developed by the bureaucracy” (Krasner 1972, 176). In 
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addition, these bureaucrats play an important role in diplomacy as they possess the essential 
skills in dealing with foreign governments, either to cooperate or negotiate with them. 
 
 Besides the president and the bureaucrats, political appointees also compose the 
executive government and possess a substantial influence in foreign policy particularly during 
the decision-making process. Dubbed as the ‘in-and-outers’ of government, these political 
appointees are chosen by the president seeking to achieve his/her policies. Essentially, they 
are regarded as the president’s personal representatives who would argue for his/her views 
and advocacies in the bureaucracy. 
 
 Some of these political appointees typically serve as immediate advisers to the 
president. They normally have vested interests in providing the kind of information and 
recommendations that they believe their boss desires. In turn, the president tends to listen 
to their counsel, which sometimes confirms the president’s own predispositions (Jensen 
1982, 128). Other political appointees occupy high-level positions in government agencies 
and work with the bureaucrats.  
 
Bureaucratic Politics  
 
 The dynamics between these political actors in the bureaucracy tend to produce 
critical challenges in the foreign policy process of a state. Halperin et al (2006) points to the 
concept of “bureaucratic politics,” which focuses on how the various interests and priorities 
of different government agencies, departments, and individuals – and the conflicts among 
them – can influence how foreign policy is formulated and implemented.  Though 
bureaucratic politics is difficult to analyse as it requires intimate knowledge (particularly 
during the decision-making process), it is considered a useful concept to generate 
assumptions on a country’s foreign policy.  
 
 For one, bureaucratic politics is evident in the interaction between the tenured 
president and the permanent bureaucracy. There is often pressure and anxiety whenever the 
executive government undergoes leadership transition, which significantly affects a country’s 
foreign policy. An adjustment in foreign policy is directly related to the amount of change 
involved in the coming to power of a new administration. Salmore and Salmore (1978: 110) 
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explain that: “If the new regime consists of the same support groups as the one it follows, and 
perhaps even some of the same personnel, change is likely small. The less the old and new 
regimes have in common, the more likely there is to be change in policy. The more similar 
they are, the more similar their foreign policy.” 
 
Thus, the bureaucracy tends to adjust to the idiosyncrasies of each president, hoping 
to minimize differences between the past and present chief executive. Hermann (1980) 
generally describes this tendency as follows: “One head of state may focus foreign policy-
making within his own office, while his predecessor may have been willing to let the 
bureaucracy handle all but problems of crisis proportions. One head of state may be given to 
rhetoric in the foreign policy arena; while his predecessor may have wanted action” (11).
         
Secondly, there is a tendency for the bureaucracy to be politicized due to the presence 
of political appointees. The more there are layers of political appointees, the more the 
bureaucracy is politicized. Further, bureaucratic politics becomes apparent when bureaucrats 
have to deal with the president’s political appointees who may have limited foreign policy 
experience. Moreover, these appointees whose positions are coterminous with the president, 
seek to move up in their business or profession as a result of having served in the government. 
Most of them have further aspirations to run for elective posts in the future and believe that 
the publicity and prominence of an appointive office will further those ambitions (Hilsman 
1990, 152).  
Tensions often arise between the professional bureaucrats and political appointees 
when they possess conflicting views on foreign policy matters. Generally, political appointees 
are expected to accede to the expertise of the bureaucrats who are often more 
knowledgeable regarding foreign policy issues and the work of the government agencies they 
head. Yet the usual outcome is that the position and recommendations of the political 
appointees serving as advisers to the president or head of the department, trump those of 
the bureaucrats who work under them.       
  
Lastly, bureaucratic politics is reflected among the different agencies comprising the 
bureaucracy.  The executive government is expected to consider the different department 
agencies in its large bureaucratic structure, which may result in the slow and protracted 
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process in foreign policy decision making. Though they generate a wide range of alternatives, 
this also means that several layers of information relevant to rational decision making must 
be accounted for. Since foreign policy issues affect many agencies, “decision making is likely 
to proceed at a snail’s pace if all relevant agencies are provided with the opportunity to ‘sign 
off’ on a given report or decision” (Jensen 1982, 124).     
  
In relation, the executive government is inclined to oversee the diverse interests of 
these agencies. Some of these interests include augmenting their resources, furthering their 
ability to fulfil their stated missions, and maintaining morale among their personnel, which 
affect their foreign policy outputs (Halperin et. al 1971, 70). With their varying outlook on 
international affairs, these agencies struggle to establish policies that will protect, if not 
advance, their interests. The old phrase of "where you sit is where you stand" accounts for 
the idea that a particular agency’s bureaucrat will advocate on behalf of their organization's 
interests (Preston 2001), and not automatically the interest of the state.   
    
Understanding these political actors and their interactions in the bureaucracy provide 
an indication into the state’s level of institutionalisation. It is essentially affected by the 
bureaucratic politics among these actors operating in the state’s political institutions. 
Huntington (1968: 12) characterizes institutionalisation as “the process by which 
organizations acquire value and stability.” According to Salmore and Salmore (1978: 111): “A 
political regime that is highly institutionalized--- that is, autonomous from other centres of 
power in society, operating within the context of a complex and efficacious bureaucracy, and 
having structural arrangements and decision-making processes that are well-established--- is 
in a better position to act than one that does not enjoy these advantages.” In contrast, a 
political regime that is less institutionalized has more bureaucratic challenges in the 
implementation of its foreign policy and its conduct in the international community.  
Therefore, the level of institutionalisation influences a state’s foreign policy.    
     
National Interests of the State 
 
 National interests are considered as the constant driving force in a state’s foreign 
policy. These are the “perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other 
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sovereign states comprising the external environment” (Nuechterlein 1976, 247). National 
interests are also the motivational basis of a state’s foreign policy, which leaders often 
insinuate and refer to when explaining their country’s conduct in international affairs. 
Officials and scholars occasionally proclaim them as their state’s ambitions, ideals, and goals 
to the world by way of high-sounding declaratory statements. 
 
 But behind the public facade of high moral purpose exist real and tangible 
considerations of national interest. Aside from ideological interests, Nuechterlein (1976, 248) 
discusses two of the basic interests shared by all states in the international community. 
Security interests are the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of 
physical violence directed by another state, and/or the externally inspired threat to its system 
of government. Meanwhile, economic interests refer to the enhancement of the nation-
state's economic well-being in relation with other states. 
       
These basic interests do not suggest a higher priority for one over the other, since 
articulating and ordering them in a scheme of importance is the primary task of the state. 
Prioritizing is actually deemed a difficult endeavour as these interests are not mutually 
exclusive. The government is expected to effectively prioritize which interests are to be 
defended, and which (if necessary) are to be sacrificed in dealing with other states. 
Essentially, the state leadership must be able to make compromises and manage trade-offs 
in advancing the nation’s interests.        
  
Meanwhile, national interests bear a significant impact on public opinion as the state 
deals with pertinent issues in foreign affairs. Public opinion is a broad term that encompasses 
various sectors in a society. Rosenau (1961) studies public opinion based on a pyramid where 
the peak is the elite (the government, the legislature, and the media); the second level is the 
attentive public (intellectuals and business people); and the third level is the general public 
(who tend to be indifferent).  Generally, only a small section of the population (mostly the 
elites and the attentive public) is interested in foreign policy.  However, public opinion cannot 
be totally ignored since it sets both the motivation and restraint for government decisions on 
foreign policy making and implementation.        
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The relation between national interests and public opinion is important to understand 
the impact of foreign policy to a state.  For the government, the saliency of the international 
issue is dependent on its relevance to national interests. For the people, the level of public 
opinion on international issue is contingent on the impact of national interests to their own 
interests. Though it is usually less interested in foreign policy, the public may give it more 
attention when national interests directly affects them. According to Foyle (1997), routine 
issues related to diplomacy are not high on the agenda of national concerns, but economic 
and trade issues as well as questions related to war and peace arouse public interest. 
Essentially, when national interests generate strong public opinion, they significantly affect 
government’s foreign policy decisions that tend to be responsive to the appeals of its citizens. 
   
3.3.3 Bilateral Determinants: Power Capabilities and Asymmetric Relations 
 
Aside from the leadership and political determinants that are both internal to the 
state, there are also the bilateral determinants that influence a state’s foreign policy. They 
essentially explain the policies and actions of a small state in relation to another.  
  
Relative Power Capabilities between States 
 
 A state’s power in terms of its possessions is synonymous to the aggregate structural 
power, which typically involves an inventory of its resources. Such ‘power inventory’ generally 
includes a state’s human resources, geographic conditions, industrial capability, economic 
assets, advanced technology, and military forces. The resources that a state possesses or 
lacks, affects a state’s foreign policy choices and the menu of activity that it can afford to 
pursue. And if these are available to the state, it must operationalize such resources into 
capabilities, which Russett and Starr (1981, 136) regard as the ‘means’ part of the means-end 
process of foreign policy. They argue that what is possible for a state is dependent on the 
means at its disposal.   
 
 Meanwhile, analysing a state’s power in relational terms also emphasizes the use of 
its capabilities to affect the behaviour of others. The differences in the capabilities available 
to each state compared to another is referred to as relative power capabilities (Barbieri 1996). 
This is typically utilised by a state to project influence over another. This relational concept of 
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power goes beyond the possession of resources and centres on the actions taken by country 
A that cause a change in the behaviour of country B (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950). Using relative 
capabilities to influence others requires ‘power instruments’ that may be combined in a 
variety of ways. Goddard and Nexon (2016) categorise these power instruments as follows:  
 
 Military instruments are used to threaten or directly deploy warfare against a target. 
It can also include arms sales, defence pacts, access agreements, or any other mode 
of influence rooted in military capital. 
 
 Economic instruments make use of financial assistance, trade relations, economic 
sanctions, among others. They are used to gain influence over another state. 
 
 Diplomatic instruments involve a wide array of practices that includes representation 
and negotiation. It leverages on the social and political capital (commonly known as 
diplomatic capital) of state representatives or other actors  accumulated through 
cross-boundary interactions to influence countries.  
 
 Symbolic instruments centres on appeals to normative symbols as well as the 
provision of information. Discourses, propaganda, and narratives could be considered 
symbolic means of influence. A state might “accumulate” symbolic capital by 
successfully framing its policies as coinciding with the ideological preferences of 
another actor. 
 
Asymmetric Relations between States 
 
Another important factor that affects interstate relations is bilateral asymmetry, 
which shifts the focus away from the capabilities and power instruments used by the small 
states.  This asymmetry is particularly apparent in the economic ties between states when 
one has to rely on another for resources or commodities. As Holsti explains, “Needs that 




 Because economic interactions as well as political and diplomatic engagements 
increase the involvement of states with each other, it also expands the number of issues over 
which they might clash. According to Jensen (1982, 194): “If there were little or no 
interactions with other states, international conflict might be considerably reduced.” But the 
reality is that frequent interaction through trade and diplomacy can cause conflict or heighten 
antagonism, particularly on the part of a state that feels itself to be in an unequal relationship. 
  
 Such inequality between states emphasizes dependence in an interdependent world. 
Barbieri (1996, 33) distinguishes ‘interdependence’ as relations of mutual need, while 
‘dependence’ denotes unequal relations. In this context, dependence highlights the fact that 
one state needs the benefits derived from a relationship more than the other. It exposes the 
vulnerabilities of the dependent state and bestows power to the other arising from this 
asymmetrical dependence.  
 
 The exploitation of a state’s vulnerability (whether economic or otherwise) is the 
source of such power by the more affluent or superior state. In interstate bargaining for 
example, the dominant state normally attempts to use economic sanctions for political 
influence in what Keohane and Nye (1977) label as "linkage strategies." According to Russett 
and Starr (1981, 178): “economic resources can be manipulated by states who possess them 
to influence those who do not.” Sometimes regarded as economic statecraft, they are utilized 
by the state to coerce, cajole, or reward another. 
 
 Moreover, the asymmetry in bilateral relations based on dependence may result in 
potential hostility. Barbieri (1996, 30) argues that “asymmetrical dependence creates 
tensions that may eventually manifest themselves in conflictual interactions.” Such 
considerations are applicable in understanding interactions between small states. Though 
they may belong in the same category, small states are not always on equal footing, which 
impact their policy stance and behaviour towards one another.      
 
Following the above discussion on the small state’s foreign policy, the figure in the 
next page visually summarizes these for clarity.  It provides a graphic demarcation of its policy 
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determinants and their corresponding explanatory factors that are arranged in concentric 
circles based on the levels of analysis framework.    
 




In this figure, the small circle refers to the ‘individual level of analysis.’ It highlights the 
leadership determinant, which focuses on state leaders who drive their nations’ foreign policy 
on behalf of the government and take action in international affairs. Their personal 
characteristics and global perceptions influence their country’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, the 
mid-sized circle represents the ‘state level of analysis.’ It features the political determinants 
of a state, which underscores the institutional and domestic constraints affecting the 
formation and implementation of foreign policy. These involve political institutions and 
national interests, particularly those that are largely driven by public opinion. Lastly, the big 
circle stands for the ‘inter-state level of analysis.’ It points to the bilateral determinants, which 
                                                          
12 The foreign policy determinants and its explanatory factors are taken from Jensen’s (1982) work on 
“Explaining Foreign Policy.” The figure however is an original illustration by the author of this study. 
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emphasizes the power dynamics that affect state interactions. These concern the relative 
power capabilities and asymmetry in relations of a small state towards another.   
 
For investigative purposes, it is necessary to initially assess these determinants 
separately in foreign policy analysis. Breuning (2007: 11) posits that each of them provides 
distinct explanation: “individuals ponder options and make decisions, states engage in foreign 
policy behaviours, and the interaction between states in the international system yields 
outcomes.” In fact, some of the explanatory factors in each foreign policy determinant are 
generally evaluated as a separate entity to comprehend a state’s decisions and actions, 
depending on specific policy issues or cases. However, it is also important to examine the 
interrelationships of the multiple explanatory factors since they operate in combination with 
one another. Hey (2003: 194) explains that: “Individual leaders dominate foreign policy 
development and implementation. But their policy choices and their options are constrained 
by domestic and international factors, such as regime security needs, culture, political 
ideology, geography, economic necessity, hegemonic pressure, and changes in the regional 
and global systems.”           
   
There are many influential factors at work in analysing a state’s foreign policy, which 
reinforces the fact that it is a complex process even in small states. Thus, examining the 
linkages of these factors should provide a holistic conception in comprehending its foreign 
policy, which leads to a multi-variate explanatory model. This model views these explanatory 
factors in combination with one another, and not in competition against each other. It 
therefore produces a more adequate explanation than any one factor or variable could do 
alone (Hermann and East 1978, 18-19).  
 
3.4 Theoretical Perspectives between Policy and Behaviour 
 
 Since external behaviours and foreign policy are deemed as distinct entities in this 
study, their correlation can be analysed with a set of theoretical perspectives highlighting 
their complementarity. These theoretical perspectives are defined as the general orientation 
postulating the importance of explanatory factors that influences a state’s foreign policy, and 
provides the underlying logic linking these factors to state behaviour. For Hermann and East 
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(1978, 24), the advantage of having these perspectives is that “one can easily judge whether 
or not the assumptions connecting policy and behaviour seem reasonable.” 
 
The figure below provides an illustration of the connection between the external 
behaviour and foreign policy of a state through the theoretical perspectives.  
 
Figure 4: Theoretical Perspectives Linking External Behaviour and Foreign Policy  




 From the above illustration, the left rhombus symbolizes a small state’s external 
behaviour while the concentric circles on the right represent its foreign policy, with an arrow 
signifying the theoretical perspectives that connects the two. The rhombus is divided into the 
issue-based approach/attitude and the actor-based action/reaction. Whereas the concentric 
circles are composed of leadership determinants (inner circle), political determinants (middle 
circle), and bilateral determinants (outer circle). The theoretical perspective is represented 
with two arrowheads at both ends, which stands for the mutual link between external 
behaviour and foreign policy as having reciprocal impact with each other.   
     
The theoretical perspectives provided in this study are based on Salmore and 
Hermann’s seminal work published in 1978 entitled Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives 
                                                          
13 The theoretical perspectives linking external behaviour and foreign policy are based on Salmore and 
Hermann’s (1978) work on “Comparative Foreign Policy Studies.” The figure however is an original illustration 
by the author of this study. 
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for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies. Their objective is to determine how plausibly each 
perspective by itself can account for a state’s behaviour, and to establish a foundation for 
future analysis.  Using their work on foreign policy as reference, this study formulates its own 
original list of theoretical perspectives, which it deems relevant to analyse small states.     
 
While the theoretical perspectives are important to conceptually determine the 
connection between a small state’s behaviour and policy, no attempt however is made to be 
exhaustive in this study’s discussion on each perspective. It shall basically highlight the 
explanatory factors in the state’s foreign policy and connect them to its discrete behavioural 
implications. The following are the theoretical perspectives introduced in this study as a 
contribution to the conceptual connection between policy and behaviour:     
 
A. Personal Characteristics of a leader ↔ Cooperative/ Combative Action 
There is a correlation between the personal characteristics of a leader and the foreign 
policy and actions of his/her government. Essentially, a leader’s personal characteristics 
based on personality and leadership style shape the manner in which the government interacts 
with other states. The general assumption is that leaders of a certain personality and 
leadership style will likely engage in similar stylistic behaviour. Their preferred methods of 
managing the state, making high-level decisions, and interacting with people will carry over 
to their political behaviour.  
 
These in turn influence the way state leaders relate with their foreign counterparts 
and to a larger extent, their governments’ approach to other foreign governments. On the 
one hand, the more accommodating, systematic, and conciliatory a leader’s personal 
characteristics are, the more cooperative is the state’s behaviour. On the other hand, the 
more autocratic, forceful, and independent a leader’s personal characteristics are, the more 
combative is the state’s behaviour. 
 
B. Global Perceptions of a leader ↔ Compounded/Conclusive Approach 
How a leader views the world provides a general notion of his/her predisposition 
towards international affairs. In effect, a leader’s global perceptions based on belief, ideology, 
and images guide the policy and actions that the government employs. It significantly 
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influences how he/she will define the situation when confronted with an international or 
bilateral issue, and consequently influence the strategies the government will adopt in its 
foreign policy. 
 
This features the type of policy strategies taken by the government toward its 
counterparts based on the global perceptions of its leaders. As a result, these strategies 
influence the approach taken by a small state in managing international affairs. A leader who 
holds a complex worldview as indicated in his/her liberal-Institutionalist and interdependent 
foreign policy, causes a compounded approach to issues. Whereas a leader who holds a clear-
cut worldview as revealed in his/her realist-pragmatic and independent foreign policy, brings 
about a more conclusive approach in addressing external matters.    
 
C. Political Institutions of a state ↔ Proactive/Reactive Approach  
The political actors and the institutional challenges within the government influence 
a small state’s political institutions. In effect, how institutionalized a state’s political 
institutions are governs the extent of its action and determines its competency in the pursuit 
of its foreign policy.  
 
This essentially influences the approach of the government in addressing international 
issues and consequently affect the state’s behaviour.  A state with a highly institutionalised 
political institutions with less bureaucratic challenges, tends to demonstrate a proactive 
approach; while a state with less institutionalised political institutions with more bureaucratic 
challenges, tends to project a reactive approach concerning issues with another. 
 
D. National Interests of the state ↔ Impassioned/Impassive Attitude   
Though national interests are the general objectives of foreign policy, those that are 
significantly influenced by public opinion stimulate major responses from the government. In 
contrast, those interests that have less impact on the general public produce minor reaction 
from authorities. Thus, the national interests of a state driven by public opinion generate the 




The intensity of the government’s conviction and zeal in the pursuit of its national 
interests consequently affect the state’s behaviour. Essentially, the higher the impact of 
public opinion on a state’s national interests, the more impassioned its stance towards an 
issue. Meanwhile, the lesser the impact of public opinion on a state’s national interests, the 
more impassive its stance.     
 
E. Relative Power Capabilities between states ↔ Persuasive/Coercive Action 
Inter-state relations is influenced by relative power capabilities that have implications 
on a state’s foreign policy content, the power instruments used, and the actions towards the 
other. Essentially, a state with lower power capability reveals a more normative foreign policy 
that primarily employs diplomatic or symbolic instruments with less resource commitment. 
Whereas a state with higher power capability relative to another reflects a more forcible 
foreign policy that can project an array of power instruments, even military means, when 
necessary. This indicates that it can afford more resource commitment in its foreign policy. 
             
Relative power capabilities thus affect a state’s behaviour towards another. A state 
with lower power capability tends to exhibit persuasive actions in its bilateral relations, while 
a state with higher power capability can afford it to display coercive actions in imposing its 
interests on the other state. 
 
F. Asymmetric Relations between States ↔ Acquiescent/ Defiant Reaction  
Inter-state relations is affected by bilateral asymmetry that impacts a state’s foreign 
policy posture and its response towards another’s action. Generally, the relative equality/ 
inequality in the power relations between states results in the interdependence/dependence 
of a state relative to another.  
This asymmetry has implications on the state’s posture and conduct in its interactions 
with its counterparts. In effect, the more dependent a state is towards another, the more it 
exhibits an acquiescent reaction towards the other’s actions. The more interdependent a 
state is, the more it displays a defiant reaction in response to the other’s actions.  
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Based on the above discussions, the following is a summary of the explanatory factors 
of foreign policy generating theoretical perspectives that implies a pair of external behaviour 
of a state:   
 
Table 2: Summary of foreign policy’s explanatory factors, the theoretical perspectives linking policy 
and behaviour, and the behavioural dyads of external behaviour of a small state14 
  
Explanatory 
Factors of  
Foreign Policy 
Theoretical Perspectives Linking  






A leader’s personal characteristics based on 
personality and leadership style shape the 
manner in which the government interacts 





A leader’s global perceptions based on belief, 
ideology, and images guide the policy and 






A state’s political institutions govern the extent 
of its action and determines its competency in 




National Interests A state’s national interests driven by public 
opinion generate the intensity by which it 







Inter-state relations is influenced by relative 
power capabilities that have implications on a 
state’s foreign policy content, the power 







Inter-state relations is affected by bilateral 
asymmetry that impacts a state’s foreign policy 





3.5 Review of the Conceptual Framework  
In sum, this study examines the small state’s external behaviour and foreign policy, 
considered to be separate yet related concepts. Both policy and behaviour, as well as their 
theoretical connections with each other, have significant impact in a small state’s interaction 
                                                          
14 Details on the “Explanatory Factor based on a State’s Foreign Policy” is taken from Jensen (1982). The 
“Theoretical Perspectives Linking Policy and Behaviour” used Salmore and Hermann’s (1978) work as reference. 
The list on the “Behavioural Dyads of a State’s Discrete Behaviour,” is an original inventory conceived by the 
author of this study.   
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with others in a specific bilateral issue. A summary of this study’s conceptual framework is 









                                                          
15 This summary figure of the Conceptual Framework is an original illustration made by this study combining all the other figures earlier discussed. The references used to 
arrive at this illustration are from Habeeb (1988), Jensen (1982), and Salmore and Hermann (1978) mentioned in the previous footnotes.   
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This figure includes all of the conceptual illustrations earlier discussed in this chapter. 
It serves as a visual sketch utilized as an analytical guideline in understanding the external 
behaviours and foreign policy of a small state in relation to another small state.  This last 
figure is divided into the following three parts:  
 
The first part on the left side represents the interaction between two small states. It 
emphasizes on the behaviour of small state 1 towards small state 2.  An initial estimation of 
small state 1’s weak or strong behaviour is evaluated based on issue power balance and issue 
outcome. Yet other discrete external behaviours may result in the probability of a reduced 
degree of weakness or strength, in the form of semi-weak or semi-strong behaviours of small 
state 1.   
 
The second part at the centre symbolizes small state 1’s discrete external behaviours 
composed of situation-based approach/attitude and actor-based action/reaction. These 
behaviours have implications in small state’s 1 bilateral interaction with another small state. 
Its connection is represented in an arrow pointing to the left towards the first image. They 
provide the nuances behind a small state 1’s weak or strong behaviour, which can likely 
produce semi-weak or semi-strong behaviours. This is illustrated in the first part of the figure 
on the left side as discussed above.  
 
The third part on the right side signifies the foreign policy and its corresponding 
determinants of small state 1. The leadership, political, and bilateral determinants of foreign 
policy possess explanatory factors that provide the rationale behind each of the small state’s 
discrete external behaviours. Both policy and behaviour mutually influence each other 
through the theoretical perspectives, which is represented by an arrow linking them together.   
  
This study’s Conceptual Framework is applied in studying the Philippines as a small 
state. It shall be employed to analyse its external behaviour and evaluates its weakness or 
strength relative to its interaction with fellow small states. It shall also serve as a guide in 
understanding the rationale behind each of its behaviours by probing into its foreign policy. 
To examine its effectiveness and applicability, this conceptual framework shall be utilized to 
analyse cases involving issues between the Philippines and other small states.    
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CHAPTER FOUR  
METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF CASE STUDIES:  
The Philippines’ Behaviour and Interactions with Small States  
 
 Following an explanation of the conceptual framework in the previous chapter, this 
study then seeks to test its relevance and applicability. To do so requires employing case 
studies to understand the Philippines as a small state and its interactions with each other. 
This chapter therefore explains the methodology and the operationalization of the concepts 
that will be applied to analyse each of the cases included in this study.      
4.1 Methodology 
In looking at small states, this study utilizes the case study method.  For Bennett and 
Elman (2007: 173), employing this method in the fields of International Relations and Foreign 
Policy “follows an increasingly standardized and rigorous set of prescriptions and have 
contributed to cumulatively improve the understanding of world politics. Some of the most 
prominent subjects of study, for example, wars and the formation of new international 
security and economic systems, often involve interaction effects among many structural and 
agent-based variables, and strategic interaction between actors across multiple levels of 
analysis.”  
Noting their importance, this study analyses several cases that serve as the contextual 
background on the Philippines’ behaviour and interactions. These cases deviate from the 
country’s normal relations, which are characterized by regular bilateral interactions. They are 
considered as uneventful streams of trade, investment, tourism and people-to people 
exchanges.   
Instead, the selected cases in this study are considered as ‘anomalies’ from these 
normal bilateral relations. What is interesting in studying these anomalies is that they reveal 
the policy and behaviour of the small state relative to another amidst bilateral issues or 
conflict situations.  According to Knudsen (2002, 187): “It is primarily in the study of small 
states placed in the context of an interstate confrontation of a particular external 
problematique that the small-state concept can defend its utility.”  
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Generally, these cases utilize events data that underscore interactions, as opposed to 
transactions, in the international system (Laurance 1990, 112). According to Azar (1975), an 
event many be defined as “some activity undertaken by an international actor (a nation-state 
or an international organization), an activity which an actor undertakes at a specific time and 
which is directed toward another actor for the purposes of conveying interest in some issue.  
In the CREON Project, such event data set is composed of an actor, an action, and a recipient. 
According to Hermann (1978, 35): “Taken as a whole, it is defined as the discrete, purposeful 
behaviour (the action) of a state (the actor) that is addressed to one or more direct target 
(the recipient of the action).”  
Typically derived from public sources, the events data shall be used to analyse five 
cases on the Philippines’ interactions with small states. The cases that are included in this 
study are international events that occurred during the previous administration of former 
President Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016) and the current administration of President Rodrigo 
Duterte (2016-2022).16 Because of its personality-based political culture, the Philippines’ 
external relations and international affairs are normally evaluated based on its presidents. 
The presidential terms of Aquino and Duterte shall serve as the background for the following 
cases to be discussed in this study:   
1. The Philippines’ Deportation of Taiwanese Suspects to China  
(December 2010- March 2011) 
2. The Philippines’ Political Clash with Taiwan17 over Fisherman’s Death  
(May-August 2013)  
3. The Philippines’ Interaction with Malaysia over the Sabah Standoff  
(February 2013- March 2013)  
4. The Philippines’ Petition to Save the Life of Filipino Worker in Indonesia  
(April 2015- ongoing) 
                                                          
16 There are other cases that happened during previous presidential administrations involving the Philippines 
and other small states. One controversial case is the 1995 execution of Filipino domestic helper Flor 
Contemplacion for murder in Singapore, which severely strained relations between the two countries during the 
term of Philippine President Fidel Ramos. Despite the availability of other cases, this study shall focus on the 
more recent cases under the administrations of Presidents Aquino III and Duterte.   
17 Despite the legal issues of its statehood, Taiwan is considered a ‘small state’ since this study emphasizes less 
on small state classification and focuses more on external behaviour and the power dynamics in state 
interactions.        
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5. The Philippines’ Diplomatic Row with Kuwait over Filipino Workers  
(January- May 2018)  
 
There is no particular criteria used in the selection of these cases; the above cases are 
ALL of the recent ‘anomalies’ that featured the Philippines’ interaction with fellow small 
states. In this study, there are four cases included under the previous Aquino administration, 
which is already a significant number considering that the most prominent bilateral 
interactions of the Philippines are with great powers such as US, China, and Japan, and not 
with other small states. Meanwhile, since Duterte has not yet finished his term as of this 
writing, there are technically two cases included in this study under his reign--- one of which 
is a carryover from the previous Aquino administration, while there is only one case that 
occurred during his administration. Despite this lone case, it is still considered relevant to 
understand the Philippines’ behaviour towards small states.   
While there are other similarly important cases during previous presidential terms, 
the decision to employ the Aquino and Duterte administrations as the background of the case 
studies have practical reasons. For one, these cases have more available events data based 
on various public resources and information because of their relatively recent occurrences. 
Secondly, they can generate better recollection from both interview participants in the case 
studies and prospective readers of this study. A relatively easier recall of recent events in each 
case is expected to produce more thoughtful insights and analysis necessary for this study.  
In evaluating these cases, this study’s methodology embarks on an incisive qualitative 
research highlighting the use of secondary sources. Since all of these cases are recent events 
involving the Philippines and its external relations, media sources are primarily used.  Aside 
from news articles, this study also draws on published opinion pieces and commentaries by 
journalists and political analysts regarding these cases. However, one caveat to take into 
account is that this study is hampered by the difficulty in obtaining detailed information 
regarding the motivations, calculations, and actions of the key players, given the highly 
charged political atmosphere in which these issues played out. 
Meanwhile, complementing these secondary sources are primary sources based on 
personal interviews. Each of these cases highlight the insights and opinions of Filipino 
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diplomats, academics, policy analysts, government officials, and members of civil society 
groups. The interviews seek to validate or refute the facts and views gathered from secondary 
sources. The opinions of the respondents in this study shall be included in the discussion on 
the Philippines’ external behaviour and its interactions with other small states.   
Despite the importance of primary sources, there are challenges in employing 
personal interviews in the case studies. In particular, government officials are “not noted for 
the frank way in which they comment on policy past and present. Moreover, they tend to 
shroud information in secrecy since most of them regard foreign policy as a particularly 
sensitive area of their activities” (Clarke and White, 1989, 9). Notwithstanding this challenge, 
this study presents the perspectives of these relevant stakeholders, including individuals from 
non-government organizations. They are given the option to identify themselves or to remain 
anonymous in this study. Not surprisingly, most of the interview participants opted not to be 
attributed for their opinions and insights in each of the cases. In spite of this, their views and 
responses are useful in understanding the Philippines’ interactions with other small states.  
4.2 Operationalization 
 Each of the cases in this study has the following three sections that analyses the 
Philippines’ behaviour towards fellow small states:  
A. Discussion of the Philippines’ Case   
 This section narrates the cases using events data, which identifies the behaviour 
(action) of the Philippines (actor) that is directed towards a fellow small state (recipient of the 
action).  The narration is chronological in order and highly descriptive, using publicly available 
information from secondary sources.  
B. Evaluation of the Philippines’ behaviour in each case 
 This section evaluates the Philippines’ behaviour in reverse order.  It essentially 
assesses the result of its behaviour at the conclusion of the issue or dispute with another 




The first part of the evaluation determines the Philippines’ behaviour relative to 
another small state at the end of each case. It primarily utilizes a fact-based analysis of events, 
supplemented by particular insights from primary sources through personal interviews. It 
shall give a brief initial judgment on whether the country projected a “weak,” “strong,” or in 
some instances “neutral” behaviour.   
   Subsequently, the second part of the evaluation identifies the various discrete 
external behaviours of the Philippines during the case. It also cites the explanatory factors 
that produce these behaviours. This subsequent evaluation is largely based on the viewpoints 
from both primary sources through personal interviews, and secondary sources through 
published opinion articles and commentaries.  The discrete external behaviours included in 
this study are classified into the situation-based approach/attitude and actor-based 
action/reaction as discussed in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3. The table below is an 
inventory of behavioural dyads representing a pair of possible behaviours intended to 
highlight their clear distinction between each other.  
Table 3: Inventory of Behavioural Dyads of Situation-Based Attitude/Approach and  













As earlier discussed in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3, evaluating each 
external behaviour as “weak” or “strong” is dependent on a case-by-case basis. Thus, such 
evaluation should go beyond the general tendency of presumably viewing each external 
behaviour at its face value and judging it as “weak” or “strong,” based on the nature of its 
action.   
                                                          
18 The categorization of Situation-Based Attitude/Approach and Actor-Based Action/Reaction and their 
corresponding behavioural dyads are the original conception made by the author for this study.      
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For instance, a proactive approach of a small state in a given issue does not always 
result in a strong behaviour, while a cooperative attitude towards another small state may 
actually represent a weak behaviour. Thus, this second part examines each external 
behaviour with more attentive analysis, which considers its impact and outcome during the 
case and takes into account the perceptions of case actors and external observers.    
Since the first and second parts of the evaluation are combined to determine the 
Philippines’ overall behaviour, it is important to emphasize that there are instances when the 
findings on each of them overlaps. For instance, the country can use an “alternative” that can 
strengthen its ‘power balance’ with another small state, which may similarly indicate a 
persuasive action (external behaviour) taken during the case. Conversely, more “concessions” 
as a result of the ‘issue outcome’ may also imply an acquiescent reaction (external behaviour) 
from the state towards another.  
While both have overlapping implications, the issue power balance/issue outcome 
and external behaviours are acknowledged separately in the behavioural assessment of each 
case. This should provide distinctive recognition of other variants in small state behaviours 
aside from identifying its weakness and strength.     
C. Assessment on the Philippines’ overall behaviour towards small states 
 This section essentially operationalizes the concepts discussed in this study’s 
Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3. It also organizes the results of the “Evaluation of the 
Philippines’ behaviour” from the preceding section. The following procedures are originally 
proposed and invented for this study. As the main scholarly contribution of this research, this 
process is undertaken to assess the overall behaviour of the Philippines in its cases with fellow 
small states: 
1. Determine the “initial estimation” of the Philippines’ behaviour: The Behavioural 
Point of Reference  
 
 This relates to the first part of the “Evaluation of the Philippines’ behaviour,” which 
reveals the initial estimation of the country’s conduct at the conclusion of each case. This 
initial estimation uses the evaluative measures based on issue power balance (alternatives, 
commitment, control) and issue outcome (concession, position, objective). The use of these 
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measures can determine the Philippines’ behaviour relative to another small state.  The table 
in the next page (based on Table 1 from the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3) provides 
the specific criteria that determines WEAK and STRONG behaviour:  
Table 4: Criteria for Weak or Strong Behaviours based on Issue Power Balance  
and Issue Outcome19 
 
Issue Power Balance Issue Outcome Weak Small State 
Behaviour 
Strong Small State 
Behaviour 
Few Alternative More Concession √  
Low Commitment Missed Objective √  
Weak Control Position Change √  
More Alternative  Few Concession   √ 
High Commitment Achieved Objective  √ 
Strong Control No Position Change  √ 
 
    In the event that there are both weak and strong behaviours based on the 
combination of variables in the issue power balance and issue outcome, the result is a 
NEUTRAL behaviour. This implies that the weakness and strength of the Philippines’ 
behaviour offset each other.  The following table is an example of this:  
Table 5: Weak and Strong Behaviours based on Issue Power Balance  
and Issue Outcome Resulting in Neutrality20 
 
Issue Power Balance Issue Outcome Weak Small State 
Behaviour 
Strong small state 
Behaviour 
Few Alternative More Concession √  
High Commitment Achieved Objective  √ 
 
Such neutrality is deemed as a normal probability. This happens when the issue power 
balance fluctuated during the course of a bilateral dispute, which does not result in a fully 
                                                          
19 This table is similar to Table 1. This was originally created by the author for this study.   
20 An example made by the author.  
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favourable nor completely detrimental issue outcome for the Philippines towards another 
small state. In effect, the conclusion of the bilateral dispute produces no ‘clear winner.’ 
 Based on these, the initial estimation of the Philippines’ behaviour at the conclusion 
of each case can be WEAK, STRONG, or NEUTRAL depending on the variables in the issue 
power balance and issue outcome. Either one of these results shall serve as the behavioural 
point of reference, also known as the “initial estimation of its behaviour.” Essentially, this will 
provide the preliminary basis of this study’s assessment on the overall behaviour of a small 
state towards another in a given case.    
2. Identify “impact of discrete external behaviour” of the Philippines:  Reinforcement 
or Regression  
 
 As the initial basis for evaluation, the behavioural point of reference is also affected 
by other discrete external behaviours that the Philippines’ exhibited during the case. These 
external behaviours are either situation-based approach/attitude or actor-based 
action/reaction. Each behaviour either reinforce or regress from its behavioural point of 
reference.   
 The impact of these reinforcement and regression on the behavioural point of 
reference is visually illustrated in the “behavioural spectrum.” In this spectrum, a 
reinforcement from the discrete external behaviour expands the scope of the behavioural 
point of reference; while a regression breaks out from this range.  
Generally, this regression reflects the gradations of the behavioural point of reference. 
As such, these gradations result in a SEMI-WEAK or SEMI-STRONG behaviours implying partial 
or some degree of weakness or strength respectively. The more the regression, the range of 
the semi-weak or semi-strong gradation expands. Thus, these regressions essentially reflect 
the nuances behind the Philippines’ behaviour, which suggests the probability of it neither 
possessing a completely weak nor a fully strong behaviour. 
3. Establish the “overall behaviour” of the Philippines: Using the Behavioural 
Spectrum 
 
The figure below visually presents the connection between the behavioural points of 
reference and the external behaviours that will determine a small state’s overall behaviour:   
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Figure 6: Illustrated model of a behavioural spectrum to determine the  
Overall behaviour of a small state21 
 
BEHAVIOURAL POINTS OF REFERENCE 
WEAK         NEUTRAL     STRONG 
 
 
            
            EXTERNAL BEHAVIOURS      
    SEMI-WEAK       SEMI-STRONG  
 
 At the top of this figure, the behavioural points of reference include weak (leftmost), 
neutral (centre), or strong (rightmost) indicating the initial estimation of the Philippines’ 
behaviour. In the figure’s behavioural spectrum, the discrete external behaviours shall be 
identified, which are represented by arrows pointing downwards. Each of these external 








                                                          
21 This behavioural spectrum is an original illustration made by the author for this study to determine a small 
state’s overall behaviour.  
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Arriving at a WEAK overall behaviour:  
If there are external behaviours that reinforce the WEAK behavioural point of 
reference, there will be arrows pointing downwards located in the weak panel (black shade) 
in the behavioural spectrum. This means that each of the external behaviour amplifies the 
initial “weak” assessment of the small state’s behaviour.  The more there are external 
behaviours that reinforce the weak behavioural point of reference, the more the weak panel 
expands in the behavioural spectrum. This shall then become the country’s overall behaviour.  
This is reflected in the behavioural spectrum below:  
 
Figure 7: Illustrated model of a behavioural spectrum with a WEAK overall behaviour of a 
small state22  
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WEAK         NEUTRAL     STRONG 
 
 
            
            EXTERNAL BEHAVIOURS  





                                                          
22 This behavioural spectrum is an original illustration made by the author for this study that results in a small 
state’s overall WEAK behaviour. 
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Arriving at a STRONG overall behaviour:  
If there are external behaviours that reinforce the STRONG behavioural point of 
reference, there will be arrows pointing downwards located in the strong panel (black shade) 
in the behavioural spectrum. This means that each of the external behaviour bolsters the 
initial “strong” assessment of the small state’s behaviour.  The more there are external 
behaviours that reinforce the strong behavioural point of reference, the more the strong 
panel expands in the behavioural spectrum. This shall then become the country’s overall 
behaviour.  This is reflected in the behavioural spectrum below:  
 
Figure 8: Illustrated model of a behavioural spectrum with a STRONG overall behaviour of a 
small state23  
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23 This behavioural spectrum is an original illustration made by the author for this study that results in a small 
state’s overall STRONG behaviour. 
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Arriving at a SEMI-WEAK overall behaviour:  
If there are external behaviours that regress from the weak behavioural point of 
reference, there will be arrows pointing downwards located in the semi-weak panel (grey 
shade) in the behavioural spectrum. This means that each of the external behaviour reduces 
the degree of the initial “weak” assessment of the small state’s behaviour.  The more there 
are external behaviours that regress from the weak behavioural point of reference, the more 
the semi-weak panel expands in the behavioural spectrum. This shall then become the 
country’s overall behaviour. This is reflected in the behavioural spectrum below: 
Figure 9: Illustrated model of a behavioural spectrum with a SEMI-WEAK overall behaviour of 
a small state24  
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24 This behavioural spectrum is an original illustration made by the author for this study that results in a small 
state’s overall SEMI-WEAK behaviour.  
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Arriving at a SEMI-STRONG overall behaviour:  
If there are external behaviours that regress from the strong behavioural point of 
reference, there will be arrows pointing downwards located in the semi-strong panel (grey 
shade) in the behavioural spectrum. This means that each of the external behaviour lessens 
the degree of initial “strong” assessment of the small state’s behaviour.  The more there are 
external behaviours that regress from the strong behavioural point of reference, the more 
the semi-strong panel expands in the behavioural spectrum. This shall then become the 
country’s overall behaviour. This is reflected in the behavioural spectrum below: 
Figure 10: Illustrated model of a behavioural spectrum with a SEMI-STRONG overall 
behaviour of a small state25  
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25 This behavioural spectrum is an original illustration made by the author for this study that results in a small 
state’s overall SEMI-STRONG behaviour. 
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In the event of a NEUTRAL behavioural point of reference…  
In the instance that a NEUTRAL behavioural point of reference is identified, the 
external behaviours are expected to produce regressions or gradations toward either a SEMI-
WEAK or a SEMI-STRONG overall behaviour. A NEUTRAL behavioural point of reference 
happens when there are both weak and strong behaviours reflected by a small state at the 
conclusion of the case as previously mentioned.   
Such neutrality is considered the initial estimation of a small state’s behaviour, which 
is rather vague. Thus, the various external behaviours that the small state exemplified during 
the course of the case shall determine its overall behaviour.  These external behaviours will 
likely result in either a SEMI-WEAK or a SEMI-STRONG overall behaviour. 
If an external behaviour is considered weak, the regression from the NEUTRAL 
behavioural point of reference is placed in the semi-weak panel (grey shade). The more there 
are weak external behaviour, the more the semi-weak panel expands.  
If an external behaviour is considered strong, the regression from the NEUTRAL 
behavioural point of reference is placed in the semi-strong panel (grey shade). The more there 
are strong external behaviour, the more the semi-strong panel expands.  
These incidences shall then result in a semi-weak or semi-strong overall behaviour of 
a small state based on a neutral behavioural point of reference as reflected in the behavioural 










Figure 11: Illustrated model of a behavioural spectrum with a NEUTRAL behavioural point of 
reference resulting in a SEMI-WEAK or SEMI-STRONG overall behaviour of a small state26 
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26 This behavioural spectrum is an original illustration made by the author for this study that results in a small 
state’s overall SEMI-WORK or SEMI-STRONG behaviour form a NEUTRAL behavioural point of reference.  
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4.3 Case Studies 
 To operationalize the concepts mentioned above, this section presents the following 
five cases involving the Philippines and other small states.  
1. The Philippines’ Deportation of Taiwanese Suspects to China  
2. The Philippines’ Political Clash with Taiwan over Fisherman’s Death  
3. The Philippines’ Interaction with Malaysia over the Sabah Standoff  
4. The Philippines’ Petition to Save the Life of Filipino Worker in Indonesia  
5. The Philippines’ Diplomatic Row with Kuwait over Filipino Workers  
As a recap from the previous discussion, each of the cases highlights the following 
sections:  
1. Discussion of the case. This provides a narrative of the issue between the Philippines 
and the other small state.    
2. Evaluation of the Philippines’ behaviour. This establishes the initial estimation of its 
behaviour based on the issue power balance and issue outcome at the conclusion of 
each case. It also identifies the discrete external behaviours demonstrated by the 
Philippines towards another small state during the case.     
3. Assessment on the Philippines’ overall behaviour. This is composed of three 
procedures:   
a. Determine the “initial estimation” of the Philippines’ behaviour based on its 
behavioural point of reference, which can be WEAK, STRONG, or NEUTRAL.  
b. Identify the “impact of discrete external behaviour” of the Philippines, which can 
either be a reinforcement or regression from its behavioural point of reference. In the 
case of regressions, the impact of the country’s discrete external behaviours can 
possibly point to either a SEMI-WEAK or a SEMI-STRONG behaviour.   
c. Establish the “overall behaviour” of the Philippines, which is derived from the initial 
estimation of its behaviour and the impact of its discrete external behaviours as 
illustrated in the behavioural spectrum. The result of the Philippines’ overall behaviour 
towards another small state in a specific case can either be WEAK or STRONG, or its 
respective gradations of SEMI-WEAK or SEMI-STRONG.      
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4.3.1  The Philippines’ Deportation of Taiwanese Suspects to China 
December 2010- March 2011 (Aquino administration) 
 
Background:  
Upon the request of the Chinese government, the Philippine National Police arrested 
14 Taiwanese along with 10 Chinese suspects on 27 December 2010. They were arrested for 
swindling USD 20.6 million through an internet scam that largely targeted mainland Chinese.  
Issue:  
The Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in the Philippines demanded that its 
14 nationals be deported to Taiwan. On 31 January 2011, it has secured writs of habeas corpus 
from the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Philippines to prevent the Taiwanese nationals’ 
deportation so that they can personally appear on their case hearings scheduled on 2 
February 2011. However on the same day, the Bureau of Immigration (BI) in the Philippines 
deported the Taiwanese together with their Chinese cohorts to China.  
Taiwan’s Reactions:  
Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-Jeou deemed the action of the Philippines as "wrongful 
deportation.” He accused the Philippine government of “violating international law and time- 
honoured international practices” by failing to repatriate the 14 Taiwanese back to their 
home country after expelling them. Moreover, President Ma alleged that the Aquino 
administration had violated its own country's law when the Bureau of Immigration defied the 
writ of habeas corpus issued by the Court of Appeals and pushed through with the Taiwanese 
deportation to China.  
Philippines’ Justification:  
The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) in Taiwan issued a statement saying 
that the suspects were deported to the mainland because “the crime was committed in China, 
the evidences is in China, all the victims are Chinese, and the case can be best settled in China 
(Porcalla 2011).” They were the subject of outstanding warrants of arrest and Interpol red 
notices for a "massive criminal modus operandi using internet and telecommunications 
devices to access their victims and extract money from them."  
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As per the Bureau of Immigration, the Taiwanese also failed to present their original 
passports and travel documents that would legally prove their nationality. Moreover, under 
the One-China policy to which the Philippines adheres to, Taiwan is considered a province of 
China. Thus despite the writ of habeas corpus, the BI decided to deport the Taiwanese to the 
mainland.     
Aquino’s Decision:  
According to an anonymous source from the Court of Appeals, the Bureau of 
Immigration blatantly defied the Court’s decision upon instructions from the president. Based 
on this insider’s account published in the Manila Times (Canlas 2011), the Aquino 
administration allegedly deported the Taiwanese to the mainland as a “peace offering” to 
China over the bus hostage fiasco in Manila in August 2010.27 His decision was also deemed 
as an attempt to hopefully persuade the Chinese government to stop the execution of three 
Filipinos for drug trafficking scheduled on 20 February 2011.28            
Taiwan’s Demands and Sanctions:   
President Ma demanded a formal apology from the Philippines regarding the incident 
and recalled its Taiwanese Representative in Manila as a sign of protest. When it failed to 
obtain an apology, Taiwan carried out punitive measures on 7 February 2011 against the 
Philippines. It cancelled a visa-waiver arrangement for certain categories of Filipino tourists 
who want to visit Taiwan. It also implemented stricter screening of applications by Filipinos 
seeking to work in Taiwan; and made visa processing for Filipino workers longer, from 12 days 
to 4 months. Moreover, the Taiwanese government considered to implement a freeze hiring 
of Filipinos if the Philippines "did not fully meet Taiwan's expectations” (Wang 2011).   
 
                                                          
27 A disgruntled former Philippine National Police officer hijacked a tourist bus in Luneta Park, Manila on 23 
August 2010, which left eight Hong Kong tourists dead. The incident caused outrage in Hong Kong and was 
largely condemned by the Chinese government in the mainland. The Aquino administration was criticized for its 
‘bungled’ and ‘incompetent’ handling of the hostage crisis; and exposed the Philippine National Police’s lack of 
planning and strategy for negotiating with the hostage-taker. 
28 The Chinese government agreed to postpone the execution of the three Filipinos on 20 February 2011, a few 
weeks after the Philippines deported the Taiwanese suspects to China.  But eventually, China executed them via 
lethal injection on 31 March 2011.  
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Philippine Response:  
Aquino has tapped former senator Mar Roxas as emissary in his private capacity "to 
fully explain the rationale behind the Philippines’ action to Taiwanese officials." Roxas met 
with President Ma on 22 February 2011 but did not apologize on behalf of the Philippines, 
explaining that his mission was only to “seek for understanding.” The Philippine government 
argued that it need not apologize because of the “one China policy” and that it believed “in 
the process that they undertook (Legaspi 2011).”  
Case Outcome:  
On 10 March 2011, Taiwan lifted its sanctions after the Philippine government 
replaced its immigration officials involved in the deportation case.  In addition, the Philippines 
and Taiwan signed the “Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters” in 2013. 
The Agreement provides the basis of bilateral cooperation to fight crimes and protect the 
interests of citizens in both countries.  
Evaluation of the Philippines’ Behaviour on the Taiwanese Deportation Case 
 The Philippines had to do diplomatic troubleshooting to pacify Taiwan over the 
deportation case and displayed strong control of the situation. It sent a special envoy to 
“explain its actions” and to “seek for understanding.” As a sovereign nation, the Philippines 
stood its ground and did not apologize to the Taiwanese government due to its adherence to 
the “one-China policy.” Despite Taiwan’s punitive actions, there was no position change for 
the country, with its firm stance not to offer an official apology.  
In a discussion with Interviewee 1,29  she argued that: “If we apologized, then that 
would be tantamount to admitting that we made a wrong decision in deporting the Taiwanese 
to China.”  Meanwhile, for Interviewee 230 a senior foreign affairs analyst working in a 
government research institution: “the Philippines’ refusal to apologize does not mean 
anything beyond what is expected: for one, it reflects a firm and decisive stance on the 
                                                          
29 Interview with a Member of the Committee of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine House of Representatives in 
November 2018. 




deportation decision; secondly, it adheres to the One China Policy; and lastly, it was an 
exercise of sovereignty.” 
 In lieu of an apology, the Philippines dismissed the immigration officials involved in the 
case as a political alternative to appease Taiwan.  The Taiwanese government eventually 
viewed such action as a form of apology, with the Philippines showing “goodwill and regret.” 
As a result, the Taiwanese government immediately lifted its sanctions. With Taiwan 
accepting this political gesture, this save the Philippine government from further giving 
concessions.  
 In both instances, the Philippines displayed an initial estimation of a STRONG 
behaviour relative to Taiwan. This was exhibited at the conclusion of the case over its 
deportation of Taiwanese nationals to China. However, the Philippines’ conduct in various 
instances also affect its overall behaviour. The following are the approaches, attitude, and 
actions of the Philippines during the case:   
1. Inconsistent and Reactive Approach of the Philippines due to its political institutions  
When the Court of Appeals issued the writs of habeas corpus, the Bureau of 
Immigration disregarded it. Professor Edgardo Dagdag (2011) of the University of the 
Philippines raised questions that cast doubts over the legitimacy of the immigration officials’ 
actions. “Why were they deported even before the hearings on the case could start? Why the 
haste?” According to Congressman Antonio Diaz (2011) of the Philippine House of 
Representatives, the Bureau’s disregard of the Court’s decision “is an insult to a lawful order 
from the Appellate Court, a contempt of the Philippine constitutional guarantee of due 
process, and an affront to the integrity of the country’s judicial system.”    
 The contradicting decisions between the judicial and executive branches of the 
Philippine government reveals its fragmented political institutions. This consequently brings 
about bureaucratic inconsistencies in addressing the case. According to Interviewee 2: “There 
was no consistency in the interpretation/application of Philippine laws. It was as if the 
government is contradicting itself and does not show a unified stance.”  
 In addition, the Bureau of Immigration’s decision to deport the Taiwanese to the 
mainland based on the “one-China” policy is deemed unconvincing. According to the report 
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by the Philippine House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs (2011), “the 
deportation is a judicial and legal issue. As such, it has very little bearing on our foreign policy 
or on our adherence to the One-China Policy.” Congressman Diaz (2011) went so far as to say 
that “it is a cockeyed policy which makes us the victim of our own policy.” Moreover, the 
allegations that the Aquino administration is invoking the One-China policy to appease China, 
reflects the ‘politicization’ of what is supposed to be a legal decision. 
 In this regard, such ad-hoc political decision imposed on the Bureau of Immigration by 
the executive branch of the Philippine government reveals its less institutionalized 
mechanisms and protocol in dealing with Taiwan. Thus, the country manifests a reactive 
approach due to the absence of standard guidelines, constraining it to act judiciously on issues 
related to Taiwan that may impinge on relations with China. While the Philippines may have 
stood its ground in deporting the Taiwanese to the mainland, its approach and its institutional 
inconsistencies have diminished its strong demeanour.  
2.  Compounded approach of the Philippines due to Aquino’s complex global perceptions  
 Aside from invoking the One-China Policy, Aquino was deemed to have decided to 
deport the Taiwanese to the mainland for the purpose of appeasing China (for the bus 
hostage crisis in Manila) and to gain favour from it (for the revocation of the death penalty of 
Filipino drug traffickers).  Presumably, if not for his administration’s instruction to the Bureau 
to deport the Taiwanese to the mainland, the case would have been properly addressed by 
the court. Ultimately, he gave in to China’s request to get custody over the Taiwanese 
suspects. According to Canlas (2011), an anonymous source from the Court of Appeals 
claimed that the reason why the Philippines gave in to Chinese request for the Taiwanese 
deportation was because “it is afraid of China.” 
 Aquino’s decision reflected a more complicated and nuanced global outlook when he 
associated current issues at hand with other external matters. This was evident in his attempt 
to balance Philippine interests with Taiwan and China. In this case, Aquino’s complex global 
perception of external issues influenced his assessment on the country’s interests. According 
to Interviewee 1: “as the president, Aquino is tasked to make judgments and redefine 
priorities on a case-by-case basis, which exposes his multifaceted international outlook.”  
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This tends to result in a more compounded approach for the Philippines brought about 
by Aquino’s multiple diplomatic considerations. His ‘fearless’ decision to deport the 
Taiwanese in effect revealed his alleged ‘fear’ of the Chinese. This consequently exposed the 
Philippines’ vulnerable position, which essentially diminished the credibility of its ‘strong’ 
stance to deport the Taiwanese.   
3. Impassioned attitude of the Philippines due to its national interests concerning Filipino 
workers  
  Without getting an apology, the Taiwanese government carried out punitive measures 
affecting Filipino workers. Roxas made an appeal to the Taiwanese officials to spare the 
Filipino workers bound for Taiwan: “Should you push through with your plan to freeze the 
hiring of Filipino workers, please spare the batch of 5,000 Filipinos who had just completed 
their requirements. They spent so much just to get a job in Taiwan. Many of them even had 
to borrow money just to pay placement fees (GMA News 2011)." With Roxas’ appeal, the 
Philippines was deemed to have projected an impassioned attitude towards the Taiwanese 
government, given that its sanctions affected the welfare of overseas Filipino workers. Such 
appeal was deemed to have exposed the Philippines’ vulnerability. To a certain extent, this 
diminished the Philippines’ strong posture towards Taiwan regarding the deportation case.   
4. Persuasive action of the Philippines due to its diplomatic power capabilities  
 With Taiwan’s threat of freeze hiring Filipino workers, the Philippine government took 
action to resolve the issue by replacing the immigration officials involved in the case. Without 
the Philippines offering a formal apology, Taiwan viewed such action as an expression of 
regret. According to Interviewee 331: “despite the denial of the Aquino administration, this 
was intended to appease Taipei and took into account the sensitivities of the Taiwanese.” As 
a result, the Taiwanese government immediately lifted its sanctions. Such persuasive action 





                                                          
31 Interview with an officer of a non-government think tank in the Philippines in November 2018.  
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Assessment on the Philippines’ Overall Behaviour towards Taiwan Over the Deportation 
Case 
 
 The first table below summarizes an initial estimation on the Philippines’ behaviour 
towards Taiwan. Based on the evaluative measures using issue power balance and issue 
outcome, the conclusion of the case reveals that the Philippines’ displayed an initial 
estimation of a STRONG behaviour. This represents its behavioural point of reference.   
Table 6: The Philippines’ Initial Estimation of STRONG Behaviour towards Taiwan  
over the Deportation Case32 
 
Issue Power Balance Issue outcome Weak Behaviour Strong Behaviour 
The Philippines displayed 
STRONG CONTROL by 
sending a special envoy 
to explain its actions and 




CHANGE for the 
Philippine due to its 
firm stance not to 
offer an official 
apology to Taiwan 
 √ 
The Philippines used a 
POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE 
by dismissing its 




for the Philippines to 
resolve the 
deportation case  
 √ 
 
 The second table in the following page highlights the discrete external behaviours that 
have implications on the Philippines’ strong behaviour. In particular, they are the situation-





                                                          
32 This table is a summary of the Philippines’ Initial Estimation of Behaviour originally created by the author for 
this study.    
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Table 7: The Philippines’ External Behaviours Affecting its STRONG Behavioural Point of Reference 
towards Taiwan over the Deportation Case33 
 








The Philippine Court of Appeals issued 
writs of habeas corpus, but its Bureau 
of Immigration disregarded it and 
deported Taiwanese nationals to 







The Philippines’ decision reflected 
Aquino’s nuanced outlook when he 
associated current issue (Taiwanese 
deportation) with other matters (issues 








The Philippines appealed to Taiwan not 
to push through with freeze hiring 
Filipino workers. This reflected its 










The Philippines replaced Immigration 
officials in lieu of a formal apology to 













                                                          
33 This table is a summary of the Philippines’ External Behaviour originally created by the author for this study.    
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 Based on the two tables, the Philippines on the whole generated a SEMI-STRONG 
behaviour towards Taiwan over the deportation case as illustrated in the figure below:  
Figure 12: The Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines’ Resulting in an Overall SEMI-STRONG 
Behaviour towards Taiwan over the Deportation Case34 
 
 Weak               Neutral         STRONG 
         
 
                        SEMI-STRONG 
 
        Impassioned Reactive/Inconsistent Compounded Persuasive 
 
 At the end of the case, the Philippines projected an initial estimation of a STRONG 
behaviour towards Taiwan. Its persuasive action reveals its strength, ‘reinforcing’ its strong 
behaviour that is placed in the black panel. But during the case, other external behaviours 
cause ‘regressions’ from its STRONG behavioural point of reference, that are situated in the 
grey panel causing its wider expansion.  The Philippines’ reactive and inconsistent approach 
in handling the case and its impassioned attitude towards the threat of freeze hiring Filipino 
workers, diminished its strong position. Meanwhile, Aquino’s compounded attitude also 
reduced the credibility of its strong stance in deporting the Taiwanese to the mainland due to 
Chinese influence. Because there are more external behaviours that negatively affected and 
regressed from its initial STRONG behaviour, the Philippines consequently displayed an 




                                                          
34 This figure is the Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines that reflect its overall behaviour. This is an original 
illustration made by the author for this study.  
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4.3.2  The Philippines’ Political Clash with Taiwan over Fisherman’s Death  
May-August 2013 (Aquino administration) 
 
Background:  
The looming tensions between the Philippines and China over the Scarborough Shoal 
in 2013 compelled the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) to be on high alert. It vigorously patrolled 
the country’s territorial waters, particularly from any foreign intrusions such as navy ships, 
marine vessels, and fishing boats from other countries.    
Issue:  
Against this security context, the Philippine Coast Guard fired shots at a Taiwanese 
fishing boat, killing one of its fishermen, Hung Shih-cheng on 9 May 2013. It claimed that the 
shooting was a reaction to a threat against a Philippine patrol boat being rammed at within 
the country’s exclusive economic zone. Philippine authorities maintained that the loss of the 
Taiwanese fisherman’s life was "unintended." However, Taiwan rejected this explanation. It 
insisted that the 45 bullet holes discovered on the boat reflected a disproportionate response 
by the coast guards.  
Taiwan’s Demands:  
On 11 May 2013, Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou immediately demanded an apology 
from the Philippines and requested financial compensation for the fisherman’s family. He also 
demanded that criminal charges should be filed against the accused from the PCG, and 
insisted on a joint investigation of the case. He also pressed the Philippines to start 
negotiations for a fisheries agreement to avoid any future incidents at sea. President Ma gave 
the Philippine government 72 hours (May 11-14) to address Taiwan’s five demands.  
Philippine Response:  
The Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ) turned down Taiwan's request to 
participate in the investigation and refused to meet with the Taiwanese investigators who 
arrived in Manila. The DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima said:  "I don't think we can agree to a joint 
investigation because we're a sovereign country. We have our own processes. We have our 
own justice system (Orosa 2013)." 
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Meanwhile, Aquino had sent Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) Chairman 
Amadeo Perez as his personal representative to "convey his and the Filipino people's deep 
regret and apology" to the fisherman's family. To avoid violating the Philippines’ “One-China” 
policy, he avoided apologizing to the Taiwanese government. However, Taiwan dismissed the 
apology, claiming that it ‘lacked sincerity.’ The Taiwanese government also viewed Aquino’s 
statement of “unintended loss of life” as unacceptable and premature when the investigation 
of the case has not been concluded. According to Taiwanese Premier Jiang Yi-huah: “This 
statement is one that we totally cannot accept. The Philippines apologized on one hand, but 
on the other emphasized that it wasn’t an intentional act (Chung 2013).” This consequently 
provoked more negative sentiments in Taiwan.  
Taiwan’s Sanctions:  
The Taiwanese government recalled its representative in Manila and requested its 
Filipino counterpart to leave Taipei. In a show of force, President Ma ordered naval exercises 
involving frigates, destroyers, and coast guard ships near the waters where the fisherman’s 
murder took place. On 15 May 2013 (after the 72-hour deadline), the Taiwanese government 
issued a travel advisory warning its citizens against travelling to the Philippines, tightened its 
procedures for tourist visa applications of Filipinos, imposed a freeze on hiring Filipino 
workers intending to go to Taiwan, and suspended trade and academic exchanges with the 
Philippines.  
Philippine Actions:   
On 8 August 2013, MECO Chairman Perez met with Hung’s family (the Taiwanese 
fisherman) and personally delivered a formal letter of apology on behalf of the Philippine 
president and the Filipino people. He also provided financial compensation to the family. 
Perez's visit to Taiwan comes after investigators in Manila recommended homicide charges 
against eight Philippine coast guard officers involved in Hung’s death.  After which, the 
Taiwanese government immediately lifted all its sanctions.     
Case Outcome:   
In August 2013, the Philippines released its investigation report and concluded that 
the coast guard officers used excessive force that resulted in Hung’s death, which had “no 
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conclusive justification.” It then recommended to file homicide charges against the coast 
guard officers. Moreover, the report concluded that there was “no categorical proof” of the 
Taiwanese boat posing “an imminent or grave threat” to those aboard the Philippine patrol 
ships (Esmaquel 2013).  
In November 2015, the Philippines and Taiwan eventually signed the Agreement 
Concerning the Facilitation of Cooperation on Law Enforcement in Fisheries which seeks to 
reduce the fisheries disputes between the two parties. An important provision in the 
agreement includes a one-hour advance notification that will be given to fisheries and coast 
guard agencies before law enforcement action is implemented against a fishing vessel from 
the other party believed to be operating illegally.  
Evaluation of the Philippines’ Behaviour on the Taiwanese Fisherman’s Death 
 Three months after the shooting, the Philippines was able to comply with all of 
Taiwan’s demands, except for the joint investigation. It offered an apology to the fisherman’s 
family on behalf of the Philippine president, provided financial compensation, filed criminal 
charges against the coast guard officers, and established a fisheries agreement with Taiwan. 
Because the Taiwanese government was clear and firm in its demands, the Philippines is left 
with few alternatives to consider.  
On the whole, the Philippines has largely conceded to Taiwan, granting almost all of 
its demands. Interviewee 435 noted that the country was generally deemed to be in a “more 
vulnerable position.” This was partly due to the Taiwanese government’s coercive stance, and 
partly because of the Philippine government’s ‘mishandling’ of the case. This ultimately 
resulted in a perceived “weak behaviour” of the Philippines relative to Taiwan. 
 However, the Philippines displayed strong control by asserting its sole authority to 
conduct the investigation despite the various punitive actions from Taiwan.  It did not waiver 
in its position as a sovereign state and strongly adhered to the “One-China policy.” According 
to Interviewee 4: “I believe that no other country with sovereignty will agree to a joint 
investigation over an issue that squarely took place within one nation’s territory.” For 
                                                          
35 Interview with Denise Suarez, lecturer at the New Era University in December 2018.  
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Interviewee 5,36 “the Philippines in this case exhibited a firm stance, since it did not allow 
Taiwan to intervene in its own domestic legal processes.”  
 In separate instances, the Philippines displayed a weak posture on the one hand, and 
a strong stance on the other. This divergent evaluation puts the Philippines in a neutral 
position its interaction with Taiwan regarding the death of its fisherman. To expound on its 
initial NEUTRAL estimation of its behaviour, the following approach and reaction of the 
Philippines during the case are assessed:  
1. Reactive Approach of the Philippines from its political institutions  
 After the shooting incident, the Philippine government immediately justified the coast 
guard’s action as an act of self-defence, and that Hung’s death was an “unintended loss.” 
However, such justification was perceived as premature amidst an ongoing investigation by 
Philippine authorities. According to Halpin (2013), “how could the Philippine government 
prejudge the Taiwan fishing boat as the aggressor and certify its ‘ramming’ into the PCG and 
the ‘unintended loss of life’, given that Manila's investigation was not yet even completed?”  
Such statement essentially raised legitimate concerns about the transparency and 
impartiality of the Philippine-based investigation.  Its defensive statement manifested a very 
reactive approach by the Philippines in addressing the issue. It was deemed as a poor attempt 
by government authorities to evade responsibility for the tragedy, thus the country is deemed 
to have displayed poor judgment in responding to the case.         
2. Acquiescent Reaction of the Philippines due to its military weakness and dependent 
economic relations with Taiwan 
 In a show of force, Taiwan displayed its military capabilities by organizing naval 
exercises and implementing various punitive measures against the Philippines. And more 
importantly, it imposed economic sanctions that affected Philippine trade and its overseas 
workers. According to Interviewee 4, “Taiwan in this case is the party coming on strong 
because its citizens have also trespassed on Philippine territory, but the Taiwanese 
government did not acknowledge such violation.”    
                                                          
36 Interview with a senior analyst from a local foreign policy research centre in December 2018.  
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Taiwan’s retaliatory measures resulted in an acquiescent reaction from the 
Philippines, which revealed its weakness. In its desire to appease the Taiwanese over the 
incident, the Philippine government took steps to satisfy Taiwan’s demand and to normalize 
its relationship. The Philippines offered an apology and pressed charges against the PCG 
personnel. For Interviewee 6,37 she observes that: “It seems that these efforts were meant to 
appease the outcry in Taiwan.” But because of Taiwan’s hard-line stance, the Philippines 
seemed to yield to its demands. As observed by Interviewee 6, “the homicide charges implied 
this. Though their response was deemed excessive resulting in Hung’s death, the Philippine 
Coast Guards were merely patrolling and guarding Philippine waters, which was their 
mandate. They were unfortunately the sacrificial lambs to assuage Taiwan.”     
Assessment on the Philippines’ Overall Behaviour towards Taiwan Over its Fisherman’s 
Death  
 
 The first table below summarizes an assessment on the Philippines’ behaviour 
towards Taiwan. Based on the evaluative measures using issue power balance and issue 
outcome, the conclusion of the case reveals that the Philippines exhibited both weak and 
strong behaviour that consequently reflected an initial estimation of a NEUTRAL stance. This 
represents its behavioural point of reference.   
Table 8: The Philippines’ Initial Estimation of NEUTRAL Behaviour towards Taiwan  
over the Fisherman’s Death38 
 
Issue Power Balance Issue outcome Weak Behaviour Strong Behaviour 
The Philippines is left 
with FEW ALTERNATIVES 
because Taiwan was 
clear and firm in its 
demands 
MOST CONCESSIONS 
were granted by the 






The Philippines displayed 
STRONG CONTROL by 
asserting its sole 
authority to conduct the 
investigation   
NO POSITION 
CHANGE for the 
Philippines as it did 
not waiver in its 






                                                          
37 Interview with Marsha Gomez, Assistant Professor at the Philippine Normal University in December 2018.  




The second table below highlights the discrete external behaviours that can further 
elaborate on the Philippines’ neutral behaviour. In particular, they are the situation-based 
approach and actor-based reactions that the Philippines exhibited during the case.  
Table 9: The Philippines’ External Behaviours affecting its NEUTRAL Behavioural Point of Reference 
towards Taiwan over the Fisherman’s Death39 
 
External Behaviour Details Impact on  






The Philippines justified the coast 
guards action as self-defence and 
pre-judged the fisherman’s death as 
unintended. This reflected its weak 
judgment.         







The Philippines gave in to Taiwan’s 
demands after it launched military 
exercises and imposed economic 
sanctions. This revealed its weak and 
vulnerable stance.   




Based on the two tables, the Philippines on the whole generated a SEMI-WEAK 
behaviour towards Taiwan regarding the case of its fisherman’s death as illustrated in the 
figure below:  
Figure 13: The Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines’ Resulting in an Overall SEMI-WEAK Behaviour 
towards Taiwan over the Fisherman’s Death40 
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39 This table is a summary of the Philippines’ External Behaviour originally created by the author for this study.    
40 This figure is the Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines that reflect its overall behaviour. This is an original 
illustration made by the author for this study. 
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At the end of the case, the Philippines projected an initial estimation of a NEUTRAL 
behaviour towards Taiwan, which displayed both its strength and weakness. But during the 
case, its other external behaviours cause ‘regressions’ from its neutral behavioural point of 
reference. These external behaviours are placed in the grey panel, causing its expansion in 
the behavioural spectrum. Its reactive approach on the fisherman’s death reflected its 
institutional prejudgment of the case, whereas its acquiescent reaction to Taiwan revealed its 
economic dependence and military weakness. Because of these external behaviours that 
negatively affected its initial neutral position, the Philippines consequently displayed an 


















4.3.3  The Philippines’ Interaction with Malaysia over the Sabah Standoff    
February 2013- March 2013 (Aquino administration) 
 
Historical Background: 
During the late 17th century, the Sultanate of Brunei ceded Sabah (formerly known as 
North Borneo) to the Sultanate of Sulu in exchange for aid during a civil war in Brunei. In 1878, 
the British North Borneo Company (BNBC) took responsibility for the area after it signed an 
agreement with the Sultanate of Sulu.  The historical controversy is whether the Sultanate 
leased it or sold it to the BNBC. 
As the successor state, the Philippines maintains a ‘dormant claim’ on Sabah asserting 
that the Sultanate (and subsequently the Republic) had never relinquished its sovereignty 
over the territory. It contends that the Sultanate only leased Sabah to the BNBC and 
questioned the legality of the British Empire passing over Sabah to Malaysia when it gained 
its independence.  
Meanwhile, Malaysia interprets the 1878 agreement as a ‘sale’ by the Sultanate of 
Sulu to the BNBC. It also argues that the residents of Sabah had exercised their right to self-
determination when they joined to form the Malaysian federation in 1963. Since then, the 
Malaysian Embassy in the Philippines issues cheques for RM 5,300 annually to the heirs of the 
Sultan of Sulu in keeping with the terms of the agreement. While the Malaysian government 
considered it as annual cession payment, the Sultan’s descendants regard it as ‘rent.’ 
Issue:  
On 11 February 2013, a total of 235 armed militants arrived by boats in Lahad Datu 
District, Sabah from Tawi-Tawi located south of the Philippines. They called themselves as the 
“Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo," sent by Jamalul Kiram III, 
one of the claimants to the throne of the Sultanate. The group’s intrusion resulted in a 
standoff for more than a month, with the governments of the Philippines and Malaysia 
negotiating with them for a peaceful surrender that eventually led to a military operation.     
Kiram III stated that their objective was to assert the unresolved territorial claim of 
the Philippines. His group also demanded an increased in annual payments from Malaysia. He 
also mentioned that the Sultanate’s exclusion from a peace deal signed between the 
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Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),41 prompted his decision 
to send his armed group to Sabah. The provisional accord signed in October 2012, which 
Malaysia helped facilitate, seeks to establish a new autonomous region in southern 
Philippines to be administered by Muslims.  
Philippine Reaction:  
President Aquino declared that the renewed claim on Sabah by the Royal Sulu Army is 
not sanctioned by the Philippine government. He called the action of Kiram’s men “foolhardy” 
and said their objective was “a hopeless cause (Aquino 2013).” He then appealed to Kiram to 
order his followers to return to the Philippines. In his speeches during the standoff, Aquino 
sided with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s hard-line policy on Kiram’s men and 
praised Malaysia for its role as broker in the peace talks with the MILF. 
Meanwhile, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs expressed “grave concern” 
over the maltreatment of Filipinos in Sabah by Malaysian authorities. Amidst the standoff, it 
asked Malaysia for ‘maximum tolerance’ for the Sulu armed group, and the protection of 
many Filipinos living in the conflict area.  
Malaysia’s Action:  
Prime Minister Razak said the armed Filipino clan should leave soon, and commanded 
the Malaysian security forces to surround Lahad Datu. "We will not let this issue prolong.  We 
will do what it takes to defend the sovereignty of our country (Anis and Ong 2013)."  
After several weeks of negotiations and unmet deadlines for the intruders to leave, 
the Malaysian government launched a major military operation on 1 March 2013.  This was 
triggered by the killing of Malaysia’s police members. Jets bombed the Lahad Datu area in 
Sabah with hundreds of Malaysian ground troops searching for members of the Royal Sulu 
army. On March 24, Malaysia declared an end to the conflict with the death of 10 Malaysian 
security forces, 56 Filipino militants and six civilians. The rest of these militants were either 
captured or escaped back to the Philippines. 
                                                          
41 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a group based in Mindanao, Philippines seeking an autonomous 
region of the Moro people from the central government. 
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Philippine Claim:  
 The military standoff renewed discussion over the Philippines’ dormant claim and its 
policy regarding Sabah. Aquino announced that his administration would study its legitimacy, 
reflecting his uncertainties: “This issue is complex: from the basis of our claim, to the question 
of the rightful heirs, and even involving the translation of documents from an era when our 
grandparents weren’t even born.” 
But following the incident, the Department of Foreign Affairs reminded all 
government agencies on 26 March 2013 not to refer to Sabah as part of Malaysia due to an 
existing Philippine claim. This was based on a Memorandum Circular 162 dated 20 August 
2008 entitled “Guidelines on Matters Pertaining to North Borneo (Sabah),” stating that “no 
department, agency, or instrumentality of the Philippine Government shall make any act or 
statement expressing or implying, directly or indirectly, any recognition of a foreign state’s 
sovereignty over North Borneo (Sabah) or non-recognition of Philippine title or historical and 
legal rights to the same (Orosa 2013).”  
Case Outcome:   
 After the clash ended on 1 March 2013, hundreds of Filipino refugees fled to 
Mindanao, Philippines. There were more than 4,721 Filipinos who were displaced and arrived 
in Sulu, while 289 Filipinos fled to Tawi-Tawi after being deported from Sabah.  Meanwhile, 
civil society groups in the Philippines filed petitions on 1 April 2013 at the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights against Malaysia’s human rights violations. The two petitions 
expressed “grave concern on the massive and gross violations against Filipinos in Sabah” and 
reminded the government to “provide effective remedies and compensation to the Filipino 
victims of the massive and gross human rights violations committed against them by 
Malaysian state agents (Tordesillas 2013).” 
Evaluation of the Philippines’ Behaviour towards Malaysia on the Sabah Standoff 
 At the onset, the Philippine government’s objective was for the Royal Sulu Army of 
Kiram to immediately leave Sabah peacefully to avoid any untoward incidents. However, it 
failed to convince the group to surrender and instead, a major military clash occurred led by 
the Malaysian security forces. The Sulu army’s firm stance was brought about by perceptions 
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on the Philippine government’s low commitment to push for its historical claim on Sabah. In 
effect, the Philippines’ objective of a peaceful retreat and the prevention of a military clash in 
Sabah did not materialize.   
 Throughout the crisis, the Philippine government has to contend with various 
competing issues that constrained it to act decisively. In separate interviews, two policy 
analysts from local research organizations believe that the Philippines’ took a more compliant 
stance towards Malaysia during the standoff. According to Interviewee 7,42 the Philippines’ 
position was “for the continuation of the peace talks in Mindanao and the prevention of 
conflict escalation with Malaysia.”  
However, such compliant stance is perceived as “weakness” given the urgency of the 
situation. It also manifested the Philippines’ weak control, giving Malaysia the upper hand to 
manage the conflict. According to Interviewee 843: “the lack of condemnation from the 
Philippine government against human rights abuses committed by Malaysian forces during 
the Sabah conflict, precisely reflects this weakness.” Its compliant stance towards Malaysia 
highlights the Philippines vague position on its Sabah claim, which continues to be inactive. 
According to Interviewee 9,44 the Philippines’ displayed a WEAK behaviour, but it is important 
to note that “it has not held a strong posture regarding its claims on Sabah to begin with.”  
This weak behaviour of the Philippines is also reinforced by the following external 
conduct it displayed during the case:    
1. Cooperative Attitude of the Philippines due to President Aquino’s personal characteristics  
 Aquino is known for his positive engagements with the Malaysian government, 
especially on issues regarding the peace process with Muslim insurgents in the Philippines. 
Because of this, he led the Philippines with a very cooperative attitude towards Malaysia since 
the start of the Sabah standoff. This was deemed to have inadvertently weakened the 
country’s stance on the case.  
                                                          
42 Interview with a policy analyst from a local research organization in January 2019.  
43 Interview with an associate professor in one of the universities in the Philippines in January 2019.  
44 Interview with a junior diplomat handling ASEAN affairs in January 2019.  
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Throughout the conflict, Aquino supported Malaysia’s stance and blamed the Sulu 
militant group for their unwarranted actions. He viewed the group as the ‘transgressors’ and 
that the Malaysian government is justified in using all-out force. A civil society group noted 
that when Aquino “from day 1 gave publicly-aired ultimatums against the group and even 
threatened it of criminal prosecution, he was being in tune with Malaysian government’s call 
on the sultanate’s army to surrender (Salamat 2013).”  
For Interviewee 10,45 she perceives Aquino as very compliant towards Malaysia 
because the conflict in Sabah is a “very delicate issue, encompassing territorial as well as the 
safety of Filipinos.” She believed that Aquino wanted to avoid further escalation of conflict, 
and prevent the possible “breakdown of relations between the Philippines and Malaysia.” 
However, in its House Resolution Number no. 51 (2013), the Philippine Congress view 
Aquino’s cooperative attitude as “pro-Malaysian and in effect adversarial on the Sultanate’s 
acts of reclaiming Sabah.”   
2. Acquiescent Reaction of the Philippines due to Malaysia’s military power capabilities and 
diplomatic/political leverage   
During the military clash, observers have pointed out that the Philippine government 
has left the fate of the royal Sulu army in the hands of the Malaysian security forces. According 
to political activist Pagaduan- Araullo (2013): “the Aquino administration had virtually given 
the Malaysian government the green light to use coercive and armed means to end the stand-
off and crush the militant group.” And despite its initial appeal for “maximum tolerance,” the 
Philippine government had to cope with various reports of human rights violations and abuses 
committed by the Malaysian security forces towards Filipinos caught in the conflict. According 
to Interviewee 7: “I think the Philippines could have asserted the applicability of international 
humanitarian law in this standoff. Malaysia’s airstrike against the Filipino militants violates 
the principle of proportionality.” But the projection of Malaysia’s more superior military 
capabilities, which resulted in more deaths from the Sulu militant group, reduced the 
Philippines to take an acquiescent reaction over the incident. 
                                                          
45 Interview with a government policy analyst from a local think tank in January 2019.  
109 
 
There were also reports that efforts of Philippine representatives to manage the Sabah 
crisis were dismissed by the Malaysian government. Sent to coordinate humanitarian relief 
efforts, former Philippine Ambassador to Malaysia Jose Brillantes was not given consent by 
the Malaysian authorities to visit Sabah. The Philippine government’s requests for 
permissions to have access to Filipinos living in the affected area and to dock a Philippine navy 
boat to fetch them, were initially ignored by the Malaysians. For journalist Ellen Tordesillas 
(2013), “Malaysia treats the Philippines like dirt and Malacañang takes it with hardly a 
whimper.”   
In addition, the Philippines is perceived to have relegated its claim to the back burner 
to avoid confrontation with Malaysia or even antagonizing it in any way. This is due to the 
Philippines’ dependence on Malaysia’s critical diplomatic role as a facilitator in the peace 
process with the MILF. Since 2001, Malaysia has become the official Third Party Facilitator in 
the talks between the Philippine government and the MILF for the Framework Agreement on 
the Bangsamoro, which seeks to provide guidelines on a peace agreement in Mindanao. This 
partly explains why the Aquino administration, more than his predecessors, is deemed to 
have no interest in supporting the Kirams in renewing the Philippines’ claim to Sabah. The 
Philippine government would not want to displease or incur the ire of its Malaysian 
counterpart.  For Pagaduan- Araullo (2013): “At the very least, it would appear to be an 
unpardonable act of ingratitude. At worst, Malaysia could retaliate and put the agreement in 
peril.” Thus, the Philippines’ acquiescent reaction during the Sabah crisis can also be 
attributed to Malaysia’s significant role in the country’s peace process.   
3. Reactive Approach of the Philippines from its political institutions  
The Sabah crisis has essentially manifested the Philippines’ reactive approach brought 
about by its indifferent stance regarding its dormant claim on Sabah. Previous administrations 
of former Presidents Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada have since ordered to conduct studies 
regarding the basis and prospects of the Philippines’ claims, without any concrete or at least 
published results.  And after the crisis, the Aquino administration has also declared that it is 
‘still studying’ the country’s claim.  
Filipino diplomats believe that the Philippine government has a solid claim to 
sovereignty over Sabah. According to retired Ambassadors Lauro Baja Jr. and Nelson Laviña 
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(2013): “To our minds, the legal situation is: the Philippines has had (de jure) sovereignty over 
Sabah since 1935. To resolve the issue, the Philippines invited Malaysia to the International 
Court of Justice, but Malaysia refused with the support of Britain. Thus, the Philippine claim 
became dormant but was not abandoned.”   
However, the Philippine government has continued to display a lack of interest in the 
claims of the Sultanate. Though it has an existing guideline to all its agencies not to refer to 
Sabah as part of Malaysia, this may not hold much ground after the crisis. As stated by 
Interviewee 8: “I think the guidelines are important to strengthen the government’s position. 
However, it may not mean anything anymore after Malaysia decisively showed its control 
over Sabah.”  
Other than this guideline, the Philippines has no clear policy stance on how to 
vigorously pursue its claim, taking into account all the geopolitical factors involved. For Consul 
General Hermes Dorado, former head of the Department of Foreign Affairs National Territory 
Division: “For half a century, Sabah has been one Malaysian obsession, and we’ve been out-
maneuvered. We are divided and we didn’t know our own country (Salamat 2013).” 
Assessment on the Philippines’ Overall Behaviour towards Malaysia over the Sabah 
Standoff 
  
 The first table in the following page summarizes an assessment on the Philippines’ 
behaviour towards Malaysia. Based on the evaluative measures using issue power balance 
and issue outcome, the conclusion of the case reveals that the Philippines exhibited an initial 









Table 10: The Philippines’ Initial Estimation of WEAK Behaviour towards Malaysia  
over the Sabah Standoff46 
 
Issue Power Balance Issue outcome Weak Behaviour Strong Behaviour 
The Philippines exhibited 
LOW COMMITMENT in 
pushing its claim on 
Sabah 
MISSED OBJECTIVE for 
the Philippines to 
avoid a military clash 
in Sabah between the 
Sulu militants and 





The Philippines’ WEAK 
CONTROL during the 
Sabah standoff gave 
Malaysia the upper hand 
in managing the conflict 
VAGUE POSITION of 
the Philippines 
regarding its inactive 
territorial claim 
resulted in Malaysia’s 
default control over 





 The second table in the next page highlights the discrete external behaviours that 
reinforce the Philippines’ weak behaviour. In particular, they are the situation-based attitude 










                                                          
46 This table is a summary of the Philippines’ Initial Estimation of Behaviour originally created by the author for 
this study.    
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Table 11: The Philippines’ External Behaviours Affecting its WEAK Behavioural Point of Reference 
towards Malaysia over the Sabah Standoff47 
 
External Behaviour Details Impact on Behavioural 





The Philippines led by Aquino 
supported Malaysia’s actions and 
blamed the Sulu militants for the 
standoff, deemed as pro- Malaysia 
and adversarial to the Sultanate’s 
effort to reclaim Sabah. This 






The Philippines’ unclear policy on 
its Sabah claims has reinforced its 







The Philippines left the fate of the 
Sulu army to Malaysia with its 
more superior military capabilities 
and its diplomatic role as mediator 
in the Mindanao peace talks. This 




Based on the two tables, the Philippines on the whole generated a WEAK behaviour 
towards Malaysia over the Sabah standoff as illustrated in the figure below:  
Figure 14: The Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines’ Resulting in an Overall WEAK Behaviour 
towards Malaysia over the Sabah Standoff48 
 
WEAK                Neutral         Strong 
 
 
   WEAK 
 
Cooperative  Acquiescent  Reactive 
                                                          
47 This table is a summary of the Philippines’ External Behaviour originally created by the author for this study.    
48 This figure is the Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines that reflect its overall behaviour. This is an original 
illustration made by the author for this study. 
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At the end of the case, the Philippines projected an initial estimation of a WEAK 
behaviour towards Malaysia. And even during the case, its other external behaviours further 
‘reinforced’ its weak behavioural point of reference. These external behaviours are plotted in 
the black panel, causing its expansion in the behavioural spectrum. This was reflected in 
Aquino’s cooperative attitude that is deemed as pro-Malaysian, the government’s reactive 
approach on its Sabah claims, and the country’s acquiescent reaction towards Malaysia during 
the military clash. Because of these external behaviours that bolstered its weak positon, the 
Philippines consequently displayed an OVERALL WEAK behaviour towards Malaysia during the 


















4.3.4  The Philippines’ Petition to Save the Life of Filipino Worker in Indonesia 
April 2015- ongoing (Aquino- Duterte administration)  
 
Background:  
Indonesia has one of the world’s toughest anti-drug laws. Since taking office in 2014, 
Indonesian President Joko Widodo has claimed that the nation is facing a “drug emergency.” 
He called for severe punishments against drug traffickers and rejected any clemency for those 
convicted. Under Widodo’s administration, there were already 14 drug convicts executed, 
most of them were foreigners. 
Mary Jane Veloso, a Filipino worker, was arrested in Yogyakarta International Airport 
in April 2010 for carrying heroin in her luggage. Throughout her trial, she maintained her 
innocence, claiming that she was duped by an international criminal syndicate and 
unknowingly brought drugs on her way to work as a maid in Indonesia.    
Issue:  
Veloso was eventually sentenced to death for drug trafficking. President Widodo 
earlier rejected appeals for clemency, maintaining that countries with nationals facing death 
sentences in Indonesia should respect the ‘supremacy’ of its laws. Veloso’s case was put into 
spotlight when she was scheduled to be executed by firing squad on 29 April 2015.   
Filipino Public’s Response: 
The news about Veloso’s scheduled execution caused an uproar in the Philippines. 
Filipinos made public and online petitions to spare the life of Veloso. Migrant groups held 
vigils outside the Indonesian embassy in Manila, pleading to stop her execution. Majority of 
Filipinos condemned her death sentence and demanded the Philippine government to do 
everything it can to stop her execution.  
Philippine Government’s Actions:  
With mounting pressures from the Filipino public, the Philippines made numerous 
appeals to save Veloso. It filed several requests for judicial review on Veloso's case and 
pleaded to commute her sentence to life imprisonment. It also cited the ASEAN Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty (MLAT), an important treaty that aims to fight transnational crimes in the 
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region. At the last minute, the Philippine government invoked this treaty and notified 
Indonesia that it had custody over Veloso’s recruiters who were allegedly involved in human 
trafficking and drug smuggling. It then requested Indonesian authorities to spare Veloso so 
she can testify as a witness in these illegal activities.  
Aquino’s Appeal:  
 Aquino has since written four letters to President Widodo and personally lobbied for 
Veloso’s life in several meetings with him. At the eleventh hour before Veloso’s scheduled 
execution, Aquino made a phone call and talked directly to the Foreign Minister of Indonesia. 
This was considered a breach in normal diplomatic protocol when state leaders are supposed 
to directly talk with their counterparts. In that last-minute phone call, Aquino requested the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister to stop the execution of Veloso and turn her into a state witness 
to pin down the drug trafficking syndicate that victimized her.  
Indonesia’s Response:      
After Aquino’s phone call and hours before Veloso’s scheduled execution, the 
Indonesian government granted her a temporary reprieve. It announced that the deferment 
of Veloso’s execution was for her to testify against members of the criminal syndicate who 
victimized her. While it continued with the execution of other foreign nationals convicted of 
drug trafficking, the Indonesian government explained that its decision to delay the execution 
of Veloso was to fully ascertain if she was just a mule, and not a drug dealer.  
Case Status:  
President Widodo insisted that Veloso’s death sentence was “not a cancellation but a 
postponement." He maintained that her fate would depend on prevailing laws in Indonesia 
and how the Philippine court would rule on the case against her recruiters.  
In contrast to Aquino’s vigorous efforts, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte 
meanwhile admitted that he felt awkward about “begging” President Widodo to spare 
Veloso’s life. Because of his hard line stance against illegal drugs, Duterte announced that he 
would be ready to accept Indonesia's decision about the case and “we will respect the 
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judgement of its courts. We will honour what the laws are in their country. We will not 
impose. We will not demand. Nothing. (Kabiling 2016)." 
In January 2018, the Philippine court barred efforts to secure Veloso’s testimony in 
Indonesia, stating that this would violate the constitutional rights of the accused. Such right 
entitles her alleged recruiters to confront Veloso in person. However, the Indonesian 
government does not allow foreign convicts to temporarily leave the country even for the 
purpose of providing testimonies, and also prohibits deposition via online video-conferencing. 
In the end, Indonesia may eventually revoke Veloso’s temporary reprieve from death row, 
and proceed with her execution if there will be no significant developments in her case.     
Evaluation of the Philippines’ Behaviour towards Indonesia on Veloso’s Death Penalty 
 
The decision of the Indonesian government to grant Veloso a last-minute suspension 
of her execution, is considered a temporary victory for the Philippines. Amidst fervent public 
clamour, the Philippine government exhibited strong commitment to save Veloso. As a result, 
it was able to achieve its objective to keep her alive (albeit temporarily pending her ongoing 
case) through effective diplomacy. Instead of conceding her fate to the death penalty, the 
Philippine government also explored an alternative solution to suspend Veloso’s execution by 
convincing its Indonesian counterpart to make her as a state witness. In both instances, the 
Philippines displayed “strong behaviour.”  
Though Veloso’s case is still pending, the Philippines is credited for its success in 
persuading Indonesia to defer her execution. However, there are crucial factors that will 
adversely affect Veloso’s ongoing case. The rules in the judicial systems in Indonesia and the 
Philippines will make it difficult for Veloso’s legal team to defend her case. The change in the 
presidential administrations in the country is another important factor. These factors may 
likely result in Veloso’s eventual death if there are no positive changes in her case. 
In hindsight, the Philippines projected other external behaviours, which have 
implication on the initial estimation of its STRONG behaviour. The following are the attitude 




1.  Impassioned attitude of the Philippines due to its national interests concerning Filipino 
workers 
 There was an overwhelming campaign among Filipinos to stop the execution of Veloso 
in Indonesia. Public emotions ran high as the scheduled execution drew near. For Interviewee 
11,49 “I think Filipinos would want to contribute in saving the life of their fellow Filipino by 
coming together and calling for the government to exhaust all efforts for justice to prevail.”  
 The emotional public sentiment among Filipinos over Veloso’s case resonates with the 
rest of the population who have to work overseas to earn a decent income. In a discussion 
with Interviewee 1250, she perceives that “the strong reaction is caused by the frustration of 
Filipinos towards the situation of OFWs abroad, considering that most of which are forced to 
work in other countries because the work situation in the Philippines is not as economically 
rewarding compared to other countries.”  And as observed by Interviewee 11, “I think as a 
nation, we put premium in the lives of our fellow Filipinos. I believe in the concept of 
kababayan where Filipinos empathize with fellow Filipinos, especially those in the vulnerable 
or marginalized sector. The profile of Veloso, a domestic helper who claimed to be a victim of 
trafficking, also appeals to the human emotions of Filipinos.”  
Due to an emotional public clamour, the Philippines accordingly projected an 
impassioned stance to save Veloso’s life that enabled it to project a strong behaviour. 
According to Interviewee 13:51 “in any democratic society, public clamour is a determinant of 
how strong the Philippine government’s reaction will be.” This observation was similarly 
shared by Interviewee 12: “public opinion is a reminder for the government to protect the 
interests of its people. In particular, strong public opinion is a reflection of how Filipinos are 
watching the government on how it deals with issues that matter to them.”  
2. Reactive Approach of the Philippines brought about by its political institutions  
 At the height of the Filipino’s public outcry, some observers criticized the government 
for waiting until Veloso’s scheduled execution to take swift actions. As argued by Interviewee 
11: “I think the investigation should have initially identified Veloso as a victim so that the 
                                                          
49 Interview with a Filipino peace and human rights advocate in February 2019. 
50 Interview with a Filipino social worker in February 2019.  
51 Interview with a Filipino diplomat who was previously posted in Jakarta in February 2019.  
118 
 
police can pin down the alleged traffickers. If from the onset her case was seen as a drug 
trafficking case where she is a victim, then most likely she would not have been included in 
the death row. Though the government made efforts to spare her life, I think they could have 
acted ahead of time to save Veloso, even without strong pressure from the public.” In this 
case, the Philippine government projected a reactive approach on her case since her arrest in 
2010, which essentially minimized its strong position. 
3. Cooperative Attitude of the Philippines due to Aquino’s personal characteristics  
 Aquino was deemed to have strongly lobbied Veloso’s case to the Indonesian 
government as he placed primacy on the sanctity of human life. He did so with a very 
cooperative attitude based on his generally courteous and conciliatory personality, which 
enabled the Philippines to have a stronger chance to save Veloso.  This was in contrast to 
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s approach in his petition to spare the two Australian 
drug convicts on death row.  He called on Indonesia to “reciprocate” Australia’s 1 billion aid 
package that it granted after the 2004 tsunami by sparing its citizens. According to Jakarta-
based political commentator Paul Rowland (2015): “President Aquino doesn’t seem to be 
‘shirtfronting’ the Indonesian government in the same way Tony Abbott did, so it got a more 
sympathetic reaction.” Eventually, the two Australians and all the other foreigners convicted 
of drug smuggling, were executed by firing squad except for Veloso. 
4. Persuasive Actions of the Philippines brought about by its diplomatic power capabilities 
The Philippines gave its determined efforts to save, or at least postpone, Veloso’s 
execution, with the combined efforts of the president and the government. It used positive 
diplomatic representation, with Aquino personally lobbying to President Widodo, which 
essentially manifested a strong behaviour. Aside from pleading sympathy, the Philippine 
government also proposed a legal approach to spare Veloso’s life.  Interviewee 12 observes 
that “Aquino appealed to the Indonesian government by offering Veloso as a state witness, 
rather than persuading it to stop the execution without offering something in return.”  
In addition, the Philippines also used symbolic means to convince Indonesia to 
postpone Veloso’s death sentence. It related the plight of overseas Filipino workers to many 
Indonesian citizens working abroad. In particular, Philippine civil society groups advocating 
119 
 
for migrant workers’ welfare tapped on the affinity many Indonesians feel in Veloso’s case. 
For Indonesian political analyst Yohanes Sulaiman (2015): “The Mary Jane Veloso narrative as 
a foreign worker being duped hits very close to home. It is also similar to the plight of 
Indonesian workers in Saudi Arabia.” This drew widespread public sympathy in the country, 
since her story resonated with many Indonesians: “her peculiar circumstance of being a 
credible victim of human trafficking plus the human side of her being a young, poor mother 
of little boys forced by poverty to work abroad (Holmes 2016).” As a result, the Philippines’ 
diplomatic and symbolic approaches were regarded as persuasive actions that succeeded in 
saving Veloso.    
5. Conclusive approach of the Philippines due to Duterte’s clear-cut global perceptions 
 The change in the presidential administration in the country implies a shift in the 
government’s outlook regarding Veloso’s case.   In particular, Aquino’s adherence to morality 
and human rights vis-à-vis Duterte’s commitment to the rule of law and respect for a country’s 
sovereignty, may diminish the Philippines’ resolve to conclusively spare Veloso from 
Indonesia’s death penalty. As explained by Interviewee 12: “such contrast revealed how 
diplomatic actions can be influenced by the different political views of state leaderships in the 
Philippines.” 
With his own anti-narcotics campaign, Duterte’s cold treatment of Veloso’s case 
reveals his clear-cut and straightforward stance that anyone involved in illegal drugs should 
be punished. In contrast to Aquino, this reveals Duterte’s less-nuanced global outlook, with a 
worldview emphasizing less on morality in determining or judging state actions. Thus, Duterte 
consigns the fate of Veloso into the hands of Indonesia’s justice system and its prevailing laws, 
minus the moral considerations. This consequently brings about a conclusive approach for the 
Philippines--- a significant change in its political stance regarding Veloso’s case, which will 










Assessment on the Philippines’ Overall Behaviour towards Indonesia on Veloso’s Case  
 
 The first table below summarizes an assessment on the Philippines’ behaviour 
towards Indonesia. Based on the evaluative measures using issue power balance and issue 
outcome, the deferment of the case reveals the Philippines’ initial estimation of a STRONG 
behaviour. This serves represents its behavioural point of reference.   
Table 12: The Philippines’ Initial Estimation of STRONG Behaviour towards Indonesia  
on Veloso’s Case52 
 
Issue Power Balance Issue outcome Weak Behaviour Strong Behaviour 
The Philippines 
manifested STRONG 
COMMITMENT to save 
Veloso  
ACHIEVED OBJECTIVE 
for the Philippines to 
defer Veloso’s death 
penalty  
 √ 
The Philippines offered 
LEGAL ALTERNATIVE to 
Indonesia by making 
Veloso a witness against 
the drug syndicate that 
victimized her  
NO CONCESSION or 
surrendering 
displayed by the 
Philippines to let 
Veloso be executed  
 √ 
 
The second table in the following page highlights the discrete external behaviours that 
have implications on the Philippines’ strong behaviour. In particular, they are the situation-







                                                          
52 This table is a summary of the Philippines’ Initial Estimation of Behaviour originally created by the author for 
this study.    
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Table 13: The Philippines’ External Behaviours affecting its STRONG Behavioural Point of Reference 
towards Indonesia on Veloso’s Case53 
 
External Behaviour Details Impact on Behavioural 





The Philippines displayed resolute 
efforts due to an emotional public 
clamour to save Veloso’s life. This 





The Philippine government was 
criticised for not acting ahead of time 
to save Veloso. This reduced its 
strong behaviour.    
Regress from STRONG 
behavioural point  
Cooperative 
Attitude 
The Philippines led by Aquino 
strongly   lobbied for Veloso’s case 
but with utmost deference towards 






The Philippines under Duterte with a 
less nuanced outlook, is likely to 
concede the fate of Veloso to 
Indonesia’s justice system and 
prevailing laws. This relegates its 
government’s initial strong posture 
regarding her case. 
 








The Philippine government 
employed positive diplomatic 
representation, while its non-
government organizations used 
symbolic means that related the 
plight of Veloso to many Indonesians 





Based on the two tables, the Philippines on the whole generated a STRONG behaviour 
towards Indonesia regarding Veloso’s case as illustrated in the figure on the following page:  
 
                                                          
53 This table is a summary of the Philippines’ External Behaviour originally created by the author for this study.    
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Figure 15: The Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines’ Resulting in an Overall STRONG Behaviour 
towards Indonesia on Veloso’s Case54 
 
Weak          Neutral         STRONG 
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At the end of the case, the Philippines projected an initial estimation of a STRONG 
behaviour towards Indonesia. Its impassioned attitude to save Veloso, its persuasive actions 
towards Indonesia, and Aquino’s cooperative approach in engaging Widodo ultimately 
‘reinforced’ the Philippines’ strong behaviour. These external behaviours are plotted in the 
black panel, causing its expansion in the behavioural spectrum.  
However, other external behaviours projected by the Philippines caused ‘regressions’ 
from its strong behavioural point of reference. These external behaviours resulted in the 
creation of the grey panel in the behavioural spectrum. The Philippine government’s reactive 
approach prior to Veloso’s death sentence negatively affected its posture. Moreover, the 
conclusive approach of the Duterte administration on Veloso’s case may eventually allow her 
death sentence in Indonesia to push through. This may completely overturn the Philippines’ 
prior position under Aquino, which may diminish its international credibility and policy stance.  
Despite these drawbacks, the Philippines displayed an OVERALL STRONG behaviour 
towards Indonesia since there are more reinforcement than regressions (wider black panel 
than grey panel) from its strong behavioural point of reference due to the effect of its external 
behaviours.  
                                                          
54 This figure is the Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines that reflect its overall behaviour. This is an original 
illustration made by the author for this study. 
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4.3.5  The Philippines’ Diplomatic Row with Kuwait over Filipino Workers 
January- May 2018 (Duterte Administration) 
  
Background:  
In January 2018, several investigations revealed that abusive employers in Kuwait had 
driven at least four Filipino domestic workers to suicide. President Rodrigo Duterte then 
imposed a temporary deployment ban on workers bound for Kuwait and threatened to 
withdraw Filipinos already employed in the country. There are more than 250,000 Filipinos 
working in Kuwait, most are employed as domestic helpers. 
Kuwait’s Response:  
The Kuwaiti government responded with an amnesty program allowing 
undocumented Filipinos to rectify their status or to exit the country without being fined. The 
program began in January 29 and extended until 22 April 2018. During this period, the two 
countries have been negotiating an end to the ban with a labour agreement that would 
protect the rights of Filipino workers in Kuwait.  
Diplomatic Crisis:   
In February 2018, the corpse of Joanna Demafelis, a Filipino household worker was 
found in a freezer in Kuwait. Though her employers were arrested in Syria and received a 
death sentence in absentia by the Kuwaiti court, Demafelis’ tragic death triggered a 
diplomatic crisis between the two countries.  
In April 2018, bilateral relations worsened when a video clip was publicly released 
showing an alleged rescue operation of distressed Filipino workers. The video revealed 
Philippine embassy officials picking up domestic workers outside their homes, and helping 
them ‘escape’ from their allegedly abusive employers in Kuwait. Embassy officials were 
deemed to have encouraged Filipino migrant workers to leave their employers.  
Kuwait’s Action:  
The Kuwaiti government accused the Philippines of breaching the rules and 
regulations that govern diplomatic actions and of violating its country’s sovereignty and 
domestic laws. In such cases, protocol dictates that the Philippine embassy will coordinate 
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with Kuwaiti police authorities. However, the embassy was deemed to have purposely failed 
to do so. Thus, the Kuwaiti government issued arrest warrants against Philippine embassy 
personnel for kidnapping. It also expelled the Philippine ambassador, declaring him “persona 
non grata" and recalled its Kuwaiti ambassador from Manila.    
Philippine Response:  
The Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Allan Peter Cayetano, a political appointee 
of Duterte, issued an apology to the government and citizens of Kuwait over the controversial 
actions of Philippine embassy officials. On 30 April 2018, President Duterte meanwhile made 
permanent the temporary ban on the deployment of Filipino workers to Kuwait that he 
imposed last January. He also cancelled his scheduled state visit to Kuwait.  
Case Outcome:  
After the diplomatic standoff, both countries eventually signed the "Agreement on the 
Employment of Domestic Workers between the Philippines and Kuwait" on 11 May 2018. The 
agreement seeks to guarantee their rights such as allowing them to keep their passports and 
mobile phones (often confiscated by employers). It also imposes Kuwaiti employees to 
provide domestic workers with food, housing, clothing, and health insurance.  
The Philippine government had set this labour agreement as a condition for its 
eventual termination of its deployment ban to Kuwait. On 16 May 2018, Duterte ordered the 
lifting of the deployment ban, and eventually declared the normalization of ties between the 
Philippines’ and Kuwait.     
Evaluation of the Philippines’ Behaviour towards Kuwait Regarding the Welfare of Filipino 
Workers 
 
The Philippines put up an assertive stance towards Kuwait regarding the increasing 
reports of death and abuse of Filipino domestic workers. The Kuwaiti government sought to 
rectify the situation by granting an amnesty program and imposing the death sentence to the 
employers who allegedly murdered Demafelis.  
However, the diplomatic blunder committed by the Philippine government resulted in 
in its loss of control towards its engagement with Kuwait.  While the country initially took the 
125 
 
upper hand in its demands with the Kuwaiti government, it eventually undermined its position 
due to the “rescue operation” instigated by the DFA. The Philippines was deemed to have 
diminished its leverage in the negotiation over the labour deal with Kuwait, with some 
observers pointing out that it could have pushed for more substantial benefits and safety 
measures for Filipino workers.” According to Interviewee 1455: “the position of the Philippines 
was sacrificed to repair diplomatic ties with the Kuwaiti government.” Though it was a 
precondition to the signing of the labour agreement, the deployment ban of Filipino domestic 
helpers bound for Kuwait was eventually lifted, reflecting a change in the Philippines’ policy 
position. On this note, the Philippines’ change in position manifested a “weak behaviour.”    
Yet Duterte’s keen attention to the issue and his combative statements has put the 
spotlight on the plight of Filipinos in Kuwait.  According to Interviewee 15,56 Duterte “shunned 
the niceties and politeness of diplomacy, as the situation calls for it. Feel good diplomacy 
stops when human rights are trampled upon.” Because of Duterte’s aggressive stance, the 
Philippines consequently manifested high commitment to safeguard the lives and welfare of 
its nationals. Eventually, the country was able to achieve its objective of protecting its citizens, 
in the form of a labour agreement with Kuwait. In this case, the Philippines manifested a 
“strong behaviour.” As observed by Interviewee 16,57 “It showed the Philippine government’s 
commitment to the protection of its overseas workers. I may not agree with some of its 
actions but at the very least, it secured a labour deal that includes additional protection for 
Filipinos in Kuwait.”  
In separate instances, the Philippines exhibited a weakened position on the one hand, 
and a strong stance on the other. This divergent evaluation puts the Philippines in a neutral 
position as its initial estimation of its behaviour towards Kuwait regarding the welfare issue 
of Filipino workers. To further explicate on its “neutrality,” the following approach/attitude 
and action/ reaction are analysed:  
 
                                                          
55 Interview with a Filipino diplomat working in the Migrant Affairs Office of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
in February 2019. 
56 Interview with a Filipino Foreign Service Officer currently posted in the Middle East in March 2019.  
57 Interview with a policy analyst specializing in migration studies in March 2019.  
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1. Combative reaction of the Philippines brought about by Duterte’s personal characteristics  
 Duterte’s assertive personality is reflected in his tough-talking attitude amidst the 
rising cases of murder and abuse against Filipino workers. In his dramatic outburst against 
Kuwait, Duterte declared: “What are you doing to my countrymen? Is there something wrong 
with your culture? Is there something wrong with your values? (Basa 2018).” For Interviewee 
17,58 Duterte’s outrage was a “long time coming. It sent a strong message against the labour-
receiving country. It also took swipes against the root cause of the abuses, which is the 
medieval kafala system.d” 
 His reaction also revealed his image as a benevolent father of the nation, who strongly 
cares about the plight of his people. Duterte (2018) proclaimed that “the Filipino is no slave 
to anyone, anywhere and everywhere. Every unlawful physical injury that is inflicted on an 
OFW is an injury I personally bear as the head of this republic."  
There were criticisms against the imposition of the deployment ban, which was 
considered as an abrupt decision without clear policy guidelines. But for Interviewee 16, 
“Duterte’s decision to impose a temporary deployment ban was strategically useful in getting 
the Kuwaiti government to negotiate with the Philippines for more labor policies that will 
protect migrant workers’ rights.” Essentially, Duterte’s aggressive personality and leadership 
style resulted in a combative attitude of the Philippines that strengthened its stance towards 
Kuwait regarding the cases of abuse against Filipinos.    
2. Impassioned attitude of the Philippines due to its national interests concerning Filipino 
workers  
 Because of several tragic cases, Duterte imposed a deployment ban for workers bound 
for Kuwait. In a speech, he declared: “Can I ask you now just to treat my countrymen as human 
beings with dignity? One more incident about a Filipina worker being raped there, committing 
                                                          
58Interview with a Filipino Foreign Service Officer posted in the Middle East in March 2019.  
d The system requires all unskilled labourers to have an in-country sponsor, usually their employer, who is 
responsible for their visa and legal status. This practice has been criticised by human rights organizations for 
creating easy opportunities for the exploitation of workers, as many employers take away passports and abuse 
their workers with little chance of legal repercussions. 
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suicide, I'm going to stop, to ban and I'm sorry to the Filipinos there, you can all go home (de 
Guzman 2018)."  
Public reaction on the deployment ban of OFWs to Kuwait was divided. Some 
expressed support on the government’s decision to prevent domestic workers from going to 
Kuwait. As early as 2013, Filipinos living in Kuwait themselves have requested the Philippine 
government to stop sending household workers in the gulf state, following numerous reports 
of maids fleeing their employers amid complaints of abuse. According to a statement from 
the group Pilipino sa Kuwait, “The Philippine government must heed our call and be moved 
with wisdom, good judgment and determination to muster the political will to freeze the 
deployment of our women as household service workers to the Middle East, and to put an 
end to this decades of vicious cycle of recruitment-deployment-abuse (Santiago 2013).”  
However, others believe that it will not stop domestic workers from going to Kuwait 
and will only increase potential victims of human trafficking by illegal recruiters. In a 
statement from the Human Rights Watch (HRW): “the ban forces Filipinos to resort to unsafe 
and unregulated channels to enter the country (2018).” Moreover, for Interviewee 14: “It’s a 
knee-jerk reaction.  Although the ban may be temporary, it may do more harm than good for 
the Philippines and the Filipinos in Kuwait in particular.”  
Regardless of the divided public opinion, there was a strong emotional reaction over 
the tragic death of Demafelis, and a widespread clamour among the Filipinos for the 
government to take strong action. With the deployment ban, the Philippines led by Duterte, 
displayed an impassioned stance in response to abuses in Kuwait, despite domestic criticisms 
and the potential loss of labour market for overseas workers.   
3. Proactive approach of the Philippines brought about by its political institutions  
 Though the protection of overseas Filipino workers is enshrined in the country’s 
foreign policy, such mandate can be conveniently exploited by Filipino politicians with vested 
interests for political mileage and self-promotion. This points to DFA Secretary Cayetano, a 
long-time politician and not a career diplomat, who was criticized for permitting the release 
of the controversial video.  That video was widely viewed as a public showcase to prove that 
government officials are making efforts to protect Filipino workers. His actions were 
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influenced by strong public opinion regarding overseas workers since each reported Filipino 
corpse arriving in the country from Kuwait, the Philippine government bears the wrath of the 
domestic public. 
 As part of its mandate, the Philippines takes a proactive approach to protect overseas 
Filipino workers. In this case, the government has declared a deployment ban and assisted in 
the repatriation and return of these workers through Kuwait’s amnesty program. However, 
the alleged “rescue operation” of Filipinos in the video backfired and largely construed as a 
form of politicking by Cayetano, an ambitious politician seeking to get elected for a 
government post. According to opinion columnist Boo Chanco (2018): “Cayetano is focused 
on how to be president after Duterte. Being Foreign Affairs Secretary is just a stepping stone. 
That Kuwaiti affair was not primarily a ‘rescue’ operation, but a publicity stunt to promote 
Cayetano’s political future.” 
Unfortunately, such proactive effort turned out to be a miscalculated and imprudent 
act that caused the tense diplomatic row between the Philippines and Kuwait, which 
ultimately weakened the country’s position. Even for Jose Alejandrino (2018), a policy adviser 
of Duterte, the video revealed Cayetano’s incompetence and recklessness. “When you run a 
covert operation you don’t advertise it. By posting the video, the Cayetano team provided the 
evidence against themselves to the Kuwaiti authorities that Philippine embassy officials had 
broken their laws. It made the Kuwaitis look impotent. It added insult to injury. Hence the 
outrage and the diplomatic protest by the Kuwaiti government.”  
4. Coercive action of the Philippines due to its bilateral economic relations  
 When the Philippine government imposed a temporary deployment ban, the Kuwaiti 
government responded with an amnesty program for undocumented Filipinos. When Kuwait 
issued arrest warrants against Philippine embassy personnel and expelled the Philippine 
ambassador, the Philippines made permanent the temporary deployment ban and cancelled 
the president’s state visit to Kuwait.  
 These are considered as coercive actions by the Philippines towards Kuwait in an 
attempt to protect the lives of Filipinos in the country, which strengthened its stance. 
Philippine authorities estimate that there are about 251,000 documented Filipinos working in 
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Kuwait. Of that number, about 163,000 are employed as household service workers. The 
Philippine government recognizes this significant number, which it deems both a major strain 
to its limited resources and a source of leverage towards its Kuwaiti counterpart.  
But what is implicit in Duterte’s actions is that it capitalized on the huge population of 
Filipino domestic workers and their contributions to the Kuwaiti economy and its households. 
His actions eventually compelled Kuwait to make institutional arrangements to safeguard the 
welfare of Filipino workers in the country. Thus, for Interviewee 17, it is possible that the 
permanent deployment ban enabled the Philippine government “to have leverage against 
Kuwait” in its negotiation on the labour agreement. As explained by Interviewee 16, “the 
reaction of the Kuwaiti government with regards to the ban also showed the indispensability 
of Filipino workers in its economy, which the Philippines was well aware of.”  
Assessment on the Philippines’ Overall Behaviour towards Kuwait Regarding Overseas 
Filipino Workers  
 
The first table below summarizes an assessment on the Philippines’ behaviour 
towards Kuwait. Based on the evaluative measures using issue power balance and issue 
outcome, the conclusion of the case reveals that the Philippines exhibited both weak and 
strong behaviours. This consequently reflected a NEUTRAL stance as the initial estimation of 
its behaviour and represents its behavioural point of reference.   
Table 14: The Philippines’ Initial Estimation of NEUTRAL Behaviour towards Kuwait Regarding 
Overseas Filipino Workers59 
 
Issue Power Balance Issue outcome Weak Behaviour Strong Behaviour 
The Philippines LOST 
CONTROL in its 
engagement with Kuwait 
due to its diplomatic 
blunder  
CHANGE IN POSITION 
of the Philippines due 
to its lifting of the 
deployment ban 
imposed on Kuwait  
√  
The Philippines reflected 
HIGH COMMITMENT to 
safeguard the lives and 
welfare of its nationals  
ACHIEVED OBJECTIVE 
for the Philippines in 
the form of a labour 
agreement signed 
with Kuwait  
 √ 
                                                          
59 This table is a summary of the Philippines’ Initial Estimation of Behaviour originally created by the author for 
this study.    
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The second table below highlights the discrete external behaviours that can further 
elaborate on the Philippines’ neutral behaviour. In particular, they are the situation-based 
approach/attitude and actor-based action/reaction that the Philippines exhibited during the 
case.  
Table 15: The Philippines’ External Behaviours Affecting its NEUTRAL Behavioural Point of 
Reference towards Kuwait Regarding Overseas Filipino Workers60 
 
External Behaviour Details Impact on  






The Philippines displayed intense 
emotional reaction over the 
mounting deaths of Filipino 
workers. This enabled its 
government to take a strong stance.  
 
Regress from NEUTRAL 
behavioural point 
              
Proactive 
Approach 
The Philippine government’s 
alleged ‘rescue operation’ of 
Filipinos backfired and construed as 
a form of politicking. This weakened 
its position in dealing with Kuwait. 







The Philippines took an assertive 
stance towards Kuwait based on 
Duterte’s tough statements against 
cases of Filipino abuse. This 
reflected its strong posture.   
Regress from NEUTRAL  




The Philippines capitalized on its 
large population of workers in 
Kuwait that empowered it to 
impose a deployment ban. It then 
gained leverage in its negotiation 
for a labour agreement, which 
essentially strengthened its 
position.  









                                                          
60 This table is a summary of the Philippines’ External Behaviour originally created by the author for this study.    
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Based on the two tables, the Philippines on the whole generated a SEMI-STRONG 
behaviour towards Kuwait regarding the case concerning the plight of overseas Filipino 
workers as illustrated in the figure below:  
Figure 16: The Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines’ Resulting in an Overall SEMI-STRONG 
Behaviour towards Kuwait Regarding Overseas Filipino Workers61 
 
Weak          NEUTRAL       Strong 
 
 
            
                   SEMI-STRONG 
 
    Proactive     Combative Coercive Impassioned 
 
 
At the end of the case, the Philippines projected an initial estimation of a NEUTRAL 
behaviour towards Kuwait, which displayed both its strength and weakness. But during the 
case, its other external behaviours caused ‘regressions’ in opposite directions from its neutral 
behavioural point of reference. Its proactive approach to save the ‘abused’ Filipino workers 
backfired, which diminished its international credibility and diplomatic standing. Thus from 
its neutral point, there is a shift towards a weakened position.  
However, the Philippine government’s impassioned attitude to protect the welfare of 
Filipinos, its coercive action to impose a deployment ban against Kuwait, and its combative 
reaction led by Duterte against the Kuwaiti government all contributed to strengthen its 
position. Thus from its neutral point, these external behaviours resulted in more ‘regressions’ 
or shift towards a stronger behaviour, causing a wider grey panel on the right side of the 
behavioural spectrum.  
Because of these external behaviours that affected its initial NEUTRAL position, the 
Philippines’ behaviour has swayed in both ways. But with three strong points as against one 
                                                          
61 This figure is the Behavioural Spectrum of the Philippines that reflect its overall behaviour. This is an original 
illustration made by the author for this study. 
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weak spot, the Philippines consequently displayed an OVERALL SEMI-STRONG behaviour 
towards Kuwait regarding the welfare of its Filipino workers.  
After discussing all of the above casess, the table in the following page presents a 
summary of the results in the evaluation of the Philippines’ external behaviour towards other 
small states. It highlights the initial estimation of its behaviour (derived from the issue power 
balance and issue outcome) at the conclusion of each case. It also lists the discrete external 
behaviours (both situation and actor based) that the Philippines projected during the course 
of the bilateral issue. Both of these factors influence the overall assessment of the Philippines’ 
behaviour in each case. This should provide an overview of the variations of the country’s 

















Table 16: Summary of the Philippines’ Initial Estimation of Behaviour, External Behaviours, 
and Overall Assessment of its Behaviour towards other Small62  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
CASE ANALYSIS: 
The Philippines’ Foreign Policy Determinants and Explanatory Factors   
 
Based on this study’s inductive approach, this chapter evaluates the foreign policy that 
explains the external behaviour of the small state in its interactions with another. It examines 
the Philippines’ foreign policy as the underlying basis of its external behaviour as examined in 
the case studies in the previous chapter.    
As discussed in this study’s Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3, an assessment of the 
Philippines’ foreign policy is based on three determinants (leadership, political, and bilateral), 
each with its own explanatory factors. Every explanatory factor corresponds to an external 
behaviour of the Philippines as pointed in the Case Studies in Chapter 4. This chapter then 
explicates each of these three determinants and their corresponding explanatory factors that 
influence its foreign policy and consequently its external behaviour.  
After the discussion on these foreign policy determinants and their explanatory 
factors, this chapter relates it across all of the cases discussed in the Case Studies in Chapter 
4. It will analyse their impact on the Philippines’ external behaviours, which could either 
weaken or strengthen its stance on an issue relative to another small state.   
Towards the end, this chapter also analyses the correlation among these determinants 
and factors, which give a holistic view of the Philippines’ foreign policy. This should provide a 
general indication on the rationale behind the country’s external behaviour and conduct in 
international affairs. 
 
5.1 Leadership Determinants: Personal Characteristics and Global Perceptions of Philippine 
Presidents 
 
In examining the Philippines’ foreign policy as a small state, the influential role of its 
president must be taken into account. With constitutional authority, the president’s power 
has wide political latitude to make quicker and more decisive actions concerning the country’s 
external affairs. Often referred to as the chief architect of foreign policy, a Philippine 
president “can redefine priorities, dictate the tone and posture in the international 
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community, and even personally manage diplomacy with selected countries if he/she so 
wishes, subject to some structural constraints” (Baviera 2015).  
 
Because of the country’s personality-based political culture, the Philippine presidency 
also possesses much leeway to put his/her personal stamp on the nation’s foreign policy. In 
fact, an assessment of the Philippines’ international affairs and external relations is generally 
based on an evaluation of presidential administrations such as the Marcos foreign policy 
(1965-1986), the Ramos (1992-1998) foreign policy, or the Arroyo foreign policy (2001-2010). 
Essentially, each of these leaders bring their own biases to the office, and their individuality 
is clearly apparent whenever they implement changes in the country’s foreign policy that are 
radically different from their predecessors.   
 
Using their administrations as the contextual background in analysing the Philippines’ 
external behaviour, this study features the profiles of Presidents Benigno Aquino III and 
Rodrigo Duterte. Each of these leadership profiles features their personal characteristics 
(personality and leadership style) and global perceptions (beliefs, ideology, and images) as 
discussed in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3. Their profiles should reveal their 
individual foreign policies and the resulting external behaviour that the Philippines 
manifested in the Cases Studies as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
5.1.1 Leadership Profile: Benigno Aquino III  
 
Benigno Aquino III was born on 8 February 1960 in Manila, Philippines. His father was 
Benigno Aquino Jr., who was regarded as a national hero after his assassination for his 
unrelenting pursuit to reinstitute democracy in the Philippines during the dictatorial regime 
of Ferdinand Marcos. His mother was Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the most prominent figure 
of the 1986 People Power Revolution that toppled Marcos and led to her installation as the 
first female president of the country.  
 
With his political pedigree, Aquino also established his career in politics. He initially 
worked in the business sector after completing his Bachelor’s degree in Economics in 1981 
prior to being elected in government posts. A fourth-generation politician, he started his 
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political life as a member of the House of Representatives for nine years, and subsequently 
served as a senator for three years. Aquino eventually became the 15th President of the 
Philippines after winning the 2010 national elections.   
 
Aquino’s Personal Characteristics: Cooperative Actions for Philippines  
 
Aquino was elected president through a formidable campaign against massive 
corruption and political instability that highlighted the reign of his predecessor (and 
incidentally his former university professor) Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010). For the 
majority of Filipinos who voted for him, Aquino possessed an untarnished image of personal 
integrity. While his record as a congressman and a senator was unimpressive, Aquino has an 
untainted reputation of honesty without any insinuations of using his political influence 
inappropriately. In a country where corruption is endemic, his clean record is in itself a 
noteworthy achievement that eventually propelled him to the presidency.     
 
Aquino also embodied simplicity and humility despite his illustrious family name. 
According to Harden (2010): “He has a low-key personality who shoots pool, enjoys jazz, and 
had never seen himself as a national saviour. He has also lived most of his life in his mother's 
modest house on the edge of Manila.” In a media interview, Aquino was quoted as saying: 
“Don't let me start out having an inflated sense of my own worth or my ego, not having my 
feet planted firmly on the ground because I might succumb to the same temptations that 
those who we are criticizing have done" (Lunt 2010). Aquino pledged not only to “set the 
example” himself to be an ethical and honest public servant, but also to hold similarly high 
standards for those who join his administration.  
 
Aquino is likewise viewed as being meticulous and methodical. Despite his minimal 
achievements in his 12 years in the legislature, he has served on a wide range of committees 
and is familiar with the issues of governance. He spent long hours examining the national 
budget and proposed key amendments to make sure that public funds were prudently spent. 
Aquino also actively participated in Senate investigations on the abuses of government 




In addition, Aquino describes himself as a leader who seeks consensus. Growing up in 
the shadow of democracy icons as parents, he encourages free and liberal thinking among his 
people, yet fosters consensus when making important state decisions. Aquino is also known 
for building partnerships between government and communities, particularly in addressing 
the country’s communist insurgency problem. Notably, he defied protocol and met with rebel 
chief Murad Ebrahim to revive the stalled peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF). At the international level, Aquino is renowned for promoting cooperation with 
other countries to address common security threats in the region.  
  
Because of his personality, Aquino may be regarded as having a ‘systematic leadership 
style,’ as he ultimately leads by ‘careful planning.’ He is predisposed to objective and accurate 
analytical thinking when making decisions. Systematic leaders like Aquino work best in 
situations requiring accuracy and long-term planning. This was evident in his diligent efforts 
in mapping out and accomplishing the economic development goals he targeted during his 
administration, which resulted in the country’s increased investor confidence and significant 
economic growth rate.    
 
However, Aquino’s leadership style tends to be less effective when faced with crisis 
that needed urgent actions, even when all the facts are not available. Such observation 
explains Aquino’s diplomatic mishandling of the Manila bus hostage crisis in 2010 that 
resulted in the deaths of Hong Kong tourists. He was criticized for his administration’s failure 
to initiate contact with the Hong Kong government and his futile attempt at damage control.    
 
In addition to his systematic leadership style, Aquino is generally regarded as a 
‘conciliatory leader.’ According to Hermann (1980), this type of leadership indicates a need to 
establish and maintain friendly relationships with others, and is less suspicious of their 
motives. Such leaders also reveal high conceptual complexity with an ability to consider a 
wide range of alternatives. They also exhibit little belief in their own ability to control events 
in which they are involved in. 
 
Based on his personality and leadership style, Aquino is predisposed to push for a 
‘participatory’ foreign policy for the Philippines. As Hermann (1980, 11) argues, such policy 
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fosters interactions with other nations to learn from them. It also seeks a wide range of 
alternative solutions to problems jointly plaguing the nation and others. A participatory 
foreign policy is largely sensitive, responsive, and attuned to what is going on in international 
relations. As a result, such foreign policy tends to evoke cooperative actions from the 
Philippines led by Aquino towards other small states.  This was evident in the manner by which 
the Philippines convinced Indonesia to grant a temporary reprieve on Veloso’s death 
sentence. 
 
Aquino’s Global Perceptions: Compounded Approach for Philippines  
 
Aquino’s perceptions about the world is largely shaped by his morals beliefs and liberal 
ideology. Often regarded as an ‘accidental president,’ he is regarded as a “unique conception 
of political ambition based on a moralistic fulfilment of a larger obligation to the collective” 
(Heydarian 2013). Because of the political legacies of his parents, Aquino continued to 
espouse democratic values in his governance platform. He clearly stated this in one of his 
interviews: “I want to make democracy work, not just for the rich and well-connected, but for 
everybody” (Tordesillas 2009).  
 
Aquino is also influenced by the images he holds about the world. Though he perceives 
the anarchic world as unfair and corrupt, Aquino believes that through democratic institutions 
and good governance, it can be better.  It is a paradigm that “assumes the application of 
reason in paving a way for a more orderly, just and cooperative world, restraining disorder 
that can be policed by institutional reforms” (Dizon and Cabalza 2016). This is the reason why 
Aquino’s strategy in dealing with overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea led to 
the country’s filing of arbitration case against China. He championed a rules-based approach 
under the facets of idealism, magnifying moral virtue by asserting that a sovereign state such 
as the Philippines should gain an equal footing in the court of law despite the apparent power 
asymmetry with China.  
 
Meanwhile, Aquino’s worldview is perceived through a moral lens. He deems that the 
anarchic world can be regulated through international institutions. This results in his affinity 
towards a ‘liberal and institutionalist’ foreign policy for the Philippines. Such policy requires 
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careful deliberation and moral and legal considerations that are aligned with the standards 
and principles upheld in international institutions. This reflects Aquino’s more sophisticated 
and nuanced global outlook that equally espouses the manner in which the state advances its 
interests as much as the achievement of its policy goals.  Such global perception of Aquino 
tends to manifest a compounded approach for the Philippines when managing issues with 
other small states.  
 
Aquino’s Personality and Perception: Implications on the Philippines’ WEAK/STRONG 
Behaviour 
 
 The personal characteristics and global perceptions of Aquino have significant effect 
on the external behaviour of the Philippines, as evidenced in the four cases discussed in this 
study during his presidential administration.   
 
 Aquino’s influence may not be evidently prominent in the two cases with Taiwan since 
as a head of state, he is not supposed to directly engage with it politically and diplomatically 
under the One-China policy. However, his personality and perception as the president are 
implicitly manifested in both cases, which have significant bearing in the Philippines’ attitude 
towards Taiwan.  
  
 In the Taiwanese deportation case, Aquino bared his multi-layered global outlook 
when he prioritized the Philippines’ interests with China at the expense of its goodwill with 
Taiwan. His decision or permission to deport the Taiwanese nationals to the mainland 
exposed his complex worldview, resulting in a more compounded behaviour for the 
Philippines.  Essentially, his high concern for the country’s issues with China enabled him to 
adopt a ‘stronger’ stance towards Taiwan by deporting its nationals to the mainland against 
the vehement objection of the Taiwanese government.  
 
 In the aftermath of the Taiwanese fisherman’s death, Aquino inadvertently revealed 
the drawbacks of his ‘systematic’ leadership style, which tends to be less effective when 
confronted with a crisis. This was implied through the reactive approach of his government 
officials in response to the controversial death of the fisherman. Aquino’s leadership may 
140 
 
have indirectly led to the Philippine government’s ‘mishandling’ of the case, which 
consequently ‘weakened’ the country’s stance towards Taiwan.  
 
 Meanwhile during the Sabah standoff, Aquino’s cooperative attitude towards 
Malaysia reflected his nuanced perception regarding the issue. This was brought about by his 
high regard for Malaysia’s role in the peace process in Mindanao, which he did not want to 
jeopardize by antagonizing it. Yet his collaborative demeanour with the Malaysian 
government during the crisis was negatively perceived as detrimental to the Sulu militants’ 
territorial claim on Sabah. Because of Aquino’s attitude and outlook, the Philippines’ 
consequently projected a ‘weakened’ stance towards Malaysia.  
 
 But in his engagement with Indonesia regarding Veloso’s death penalty case, Aquino’s 
conciliatory personality resulted in a ‘stronger’ behaviour for the Philippines. This was evident 
in the courteous manner by which he convinced his Indonesian counterpart, President 
Widodo, to delay Veloso’s execution. Moreover, Aquino’s global perception also has a 
significant effect in the Philippines’ position regarding the case. His utmost consideration for 
the sanctity of human rights and the preservation of human life, enabled him to make a 
committed appeal to Indonesia to spare the life of Veloso, even at the risk of disregarding 
Indonesia’s judicial ruling on the case.        
 
 As these cases reveal, Aquino’s personality and perception have major impact on the 
Philippines’ behaviour. However while his personality and perception naturally remain the 
same, the level of Aquino’s keenness and dedication on how he treats or perceives each case 
varies. This essentially affect the Philippines’ behaviour, which could fluctuate to either a 
weaker or stronger stance.   
 
5.1.2 Leadership Profile: Rodrigo Duterte  
 
Rodrigo Duterte was born on March 28, 1945 in Leyte, Philippines. His father served 
as a local mayor and governor, while his mother was a public school teacher. Duterte 
graduated from law school in 1972 and worked at the City Prosecution Office of Davao City, 
Mindanao (southern part of the Philippines). He eventually became Davao City mayor in 1988, 
141 
 
re-elected six times, and occupied the position for more than twenty years before becoming 
the country’s president. Duterte succeeded Aquino as the 16th president of the Philippines 
after winning the 2016 national elections.  
 
Duterte’s Personal Characteristics: Combative Action for Philippines  
 
Duterte is known for his tough-talking attitude and violent personality that are caused 
by a psychological condition. According to a report, Duterte is suffering from "Antisocial 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder,” a condition characterized by "grandiose sense of self-
entitlement and manipulative behaviour" and "pervasive tendency to demean, humiliate 
others and violate their rights and feelings" (Lozada 2016). Such condition was the basis of 
the annulment case filed by Duterte’s first wife to terminate their marriage.  
 
In the same report from official court records, Duterte is also capable of destructive 
behaviour. The “immediate gratification of his needs and desires is always expected; any 
delay can upset him a great deal" (Vitug 2016). The psychological assessment also found 
Duterte having a poor capacity for objective judgment. “He fails to see things in the light of 
facts, or at least from the point of view of most people. He also tends to rationalize and justify 
his wrongdoings” (Lozada 2016). 
 
Duterte’s psychological condition reveals a very impulsive and assertive personality.  
He is renowned for his immediate execution of policies and the implementation of reforms in 
government, with the occasional disregard for institutional checks and balances. He is also 
notorious for instigating violence that is militarised through state-armed forces in response 
to crisis. Such observation is reflected in Duterte’s brutal ‘war on drugs’ that allegedly 
involved extra-judicial killings.  
 
As a leader, Duterte won the presidency as a populist politician. According to Tanyag 
(2018), populism is an ideology and phenomenon that is characterised by a “polarised 
antagonism between the masses and the elite or the dangerous other.” It also involves the 
“harnessing of emotions as a constitutive element of governance, such as the propagation of 
oppositional thinking of ‘us versus them.’’ For the millions who voted for him, Duterte is seen 
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as an anti-elite who can change things for the people already frustrated with the chronic 
poverty and incessant crime in the Philippines.  Based on his promise of overnight salvation, 
Duterte has effectively “tapped into this collective frustrations over the inefficacy of state 
institutions led by the unresponsive and insensitive elite leaders” (Heydarian 2018).  
 
Moreover, Duterte is deemed as the benevolent father of the nation. Filipinos 
generally believe that he knows and pursues the best interest of the country and strongly 
cares about their plight. This ‘benevolent paternalism’ is supported by cultural norms around 
filial piety and reverence, which tends to undermine democratic governance in the country 
(Tanyag 2018). Add to his fatherly and macho image is his folksy charisma whom Filipinos 
consider as rough yet authentic. His signature bombastic language laced with obscene 
swearwords ironically endeared himself to the local masses. According to Moffitt (2016), 
Duterte’s “political style features bad manners, an appeal to the people versus the elite, and 
the performance of crisis, breakdown or threat.” 
 
Because of his personality and public image, Duterte may be deemed as having a 
‘direct leadership style,’ as he ultimately leads by taking charge. He has a "General-like" 
approach to getting people moving towards a goal, and takes charge no matter how 
challenging the situation. Direct leaders like Duterte are most effective in conflict, change, 
and crisis scenarios in which bold proactive action and quick effective decisions are needed, 
required and expected.  This is reflected in his assertive command during the armed conflict 
from May to October 2017 in Marawi, Philippines. Duterte immediately declared Martial Law 
during the battle, which the Philippine government forces eventually won against the local 
jihadists and militant groups affiliated with the Islamic State.  
 
However, Duterte’s direct leadership style tends to be least effective in circumstances 
requiring time to carefully plan and craft a strategy. Such shortcoming was apparent in his 
threat of a deployment ban of Filipino workers intended to leave for the Middle East. Without 
a clear policy procedure, his decision was largely viewed as a reactionary response to the 
rising cases of murder and abuse against Filipino domestic helpers allegedly committed by 
their Arab employers.   In addition to his direct leadership, Duterte is generally regarded as 
an ‘aggressive leader.’ According to Hermann (1980), this type of leadership tends to distrust 
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others and their motives. Such leaders also exhibit low conceptual complexity and are likely 
to believe that they have some control over the events in which they are involved in.  
 
Based on his personality and leadership style, Duterte is oriented towards an 
‘independent’ foreign policy for the Philippines. As Herman (1980, 12) claims, such policy 
seeks to maintain a nation’s individuality, to keep it as much as possible apart from the others 
since extensive international contact may lead to dependence. When interaction is necessary, 
an independent policy expects this to be on the nation’s terms. Thus, Duterte’s independent 
foreign policy, which is also heavily influence by his assertive personality, tends to generate a 
combative reaction for the Philippines when confronted with issues involving other small 
states.  
 
Duterte’s Global Perceptions: Conclusive Approach for the Philippines  
 
Duterte’s perception about the world is shaped by his personal beliefs and ideology. 
He believes in the principle behind ‘consequentialism’ in which the end justifies the means 
(that are presumably wrong) to achieve a supposed (and often uncertain) outcome. This is 
reflected in his autocratic tendencies that promote the methodical use of the state’s coercive 
power in order to achieve prompt implementation of policies. A self-confessed socialist, 
Duterte also pushes for equality in both his domestic and foreign policies. He aims to 
implement an “inclusive economic growth program” to directly improve the lives of the poor, 
while he subscribes to an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist ideology against the West.     
 
Duterte is also influenced by the images he holds about the world. In particular, he 
views the US as the ‘other’ or the enemy. This is based on his personal resentment against 
the Americans for their colonial subjugation of the Philippines and the unequal treaties that 
the US has long imposed on the country. Duterte also abhors the Americans and the rest of 
the Western world because of their ‘concerted condemnation’ regarding human rights 
violations in his war on drugs. 
 
In addition, Duterte views the anarchic world in “black and white, with hardly any 
shades of grey in between.” (Misalucha-Willoughby 2016). This is reflected in his clear-cut 
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‘either-or’ approach in managing the Philippines’ maritime issues with China. His verbal 
insinuations suggest that if not for his administration’s approach of bilateral engagement, the 
only alternative he has left is war with China.   
 
Meanwhile, Duterte’s worldview resonates with his own philosophy that emphasizes 
less on morality. For him, morality is less important in determining whether the state’s action 
is good or bad, as long as it paves the way for the pursuit of his version of national interest or 
political goals. A novice in international relations, Duterte seemingly reflects a simplified and 
less-nuanced outlook of the world. His perception of an anarchic world results in a ‘realist-
pragmatic’ foreign policy for the Philippines to enable it to survive in a hostile international 
environment.  
 
Thus, the country under Duterte subscribes to a foreign policy that asserts the “actual 
execution of relative power in a rational manner with outcomes falling within the expected 
range to safeguard the leader and the state’s interests” (Dizon and Cabalza 2016). Such 
foreign policy adhered to by Duterte has the tendency to generate a conclusive approach for 
the Philippines when addressing issues with other small states.  
 
Duterte’s Personality and Perception: Implications on the Philippines’ WEAK/STRONG 
Behaviour 
 
 There are only two cases under the Duterte administration that are discussed in this 
study. One of these cases is the death penalty issue of Veloso, which is a carryover from the 
previous Aquino administration. Essentially, Duterte manifested a “hands-off” reaction 
regarding the case when he implied to bequeath the fate of Veloso to Indonesia’s justice 
system. This reveals his pragmatic, less nuanced worldview that tends to result in a conclusive 
approach for the Philippines in managing bilateral issues.      
 
Duterte’s legalist perception on the issue is in sharp contrast to Aquino’s moral 
considerations and firm dedication to save the life of Veloso. With the assumption of Duterte 
as President, the Philippines took a legalist and unconcerned policy in her case that 
emphasized non-interference in the judicial process of Indonesia. But previously under 
Aquino, the country showcased a humane and committed policy to save her from the death 
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penalty in Indonesia. This reversal of policy consequently leads to a “weakened” position for 
the Philippines towards Indonesia regarding Veloso.  
 
 Meanwhile in the case with Kuwait, Duterte’s assertive personality prompted the 
Philippines’ combative reaction over the rising cases of murder and abuse of Filipino workers. 
His tough-talking pronouncements against the Kuwaiti government and his deployment ban 
for Filipinos consequently reflected a “stronger” stance for the Philippines.    
 
Similar to Aquino, Duterte’s personality and perception have major implications on 
the Philippines’ behaviour. The degree of his keenness and dedication on how he treats or 
perceives each case can vary, which could result in the fluctuation of either a weaker or 
stronger stance for the Philippines. What is evident however is that the more there are major 
differences in the personalities and perceptions of a state’s leaders, the more there are 
significant adjustments in the country’s foreign policy. Such disparity on the leaders’ 
personalities and perceptions result in major policy adjustments for the Philippines, as 
reflected on its divergent approach towards Veloso’s case.   Generally, this tends to produce 
a “weaker stance” for the Philippines. 
 
Indeed, the leadership determinant plays an influential role in a small state’s foreign 
policy. In the case of the Philippines, the contrasting personalities and perceptions of Aquino 
and Duterte have significant impact on its external behaviour. The table in the following page 











Table 17: Leadership Determinants of Aquino and Duterte63 
Leadership Determinants Characteristics 
Aquino’s Personal Characteristics Personality: consensus builder 
Leadership Style: systematic and conciliatory leader 
Aquino’s Global Perceptions Belief: moralistic  
Ideology: Liberal  
Images: Complex worldview 
Duterte’s Personal Characteristics Personality: autocratic and forceful 
Leadership Style: direct and independent leader 
Duterte’s Global Perceptions Belief: consequentialism 
Ideology: Socialist 
Image: clear-cut worldview 
 
 
5.2 Political Determinants: Political Institutions and National Interests of the Philippines 
 
 Aside from individual leaders, the political determinants of a small state are important 
in analysing its foreign policy. Essentially, they provide the domestic background in which 
these leaders operate. A small state’s political institutions feature the government actors and 
the institutional challenges in which they operate, which significantly influence the decision-
making process and implementation of its foreign policy. Meanwhile, a small state’s national 
interests underscore the driving force behind its foreign policy, particularly those that 
generate strong public opinion.  
 
  5.2.1 Political Institutions  
 
 The political institution of a country serves as the organizational context in which 
policies are formulated and implemented. As discussed in the Conceptual Framework in 
Chapter 3, it features the political actors and government institutions that have important 
roles to play in the foreign policy process.  
 
 The Philippines possesses a democratic regime with a presidential system of 
government that is largely patterned after the US. It has three coequal branches of 
government--- executive, legislative, and judiciary--- each with distinct and independent 
                                                          
63 This table is an overview of the leadership determinants of Aquino and Duterte as discussed by the author in 
this study.  
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powers and areas of responsibility. But in the foreign policy process, the executive branch and 
its extensive bureaucracy assume the primary role.  
 
  Thus, the political actors involved in the foreign policy process are mainly the chief 
executive and the bureaucrats. In the Philippines, the chief executive is represented by its 
president who is also referred to as the “chief architect” of the country’s foreign policy.  Aside 
from the president, the bureaucrats also comprise the executive branch. In the field of foreign 
policy, most of these bureaucrats serve as Foreign Service officers or diplomats. And in the 
case of the Philippines, they work in the Department of Foreign Affairs. They are largely 
consulted on foreign policy matters and serve as implementers of the country’s foreign policy 
agenda.   
  
 Aside from the chief executive and the bureaucrats, the political appointees also hold 
influence on a state’s foreign policy. In the Philippines, appointing people to official 
government posts both in the country and overseas, is a common practice by the president.  
With the consent and confirmation of the Senate, the president normally recruits these 
people to serve in the government as a debt payment for their assistance during the election 
or as a reward for their personal loyalty. These political appointments are typically regarded 
as a tool to dispense political patronage. Such political practice continues despite the 
existence of a large and professional foreign service who are recruited through a highly 
competitive examination process, and trained for the generalist functions of a Filipino 
diplomat (Baviera 2012).   
 
 In principle, the president must recognize and defer to the expertise and 
professionalism of the country’s Foreign Service. According to Republic Act 7157 or the 
Philippine Foreign Service Act: "In order to strengthen the Career Foreign Service Corps and 
to enable it to respond to the challenges in the field of international relations, the President 
shall be guided, as much as possible, by the principle that a majority of diplomatic and 
permanent missions shall be headed by career ambassadors." However, Philippine presidents 
normally assign coveted diplomatic posts to favoured allies and friends, as long as the 
designations will not exceed the number of appointees mandated by law. The Philippine 
148 
 
Foreign Service Act allots 51 percent of diplomatic positions to career officers and 49 percent 
to political envoys through presidential appointments. 
 
 Though majority of the Foreign Service posts are allotted to career officials, high-
ranking government positions with decision-making authority are typically designated to 
political appointees. In particular, the president customarily selects individuals to lead the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). He/she appoints the Secretary and several 
Undersecretaries to manage the department, and assigns a number of Ambassadors and 
Permanent Representatives to head the country’s embassies and missions abroad.  
 
Institutional Challenges: Reactive Approach for the Philippines 
 
 Because of the competing roles of these political actors and the bureaucratic politics 
within the government, the following are some of the institutional challenges that negatively 
affect the making and implementation of Philippine foreign policy:  
 
 One of these institutional challenges is brought about by the personality-based nature 
of governance in the Philippines despite its established bureaucracy.  This consequently 
produces a foreign policy that accentuates the personal predilections of the president, which 
is evident whenever there is a leadership transition that results in the adjustment of the 
country’s foreign policy. The implication is that, for every change in the presidential 
administration, the country’s bureaucracy particularly the DFA, has to accommodate the 
president’s agenda and the means to pursue it. It tends to adjust to the idiosyncrasies of each 
presidential administration, hoping to minimize differences between the past and present 
chief executive.  
 
Generally, there tends to be a major modification in the Philippines’ foreign policy and 
external behaviour, whenever there is a new presidential administration. This particularly 
happens when succeeding presidents have considerable differences in their personal 
characteristics and global perceptions. This results in inconsistencies in the country’s foreign 
policy whenever there are significant changes in the presidential administrations. As with 
other democratic countries that possess a presidential system of government, the Philippines 
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tends to suffer from less bureaucratic continuity whenever a new presidential administration 
(with a single six-year term) is established after every election. Because of these, the 
Philippines tends to suffer from the lack of standardized procedure in managing its 
international affairs. This makes the Philippines susceptible to carry out less strategic foreign 
policy decisions. Thus, Philippine foreign policy across all presidencies generally share a 
common feature----an absence of consistency and continuity which falls short of a long-term 
vision. 
 
 Another institutional challenge for the Philippines is caused by the bureaucratic 
politics between the bureaucrats and the political appointees.  This is especially apparent 
when the bureaucrats or the career diplomats have to deal with the president’s political 
appointees who may have limited foreign policy experience. Past Philippine presidents have 
been criticized for their controversial appointees who lack expertise in international relations. 
This reflects the country’s long-entrenched patronage system that enabled the president to 
appoint individuals based on personal loyalty or political quid pro quo. According to Cagoco-
Guiam (2018), some of these officials are regarded as “sycophants who are catapulted into 
positions of power in government even if their major qualification is that they are vociferous 
defenders of the administration.”  
 
 As top-level decision makers in the DFA, some of these unqualified political appointees 
hamper foreign policy decision-making and implementation. They are often tempted to 
initially advance their personal ambitions, while their organization’s mandate or the nation’s 
interests place second. The Philippines is particularly susceptible to this dilemma as its 
bureaucracy, particularly its foreign service, is led by high-ranking officials who are appointed 
by the president based primarily on loyalty and not on expertise. The tendency for some of 
these political appointees who carry self-serving agendas, is to overlook or bypass the 
recommendations and decisions of career diplomats on matters related to the Philippines’ 
external affairs. This results in an uninformed foreign policy for the Philippines. And when 
there are frequent policy conflicts between bureaucrats and appointees, Philippine foreign 




 Meanwhile, the rampant bureaucratic manoeuvring is another institutional challenge 
for the Philippines. This points to the competition and discord among professional 
bureaucrats, political appointees, and officials from different government agencies such as 
Foreign Affairs, National Defence, or Trade and Industry. The bureaucratic politics among 
these competing department agencies normally result in compromises among these actors 
with diverse interests, unequal influence, and different perceptions of national interests. Thus 
with the different agencies involved in a large bureaucracy (each with its own standard way 
of doing things), Philippine foreign policy is likely to be fragmented.   
 
These recurrent challenges reveal the Philippines’ less institutionalized political 
institutions, which are detrimental in its foreign policy process. These political and 
bureaucratic impediments prevent the country’s leaders and officials from pursuing more 
consistent, coherent, and strategic goals in the external environment. According to Salmore 
and Salmore (1978, 121), “it is anticipated that the behaviour of highly constrained regimes 
will have a higher proportion of actions elicited by another entity rather than actions 
indicating a coherent policy toward such an entity.” Because of its institutional challenges and 
political constraints, the Philippines tends to have an inward-looking predisposition that 
largely reflect a reactive approach to bilateral issues or external crises. 
 
Less Institutionalised Political Institutions: Reflecting the Philippines’ Weak Behaviour   
 
The Philippines’ reactive approach towards most of the cases in this study essentially 
reveal its “weak” behaviour. This is brought about by the country’s less institutionalised 
political institutions that largely constrain it to implement a more strategic policy and action 
in international affairs.  
 
Such observation is clearly apparent during the Taiwanese deportation case when the 
Philippines’ Bureau of Immigration repatriated them to the mainland in violation of the writ 
of habeas corpus issued by the Court of Appeals. The contradicting decisions between the 





The Philippine government also demonstrated a confounded and inconsistent manner 
by which it managed its issues with Taiwan while adhering to its One-China policy. During the 
deportation case, the Philippines sent the Taiwanese suspects to the mainland and 
vehemently refused to give an official apology to Taiwan. It strictly enforced its interpretation 
of the One-China policy to guise its accommodation of China’s looming influence over the 
case.  
 
But during the Taiwanese fisherman’s death, the Philippines offered a formal letter of 
apology on behalf of the president and the Filipino people to the fisherman’s family and to 
the Taiwanese people. It essentially revealed its compromising stance on its One-China policy 
after the country felt the negative impact of Taiwan’s sanctions.  Such inconsistency reflects 
the lack of standard procedures in the implementation of the Philippines’ foreign policy, 
which sometimes becomes politicized and subjected to various interpretations and agendas 
of its leaders.   
 
   The Philippines’ reactive approach on its external issues is also manifested on how it 
managed the Sabah standoff. While it has a dormant claim on the territory, it essentially has 
no clear policy stance on how to pursue it other than to conduct studies from one presidential 
administration after another, without any concrete proposals or recommendations. As a 
result, the Philippines has no strategic stance on Sabah, which suggests it may be relinquishing 
its territorial claims and ceding its sovereign rights to Malaysia.   
 
During Veloso’s scheduled execution, the Philippines’ reactive approach on urgent 
issues is depicted in the public criticisms against the government for failing to take immediate 
and dedicated actions on the case. Such delay can be pointed to the bureaucratic 
inefficiencies in the country’s government, which essentially reflects its low political 
institutionalization. To a certain extent, this diminished its campaign towards saving Veloso 
from the death penalty in Indonesia.   
 
In its case with Kuwait, the Philippines exposed its patronage system in its political 
institutions when Duterte appointed his political ally, Allan Peter Cayetano, as the Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs. This proved to be detrimental as evidenced in the Philippines’ political row 
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with Kuwait. With no prior diplomatic experience, Cayetano permitted the video release of 
an alleged rescue operation of Filipino workers, deemed to be a proactive approach to protect 
them, but with grave consequences as a result. He was deemed to have used the occasion to 
score ‘political points’ and media mileage for self-promotion. The alleged ‘rescue’ operation 
in the video was largely perceived as a publicity stunt to promote his political future after his 
term as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. As a result of his vested interests and erroneous 
decision, Cayetano caused diplomatic embarrassment for the Philippines, costing a 
diminished position during its negotiation with Kuwait on a labour agreement to protect the 
welfare of Filipino workers.   
 
All of the cases mentioned above point to the Philippines’ perennial institutional 
challenges, which reflect its low political institutionalization. Consequently, this negatively 
affected the country’s foreign policy and weakened its national stance towards all of its issues 
with other small states.  
 
5.2.2 National Interests   
 
 For the Philippines, its national interests are enshrined in the “Foreign Service Act of 
1991,” commonly known as the “Three Pillars of Philippine Foreign Policy.” These include (1) 
Preservation and enhancement of national security; (2) Promotion and attainment of 
economic security; (3) Protection of the rights and promotion of the welfare and interest of 
Filipinos overseas. Evidently, the Philippines shares similar security and economic interests 
with other countries, but also includes assistance to nationals as both its objective and 
responsibility in the conduct of its foreign policy.   
 
 Though a nation’s foreign policy is expected to protect its citizens abroad, the 
Philippines greatly emphasizes this mandate.  According to Hill (2003), foreign policy aims to 
work towards achieving the general conditions in which expatriates are secure enough to 
pursue life and work abroad, and to help them when they get into trouble. In the Philippines’ 
case, the estimated 12 million Filipinos scattered around the world (comprising 10 percent of 
the country’s total population) serve as an enormous and often vulnerable constituency to its 
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foreign service. Their significant number compels the government to attend to their needs 
and advance their welfare abroad through its various embassies and consulates.   
 
 Because of the continuous growth of overseas Filipino workers, it has spawned intense 
public attention as part of the country’s national interests. This despite the low awareness 
and marginal concern among the general public on issues related to foreign policy and 
international relations. Particularly in the Philippines, there is a large population of 
uneducated people who are less knowledgeable or sometimes ill-informed on foreign policy 
matters. Interests on international news are mostly confined within the elite and the attentive 
public. The general lack of concern among the masses, particularly in developing countries 
such as the Philippines, is due to the fact that foreign policy has a less immediate and visible 
impact on them. Their attention is directed towards domestic issues highlighting their 
concerns about daily survival rather than grand politics. 
 
High Public Interest on National Interests: Impassioned Attitude for Philippines  
 
 However, public opinion in the Philippines is becoming increasingly vocal on certain 
international issues, especially in relation to migrant workers. Aside from being one of the 
country’s national interests and foreign policy goals, the protection of overseas Filipino 
workers (OFW) possess large public constituencies that influence government decisions and 
actions in international affairs. Any critical issues relevant to the welfare of OFWs can easily 
mobilize public opinion and can generate domestic pressures to reach the highest level of 
government.  
 
This is the one aspect in Philippine foreign policy that arouse public emotions and 
interests since a significant number of Filipinos have family and friends living overseas.  Thus, 
the protection of overseas Filipino workers is regarded both as the Philippine government’s 
national interest and its institutional mandate. Because of this, the Philippines tends to 
project a very responsive foreign policy, and is inclined to display an impassioned stance 





National Interests embodied by OFWs: Impact on the Philippines’ Weak/Strong Behaviour 
 
 Because of both domestic pressure and public support, the advancement of the 
welfare of Filipinos overseas can serve as a motivating force to project a “stronger” stance for 
the Philippines.  
 
 This is reflected in the Filipino public’s emotional response during the impending 
execution of Veloso in Indonesia and the growing number of abuse and murder cases of 
Filipino workers in Kuwait. Both cases confirm that issues related to its nationals abroad 
prompt fervent action from the Philippines in dealing with foreign governments to promote 
their welfare and at the same time, satisfy its domestic constituency.  
 
 However, the protection of overseas Filipino workers can constrain the Philippine 
government in its external actions and can result in a “weakened” position on foreign policy 
issues. This is reflected in the two cases involving Taiwan. The Philippines conceded to the 
Taiwanese government after imposing punitive measures that negatively affected the 
employment of Filipino workers.  
 
During the Taiwanese deportation case, the Philippines was slapped with longer 
processing of work visas for Filipinos implemented by the Taiwanese government. Its emissary 
also pleaded to the Taiwanese government not to push through with its threat of a freeze 
hiring. To resolve the issue, the Philippines fired its immigration officials to avert Taiwan’s 
threat. Meanwhile during the Taiwanese fisherman’s death, the Philippines yielded to most 
of Taiwan’s demands (particularly providing an official apology and compensation) after it 
imposed a freeze hiring of Filipinos. Both cases reveal that issues affecting overseas Filipino 
workers can result in a diminished position for the Philippines in relation to others.   
 
 In sum, a small state’s level of political institutionalization and national interests can 
affect its behaviour. The table in the following page summarizes the peculiar characteristics 





Table 18: Political Determinants of Philippine Foreign Policy64 
 
 
5.3 Bilateral Determinants: Relative Power Capabilities and Asymmetric Bilateral Relations 
of the Philippines vis-à-vis other Small States 
 
 Aside from the leadership and political determinants that are both internal to the 
state, there are also the bilateral determinants that influence a small state’s foreign policy. 
They essentially explain the policies and actions of a small state in relation to another.  A small 
state’s relative capabilities refers to its power in relational terms that seeks to affect the 
behaviour of others. Meanwhile, a small state’s asymmetric relations relative to another 
highlights their unequal ties despite their seeming parity in aggregate structural power or 
material resources. Both these factors affect a small state’s foreign policy and its external 
behaviour.   
 
5.3.1 Relative Power Capabilities  
 
 In its interactions with fellow small states, the Philippines uses its relative capabilities 
to influence others by employing ‘power instruments.’ It employs these to promote its 
national interests and to gain concessions from other states in either the political or economic 
domain. Except for military instruments, it cautiously utilizes all others that may be combined 
                                                          
64 This table is an overview of the political determinants of the Philippines as discussed by the author in this 





Institutions of the 
Philippines 
Low political institutionalization due to personality-based nature of 
governance that results in major policy adjustments during changes 
in presidential administration  
Low political institutionalization allows for patronage system that 
appoints individuals with no foreign policy credentials to serve in 
government 
Low political institutionalization underscores weak bureaucracy 
susceptible to discord and competition among  government agencies  
National Interests 
of the Philippines 
Protection of migrant workers generate intense public opinion that 
influence government decision and actions in its international affairs  
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in a variety of ways. As mentioned in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3, the other power 
instruments that are commonly used include: economic, diplomatic, and symbolic. 
 
Similar to the majority of small states, the Philippines possesses weak military 
resources, which only ranks 6th out of 9 on military strength among countries in Southeast 
Asia in the Global Firepower Index in 2018. This exposes its lower military capability even in 
comparison with its fellow small states. It is subjected to the military power instruments 
exhibited by others, which makes the Philippines susceptible to the manoeuvring of its peers. 
It also has to contend with other states’ show of force or military threats when imposing their 
agenda. 
 
Its military vulnerability is particularly evident during the Sabah standoff between the 
Malaysian forces and the Royal Sulu army. The Philippine government had to yield to 
Malaysia’s tactical decision to use force against the Sulu army and to accept the death 
casualties during the military operation in Sabah. With Malaysia’s more advanced military 
capabilities, the Philippines largely had to take a backseat during the Sabah standoff. This 
largely reflected its weak behaviour towards Malaysia. 
 
Diplomatic and Symbolic Power: Persuasive Action for the Philippines  
 
Despite its military deficiencies, the Philippines is able to project power towards other 
states by using diplomatic and symbolic instruments. As a small state, it often employs these 
instruments such as protests and verbal persuasion to convey its interests and to get other 
countries to respect them. The common use of these diplomatic and symbolic power implies 
the country’s generally low aggregate power and capabilities, particularly its weak military 
force and to some extent, its limited economic resources relative to some of its peers. 
 
Because of this, the Philippines generally adopts a normative foreign policy based on 
universally-accepted norms and the rule of law. Its projection of such foreign policy is 
intended to result in persuasive actions to achieve the country’s goals and objectives in 
relation to other states. It is in the use of these power instruments that the Philippines was 
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able to convince Taiwan to lift the economic sanctions imposed on it in the aftermath of the 
deportation case; while it was able to persuade Indonesia to defer the execution of Veloso. 
 
Power Capabilities: Means towards the Philippines’ Strong Behaviour 
 
In most of the cases in this study, the Philippines was able to project “strength” by 
employing symbolic means in dealing with other small states. In the Taiwanese deportation 
case, the Philippines sent an emissary (a former Filipino Senator) to explain to Taiwan the 
reasons behind its decision to deport its nationals to the mainland. It also dismissed its 
immigration officials as a form of apology to which Taiwan has accepted. This eventually 
averted worsening relations between the two parties.  
 
Meanwhile in the aftermath of the Taiwanese fisherman’s death, the Philippines stood 
its ground not to conduct a joint investigation with Taiwan under its One-China policy. Though 
its refusal is regarded as a symbolic manifestation of its sovereign right as a state, the 
Philippines’ firm stance on such matter enabled it to project a “strong” behaviour towards 
Taiwan despite the latter’s more superior economic and military capabilities.    
 
Moreover, the Philippines employed symbolic means to protect the welfare of 
overseas Filipino workers in Kuwait. Through Duterte’s verbal attacks against the Kuwaiti 
government (that is apparently undiplomatic), the Philippines was able to shine a spotlight on 
the growing cases of murder and abuse of Filipinos. Such international “public shaming” can 
be regarded as a symbolic use of power, which prompted immediate actions from Kuwait to 
address the issue. Though this is largely implied in the case, Duterte’s condemnation has 
enabled the Philippines to demonstrate a “strong” stance towards Kuwait.   
 
In addition, the Philippines employed various diplomatic approaches to defer Veloso’s 
death penalty in Indonesia. Aquino personally lobbied her case to Widodo and the 
government made legal petitions to postpone her scheduled execution. Local civil society 
groups in the Philippines also made a humanitarian appeal for sympathy to the Indonesian 
government by using the narrative of the poor plight of their own overseas workers, which 
most Indonesians (with its own large population of citizens abroad) can relate to. Such 
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concerted national efforts “strengthened” the Philippines’ position, which eventually 
convinced Indonesia to temporarily cancel Veloso’s death sentence.  
 
5.3.2 Asymmetric Bilateral Relations   
 
 In the case of the Philippines, its relations with fellow small states reveal both 
interdependence and dependence with them.  This essentially reveals the inequality between 
small states despite its seeming power parity. As discussed in the Conceptual Framework in 
Chapter 3, Barbieri (1996, 33) distinguishes ‘dependence’ highlighting unequal relations and 
‘interdependence’ underscoring relations of mutual need. Determining a small state’s 
dependence/interdependence with another is influenced by the government and its leader’s 
perception on the cost and benefits of the bilateral relation to it. 
 
Dependent Relations: Acquiescent Reaction Revealing Weak Behaviour of the Philippines  
  
 The Philippines has several dependent ties resulting in a vulnerable foreign policy 
posture relative to its more military-advanced, and economically-superior counterpart. This 
tends to cause an acquiescent reaction from the Philippines whenever there is tension or crisis 
in its unequal and dependent bilateral relations.   
 
As a developing country, the Philippines is prone to economic sanctions such as 
reduction of investments, delays in trade, or withdrawal of loans and grants. It is also affected 
by the other countries’ subtle use of bilateral aid often employed as a reward or punishment. 
To give bilateral aid or to disallow it, and to create dependencies through its use, are all 
strategies for influence by the more affluent countries.  Thus, the Philippines is prone to 
display an insecure foreign policy stance, which also leads to an acquiescent reaction to the 
more developed adversary even to a fellow small state.  
 
In some of the cases in this study, the Philippines’ acquiescent reaction on issues with 
other small states led to its “weak behaviour.” This was clearly apparent in both cases with 
Taiwan during the aftermath of the deportation case and the death of the Taiwanese 
fisherman. The Philippines perceived itself to be economically dependent on Taiwan for trade, 
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and employment opportunities for its overseas workers. Thus, it had to make concessions 
whenever the Taiwanese government imposed economic sanctions against it.  
 
In addition, the Philippines’ political dependence with Malaysia caused its “weak 
behaviour” during the Sabah standoff. Its dependence on Malaysia’s critical diplomatic role 
as a facilitator in the peace process with the MILF, constrained the Philippine government to 
support the Sulu army led by Kiram in renewing the country’s claim to Sabah. The Philippine 
government, led by Aquino, essentially feared that Malaysia could put the peace agreement 
between the Philippine government and the MILF in peril.      
 
The acquiescent reactions of the Philippines that resulted in its “weakened” behaviour 
can largely be pointed to the Aquino administration’s perceptions of the country’s 
dependence towards other small states. This is particularly apparent in the Philippines’ 
economic dependence with Taiwan and its political dependence with Malaysia.  
 
Interdependent Relations: Defiant Action Reflecting Strong Behaviour for Philippines 
 
However, there are instances when the Philippines acted to the contrary based on its 
interdependent relations. Some of its interdependent relations with a few small states 
enabled it to have a more resolute or flexible stance that is not easily subjected to their 
influence. This typically results in a defiant action from the Philippines when it has to confront 
issues with other small states.   
 
Such defiant action generates a “stronger” behaviour from the Philippines towards 
other small states. This was evident in the Philippine government’s imposition of the 
deployment ban against Kuwait. Because of the murder and abuse against Filipino workers, 
the Duterte administration enforced the ban, taking into account Kuwait’s reliance on migrant 
workers particularly household service workers from the Philippines. Because of their 
interdependence with each other, both countries eventually signed a labour agreement that 
would end the deployment ban. It essentially guaranteed the dispatch of Filipino workers to 
Kuwait (benefitting Kuwaiti’s economy), while protecting their rights and welfare (fulfilling 
the Philippine government’s mandate).  Such view of economic interdependence can be 
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associated with Duterte’s perception that Kuwait requires Filipino workers as much as the 
Philippines needs Kuwait for employment opportunities.  
 
And to a certain extent, the Philippines’ regional interdependence with Indonesia 
generated its more confident drive to push for its interests and achieve its goal. During its 
campaign to postpose the execution of Veloso, the Philippine government invoked its regional 
affinity with Indonesia courtesy of ASEAN by citing the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The 
Philippines’ has tacitly emphasized to Indonesia their regional political interdependence to 
accomplish its objective of saving Veloso. Such emphasis on the Philippines and Indonesia’s 
political interdependence can be pointed to the Aquino administration’s perception on the 
relevance of regional affinity through ASEAN. By invoking its political interdependence and its 
ASEAN relations, this implicitly suggested a “strong” manifestation in the Philippines’ external 
behaviour.  
 
In sum, the relative power capabilities and asymmetric relations between small states 
affect their interactions. The table in the next page summarizes the power instruments 
typically employed by the Philippines and its dependent and interdependent relations with 
other small states as previously discussed:   
 





of the Philippines 
relative to other 
states 
Inadequate military and economic instruments compared with other 
countries  
Frequent exercise of diplomatic and symbolic  instruments towards other 
countries 
Asymmetric 
relations of the 
Philippines with 
other states 
Inequality can either cause dependence or independence in the economic or 
political relations with other states   
 
                                                          
65 This table is an overview of the bilateral determinants of the Philippines towards another small state as 
discussed by the author in this study. 
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Based on this chapter’s discussion, the table in the following page provides a summary 
of the external behaviours of the Philippines and the explanatory factors behind them in each 
of the cases. It also provides a brief description on how these factors could either weaken or 




























Table 20: Summary of the Philippines’ External Behaviours and the External Factors of its Foreign 
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stance  
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5.4 Correlation of Explanatory Factors in Analysing Foreign Policy 
 
 In sum, an analysis of the Philippines’ foreign policy is necessary to understand its 
external behaviour. The leadership, political, and bilateral determinants and their 
corresponding explanatory factors stipulate the foreign policy it pursues, and provide the 
rationale behind its conduct.   
 
Based on the three major determinants, Philippine foreign policy can be analysed 
through each of their explanatory factors. While some are more influential in the country’s 
foreign policy depending on specific cases, others may not be as prominent. However, these 
factors are essentially interrelated and have linkages with one another. Thus, this should be 
examined in order to have a holistic view of the Philippines’ foreign policy and its impact on 
its external behaviour towards other small states.  
 
 Generally, there is a correlation between the leadership and political determinants, 
particularly its institutions, which are internal to the state. In the case of the Philippines, its 
president possesses personal characteristics and global perceptions that shape its foreign 
policy. Because of the country’s personality-based political culture, Filipino presidents have 
significant influence in its foreign policy process. In particular, they manifest their 
personalities and perceptions in the country’s political institutions through their political 
appointees in the executive branch, which formulates and implements Philippine foreign 
policy. While the president has expansive authority in the foreign policy process acting in the 
name of the state, he/she is subjected to the country’s patronage system (appointing 
unqualified officials) and its weak and fragmented bureaucracy. These factors, which reflect 
the Philippines’ less institutionalised political institutions, constrain its leadership to promote 
an effective and strategic foreign policy.   
 
 The link between the leadership and political determinants is also manifested in the 
Filipino president’s view of national interests. He/she has to prioritize and balance Philippine 
interests in a hierarchy of importance. Particularly, national interests motivated by public 
opinion induces the president and the rest of the government to prioritize the country’s 
166 
 
foreign policy goals that would seek to satisfy domestic constituency, particularly concerning 
the protection of overseas Filipino workers.    
 
 Meanwhile, the leadership determinant of the Philippines’ foreign policy also 
influence its bilateral determinants. The relative power capabilities and the asymmetry in 
relations of the Philippines vis-à-vis other small states, have implications on how its leaders 
manage bilateral interactions. Philippine presidents generally adjust the country’s foreign 
policy stance based on its resource capabilities relative to other small states, as well as their 
bilateral asymmetry. They decide what power instruments to be used in its engagement with 
other small states. Moreover, how they perceive the Philippines’ asymmetrical relations with 
another, whether it is dependent or interdependent, tends to influence their decisions on the 
country’s foreign policy and consequently its external behaviour. 
 
  In relation, there is also a correlation between the bilateral and political determinants 
in the Philippines’ foreign policy. Generally, its unequal power capabilities and dependent 
relations with other countries normally guide the Philippine government on how to manage 
resources, whether to utilize or conserve them in its external affairs. The disparity and 
dependency in bilateral ties also affect how the country will proceed in advancing its national 
interests. In cases when the Philippines is considered as the ‘inferior’ state, it tends to 
promote a more insecure and normative foreign policy with respect to the ‘superior’ state 
given these power dynamics. These bilateral determinants explain the characteristics of 
Philippine foreign policy in relation with others, and consequently provide the basis in 
analysing its interactions with fellow small states. 
  
5.5 Explanatory Factors of Foreign Policy as Predictive Indicators of External Behaviour  
  
 This study’s use of the inductive approach in analysing cases related to the Philippines’ 
interaction with small states highlights the case outcome first (determining the weakness or 
strength of its behaviour), then provides explanations on them. As discussed, the explanatory 
factors in the leadership, political, and bilateral determinants of the Philippines’ foreign policy 
explain the reasons behind its weak or strong behaviour. But when analysed and applied in 
reverse order, these explanatory factors in Philippine foreign policy can simultaneously be 
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used as references to predict the probability of its weakness or strength relative to other small 
states.  Thus even if the case outcome is yet to be determined, it is possible to forecast a weak 
or strong behaviour from the Philippines based on the following:  
 
 In terms of leadership determinants, the Philippines can project a weak behaviour if 
there are significant differences in the personalities and perceptions between its successive 
state leaders as exemplified by Presidents Aquino and Duterte. However, it can manifest a 
strong behaviour if its leaders reflect dedication to achieve a goal in interactions with other 
small states, whatever their personalities and perceptions may be. This is revealed in Aquino’s 
committed stance towards Indonesia to save Veloso and Duterte’s strong reactions against 
Kuwait regarding the mounting cases of abuse experienced by Filipinos there.   
 
 In terms of political determinants, the Philippines is expected to act weak  towards 
another small state when its less institutionalised government institutions hamper the 
implementation of its foreign policy. The country may also exhibit weak behaviour when its 
government is constrained by the high domestic pressure to pursue its national interests such 
as the protection of overseas Filipino workers. This national interest can be potentially used 
as leverage against the Philippines by another small state in a bilateral conflict to pursue its 
own national interest.  However, the Philippines can also be predicted to act strong if the 
advancement of its national interests is significantly backed by the majority of its citizens.  
 
 In terms of bilateral determinants, the Philippines is predicted to manifest weakness 
if it has less economic and military capabilities relative to other small states (as compared 
with Taiwan) and if it deems to be in a politically and economically dependent relations with 
another (as in the case with Malaysia). In contrast, the Philippines is anticipated to project 
strength if it uses diplomatic capabilities to persuade other small states that will achieve its 
objective (as in the case towards Indonesia). It can also reflect strength if it possess 
interdependent relations with other small states or at least hold perceptions of 
interdependence, which enable it to assert its preferred outcome in a bilateral dispute (as in 




These discussions on the Philippines’ foreign policy are the reasons behind its external 
behaviour towards others small states. They can also be used as important basis in predicting 
its weak or strong behaviour. Such analysis should aim to provide relevant insights that could 
benefit other small states in managing their foreign policies and estimating external 





























CHAPTER SIX  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION  
The Philippines’ External Behaviour and Foreign Policy: Important Insights for Small States 
  
This final chapter shifts from the specifics of the individual cases of the Philippines’ 
external behaviours and the explanatory factors in its foreign policy, to the general principles 
they reveal. The purpose is to provide insights that may be relevant in analysing other cases 
of small state interactions in particular, or international relations in general. Such insights can 
serve as guidelines in understanding the behaviour and policy of a small state and how they 
affect its engagement with others. 
The first part of this chapter highlights the vital principles derived from the evaluation 
of the Philippines’ external behaviours, which reveals the weakness or strength of its conduct 
in each of the cases discussed. They are hinged on the evaluative measures determining a 
small state’s weak or strong behaviour, as explained in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 
3 and applied in the Operationalization of the Case Studies in Chapter 4.   
The second part of this chapter offers valuable reflections on the explanatory factors 
behind the Philippines’ foreign policy, which provide the logical basis of its external behaviour.  
They are grounded on the theoretical perspectives that link policy and behaviour as presented 
in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3. These factors also provide the reasons behind the 
variations in a small states’ behaviour---- weak, semi-weak, strong, or semi-strong--- during 
an issue with another small state.  
Following the principles derived from the analysis of the Philippines’ external 
behaviour and foreign policy as a small state, this chapter concludes with a brief riposte on 
the research questions raised in the Introduction in Chapter 1. It offers relevant insights that 
can serve as a guideline for other small states to enable them to determine their weak or 
strong behaviour. These insights are expected to be useful contributions to the academic 
literature on small state studies.  In addition, this study mentions its limitations in the analysis 
of small states, which can then serve as the basis for future studies that could enrich the field 




6.1 Principles in the Evaluation of External Behaviour: Behavioural Assessment of a Small 
State   
 
 As discussed in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3, the evaluative measures of a 
state’s conduct highlighting the issue power balance and issue outcome, provide an initial 
estimation of a small state’s weak or strong behaviour. In the cases involving the Philippines 
and fellow small states, these measures expose the inequality in their power relations despite 
their seeming equivalence in material power.  
Meanwhile, the discrete external behaviours of a small state provides the nuances 
behind its weak or strong behaviour. They specify its behaviour on an issue (situation-based) 
in relation towards another small state (actor-based). Along with the evaluative measures of 
behaviours, considering these external behaviours result in the overall behavioural 
assessment of a small state as detailed in the Operationalization in Chapter 4. Applying these 
evaluation process of state behaviour in the cases involving the Philippines, the following are 
some important insights that may have some resonance with other small states:  
1. Issue-specific power is a more important determinant than aggregate structural 
power in assessing a small state’s behaviour towards another. 
As pointed out in the Introduction in Chapter 1, power must be viewed as multi-
dimensional and not just an all-encompassing concept. The initial tendency in the field of 
International Relations is to focus on a state’s aggregate structural power (material resources 
and capabilities), which does not fully explain unexpected outcomes over issues between 
states. Though aggregate structural power is relevant in analysing small states, it must not be 
viewed as the primary factor in measuring state behaviour and interactions.  In fact, it does 
not necessarily influence the determination of outcomes, in the same manner that the issue 
specific power does. 
Since it does not possess large resources and adequate capabilities, a small state can 
use various tactics to alter the issue power balance in other ways. These include threats to 
withdraw in negotiations, coalition building with other states, and the use of global public 
opinion to promote its agenda, among others. These tactics do not require the tangible 
resources of aggregate structural power.   
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This was evident in how the Philippines used diplomatic and legal tactics to convince 
Indonesia to give temporary reprieve to Veloso’s death penalty. Government officials 
personally lobbied to its Indonesian counterparts and offered to make Veloso a state witness 
to capture the drug syndicate that victimized her.  
2. Issue-specific power is also a more influential determinant than aggregate structural 
power in deciding a small state’s weak or strong behaviour relative to another. 
If one has to analyse the potency of a small state’s behaviour, then the issue-specific 
power is relevant since it contextualize its resources and capabilities comparatively with 
another small state in a particular case. In fact, a small state can achieve its preferred outcome 
not necessarily due to aggregate structural power, but largely through issue-specific power.  
This implies that the assessment on a small state’s weak or strong behaviour towards 
another is largely dependent on the bilateral issue, and NOT the other small state or more 
specifically, the material power it possess. Thus a small state with lower aggregate structural 
power compared to another does not automatically result in a weak behaviour, and vice 
versa.  
Such observation is particularly evident in the two cases involving the Philippines and 
Taiwan. While the Philippines has lower aggregate structural power, it did not exhibit a 
consistently weak behaviour in both of its cases with Taiwan. Specifically, the Philippines 
projected a “semi-strong” behaviour in the Taiwanese deportation case; while it 
demonstrated a “semi-weak” behaviour in the aftermath of the Taiwanese fisherman’s death.  
These two different cases involving the same actors reveal that a small state can alter 
the issue power balance despite the discrepancy in its aggregate structural power relative to 
another. It also implies that a small state with less material power such as the Philippines do 
not have to automatically ‘loose out’ to another small state with more resource capabilities 
like Taiwan. Ultimately, issue power balance carries more influence in a small state’s conduct 
that could either weaken or strengthen its behaviour.  
3. The direct connection between issue power balance and issue outcome is vital in 
defining an “initial estimation” of a small state’s weak or strong behaviour towards 
another.   
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As discussed in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3, there is a direct correlation 
between the issue power balance and the issue outcome. Thus, analysing a state’s 
alternatives, commitment, and control as well as the tactics it adopts to affect these elements, 
can determine whether it gave few or more concessions, achieved or failed in its objectives, 
or changed or remained in its position. 
Basically, any alterations in these elements both in issue power balance and issue 
outcome determine the potency of the small state. When the issue power balance is 
consistently in favour of the small state, it will likely achieve its preferred outcome, which 
results in an initial estimation of a “strong” behaviour. This is revealed in the Philippines’ firm 
commitment to achieve its objective of saving Veloso from her scheduled execution in 
Indonesia. Its strong behaviour is also reflected in its firm control over the deportation case 
of Taiwanese suspects to China that enabled it to avoid apologizing to Taiwan, and to keep a 
resolute position on its “one-China policy.”  
Meanwhile, when the issue power balance does not align with the small state, it will 
likely fail to reach its preferred outcome while the other party succeeds. This produces an 
initial estimation of a “weak” behaviour. The Philippines’ weak control during the standoff by 
the Sulu militants exposes its unclear and insecure position regarding its dormant claim on 
Sabah. As a result, Malaysia took control of the situation that consequently solidified its 
authority over the territory.  
4. A small state can project a strong behaviour towards others by producing or increasing 
its issue power balance (alternative, commitment, control) through the use of its 
limited yet available aggregate structural power to achieve a positive issue outcome 
(concession, objective, position). 
A small state can strengthen its behaviour by increasing its alternatives through the 
use of its economic or military resources, if any, to give credibility to its tactics. If there is 
limited resources, it can use diplomatic options as an alternative to resolve issues and to 
prevent further giving concessions to the other. Instead of giving the Taiwanese government 
an official apology over the deportation case, the Philippines opted to send a special envoy to 
explain its decision, and to dismiss its immigration officials. It essentially created an 
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alternative to an official apology to increase its issue power balance and to settle the issue 
with Taiwan.   
 Moreover, a state can project a strong behaviour by using its aggregate structural 
power to increase control. It can project or use its military forces if it is relatively superior 
compared to the other state. Or it can use various tactics such as coercion, ignoring, or 
resisting the other party’s demands. Such actions enable the state to push for its firm position 
on a policy issue. But even if the state possesses aggregate structural power or material 
resources, the state may face several constraints in using them to increase control. According 
to Habeeb (1988, 131): “these constraints may derive from internal public or political 
opposition to coercively increase control, or the costs of increasing control may be greater 
than the likely benefits.”  
This is evident when Duterte took control of the growing cases of abuse against 
Filipinos in Kuwait by declaring a labour deployment ban. There was domestic opposition 
against it, resulting in the loss of employment opportunities and the possible increase in the 
number of illegal workers going to Kuwait. The Philippines eventually lifted the deployment 
ban upon signing the labour agreement with Kuwait.      
Meanwhile, a state can also exhibit a strong behaviour towards another by increasing 
its commitment, thereby enabling it to achieve its objective or preferred outcome. However, 
commitment is the one component in the issue power balance in which aggregate structural 
power resources have no effect. Basically, “commitment cannot be ‘bought’ nor can it be 
increased through coercion. It is based partly on aspiration and need, and partly on the 
tactical ability to motivate one’s constituency. In particular, commitment based on aspiration 
is the state’s best hope for creating and maintaining a favourable issue power balance 
(Habeeb 1988, 132).” In the Philippines’ case, its strong commitment and impassioned stance 
to save Veloso enabled it to successfully achieve its objective of convincing Indonesia to 
cancel her scheduled execution.   
5. The impact of a small state’s discrete external behaviours is a critical consideration in 
predicting an overall assessment of its behaviour. However the nature and tendencies 
of these behaviours do not automatically imply a small state’s weakness or strength. 
174 
 
Instead, their impact on the bilateral issue and towards the other small state is a more 
relevant indicator.   
The discrete external behaviours of a small state can influence the initial estimation 
of its behaviour, which can consequently contribute to its overall behavioural assessment. 
These behaviours essentially provide the nuances behind its weakness or strength, which may 
consequently reveal an overall ‘semi-weak’ or ‘semi-strong behaviour.’  But taking each 
external behaviour at face value and judging it as weak or strong based solely on its nature, 
may inadvertently result in an inaccurate assessment on the small state’s general behaviour.  
 
 Based on the efforts in the Operationalization of Case Studies in Chapter 4, this study 
therefore examined each external behaviours on a case-by-case basis. For instance, a 
proactive approach of a small state in a given issue does not always result in a strong 
behaviour, as revealed in the Philippine government’s ‘rescue operation’ of Filipino workers 
in Kuwait. Whereas a cooperative attitude towards another small state may actually represent 
a weak behaviour, as reflected in Aquino’s obliging stance towards Malaysia during the Sabah 
standoff. Thus, assessing each external behaviour of a small state must also include its impact 
on the issue and to the other party. And in the analyses of the cases for this study, perceptions 
from observers on each of the small state’s external behaviour must also be taken into 
account to arrive at a more informed and introspective overall assessment of its weakness or 
strength.   
 
6.2 Observations in the Explanation of External Behaviour: Foreign Policy of a Small State   
 After establishing the Philippines’ external behaviour, it is also important to determine 
the reasons behind it. As discussed in the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 2, the leadership, 
political, and bilateral determinants in foreign policy analysis produce specific explanatory 
factors that account for a state’s external behaviour. The case studies in Chapter 4 reveal 
several external behaviours of the Philippines as a small state; while the analysis of these 
cases in Chapter 5 highlight the explanatory factors that cause the recurrence and regularity 
in these behaviours. 
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Based on the analysis on the Philippines’ foreign policy, its explanatory factors account 
for its discrete external behaviours on an issue (situation-based) towards another small state 
(actor-based). The following are some of the general observations on the explanatory factors 
in Philippine foreign policy, which seek to offer insights on the probable causes of weak or 
strong behaviour that may be considered relevant to other small states:    
1. The personal characteristics and global perceptions of a leader generate diverse 
external behaviours from a small state. Yet whatever his/her personality and 
perceptions are, a leader’s keenness and dedication to achieve a goal or a preferred 
outcome in a bilateral issue tends to lead to a small state’s strong behaviour.  
Meanwhile, when there is a significant contrast of personality and perceptions 
between successive leaders, a small state will exhibit conflicting policy and conduct, 
which may reduce its international credibility and thus leads to its weak behaviour.    
    
A leader’s personal characteristics shape the manner in which a state deals with its 
external relations. With Aquino’s conciliatory personality, the Philippines pushes for a 
collaborative foreign policy with a more cooperative external behaviour. With Duterte’s 
autocratic personality, the Philippines tends to promote an assertive foreign policy that 
projects a more combative external behaviour. 
 
A leader’s global perceptions guide his/her decision-making on issues that affect state 
disposition towards an issue. There will certainly be differences in the perceptions of national 
interests and international situation from one leader to another, since their personal views 
reflect their values, goals, past experiences, and general images of the world. With his 
liberal/institutionalist and interdependent foreign policy, Aquino’s administration projected 
a very complex worldview and a compounded demeanour for the Philippines. With his 
realist/pragmatic and independent foreign policy, Duterte’s administration displayed a very 
clear-cut worldview and a conclusive demeanour for the Philippines.       
It is important to note however that regardless of a leader’s personality or perception, 
his/her keenness and dedication to attain a specific goal or a preferred outcome essentially 
result in a strong behaviour for the small state.  For instance, Duterte’s forceful personality 
brought about his stinging criticism against the Kuwaiti government for the rising cases of 
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murder and abuse of Filipino workers. His fervent desire to stop this incidence produced a 
combative action from the Philippines and eventually reflected its strong stance towards the 
issue, which resulted in Kuwait’s agreement to sign a labour deal. In contrast, Aquino’s 
consenting and conciliatory personality may have produced a very cooperative attitude from 
the Philippines towards Malaysia over the Sabah standoff. But such attitude is perceived as 
‘pro-Malaysian’ and a sign of Aquino’s indifference to firmly push for the country’s Sabah 
claim, which inadvertently reflected a weak posture for the Philippines.          
Meanwhile, major differences in the personal characteristics and global perceptions 
between leaders after each government transition can result in inconsistencies in the policy 
and conduct of a small state. This may eventually weaken its external behaviour and global 
stance. In the Philippines’ case, the considerable contrasts between the Aquino and Duterte 
administrations caused a substantial shift in the country’s foreign policy and external 
behaviour. Each time it undergoes transitions in presidential administrations with their own 
idiosyncrasies, the Philippines consequently experiences major modifications in its response 
to policy issues and its dealings with other states. This tends to diminish the Philippines’ 
credibility when confronted with ongoing international issues that require constancy in policy 
strategy and consistency in external behaviour. This is especially apparent in the divergent 
stance of the Aquino and Duterte administrations regarding Veloso’s case in Indonesia.   
2. The political institution of a small state influences its weak or strong behaviour. A small 
state that suffers from less institutionalized political institutions manifests weak 
behaviour, while a small state with more institutionalized political institution projects 
strong behaviour.  
  
With due allowance for variations from one state to another, the internal political 
situation of a small state governs the extent of its action and determines its competency in 
the pursuit of its foreign policy. How institutionalized political institutions are typically 
determines how strategic a government can implement its foreign policy, how forcefully it 
can behave externally, and how actively it can play its diplomatic hand. A small state that 
suffers from institutional challenges is highly constrained in its external conduct and is likely 
to project a weak behaviour; whereas a small state with less institutional challenges is less 
constrained in its actions and tends to display a strong behaviour. 
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As a developing nation, the Philippines is still in the process of building well-
functioning governance institutions that includes the management of its foreign policy and 
international relations. Thus at present, its less institutionalized and weak bureaucracy 
hinders it from projecting a more proactive behaviour in its international affairs. It reflects a 
foreign policy that is prone to being inconsistent, fragmented, and inward-looking.  
 
Even when governments change especially in democratic countries, foreign policy is 
expected to have continuity whenever possible. However, Philippine foreign policy is deemed 
less strategic, which is reflected in its external behaviour. Thus, the country’s political 
institutions and the bureaucratic politics behind them, seem to “undermine, ruin, or frustrate 
otherwise commendable goals and rational strategies being pursued at the international level 
(Baviera 2012).”  
 
Therefore, it is no surprise that most of the cases in this study revealed a reactive 
approach from the Philippines. Its conduct is largely limited to responding to the behaviours 
of other states, rather than formulating new initiatives or following a concerted and 
calculated policy of its own.  In the rare instance that the Philippines initiated pre-emptive 
unilateral actions, it did so only in response to urgent matters that breached into the Filipino 
public’s consciousness, as reflected in the government’s efforts at the eleventh hour to save 
Veloso’s life in Indonesia. Though it achieved a positive outcome, the Philippine government 
was still criticized for their belated and last ditch efforts.  
 
Additionally, when the Philippines took initiative, its institutional and bureaucratic 
liabilities tend to hinder it from accomplishing its preferred outcome. This is particularly 
evident during the Philippines’ controversial rescue of distressed Filipino workers in Kuwait, 
which resulted in violations of diplomatic protocol. This was purportedly due to the country’s 
leaders, particularly its political appointees with no foreign policy credentials. They are 
deemed as addicted to short-term, self-centred “politicking,” rather than committed to 
focusing on long-term policy strategy, which eventually undermined the Philippines’ position.   
 
Thus how institutionalized the government of a small state is directly affects the 
potency of its behaviour. The less institutionalized its government, the weaker its external 
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behaviour; whereas the more institutionalized it is, the stronger its external behaviour. In the 
Philippines’ case however, its less institutionalized government tends to reflect a reactive 
approach towards bilateral issues, which largely results in its weak behaviour.  
 
3. National interests driven by public opinion can either be a looming liability or a 
motivating force, which consequently weakens or strengthens the behaviour of a small 
state respectively.    
 
National interests are the motivational basis of a small state’s foreign policy, the 
objectives leaders insinuate in their policies and conduct in international affairs. In particular, 
those national interests that are driven by public opinion generate the intensity by which a 
small state carries out its external actions and foreign policy. The dilemma for state leadership 
lies in assessing which interests are to be defended and which, if necessary, need to be 
sacrificed in dealing with other states. Thus, the primary task of the leader is to articulate the 
country’s national interests and order them in a scheme of relative importance.  
 
Leaders in democratic countries, who are accountable to their constituencies, tend to 
prioritize national interests that are influenced by public opinion. The mass public rarely 
intervenes on international affairs, and only does so when national interests affect them. 
Thus, state leaders and their governments fervently promote national interests that generate 
intense public opinion; while they reveal a slightly indifferent response towards other 
interests.  
 
For other small states, there are various national interests (aside from economic and 
security interests) that cause high public opinion. There are those interests that may be 
peculiar to their countries’ cultural, ideological, or socio-economic fabric that largely affect 
their people. Thus, their respective governments value and prioritize these national interests 
in their foreign policies, which influence their conduct in international affairs.  
  
 In the Philippines’ case, its national interests that particularly trigger high public 
opinion is its migrant workers’ welfare. Since most of its domestic population has families and 
relatives working abroad, the Philippine government highly regards the advancement of 
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migrant workers’ welfare because of the local public interest it generates. This was 
particularly evident in its government’s impassioned stance to save Veloso’s life in Indonesia. 
Such behaviour was essentially brought about by the Filipino public’s zealous outcry and 
emotional attitude over her scheduled execution. In contrast, the government displayed an 
impassive stance on the Sulu Sultanate’s attempt to regain Sabah, partly due to the Filipinos’ 
low-key response and partly due to the country’s unclear territorial claims that have long 
remained dormant. In these cases, both affect national interests. Yet the protection of Filipino 
workers caused deep public sentiment than the issue of territorial sovereignty. Thus, the level 
of government response is strikingly different.   
 
Since it generates large public opinion, the protection of overseas Filipino workers is 
deemed with high importance. It is not only a national interest, but an institutional mandate 
for the Philippine government. Because of intense domestic pressure and keen public support 
to advance migrant workers welfare, this serves as a motivating force for the Philippines to 
project a strong behaviour in its external affairs. In its engagement with Kuwait, the 
Philippines displayed a firm stance by imposing a temporary deployment ban and eventually 
securing a labour deal as a protest against the rising cases of death and abuse of Filipinos. 
 
However, the protection of overseas Filipino workers is also a limiting factor that 
sometimes results in a policy dilemma for the government. Given its limited resources as a 
developing country, the Philippines is thus susceptible to experiencing constraints in the 
conduct of its foreign policy whenever it has to prioritize the protection of its nationals over 
the promotion of its political and security interests. In its dispute with Taiwan, the Philippines 
yielded to most of the Taiwanese government’s demands after the latter imposed a freeze 
hiring of Filipino workers amidst the political clash over the Taiwanese fisherman’s death. This 
consequently weakens the Philippines’ external behaviour. 
 
Thus, national interests that generate high public opinion can either embolden or 
restrain a small state’s action on an issue with another small state. The above cases 
mentioned involving the Philippines reveal that on the one hand, overseas Filipino workers 
can be a rallying cause towards its strong behaviour particularly on extraordinary and urgent 
cases of murder, abuse, and death penalty imposed on its citizens abroad. While on the other 
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hand, it can be a looming liability that could weaken the Philippines’ position during 
negotiations or conflict resolution with another small state.  
 
In relation, it is also important to note that a small state’s national interests can be 
used as leverage against it by a competing party. In their own pursuit of national interests, 
there is a tendency for other small states to exploit and use the interest of another as a means 
of coercion against it.    For instance, the welfare of overseas Filipinos was repeatedly utilized 
by other small states as a bargaining chip against the Philippines during the process of a 
bilateral negotiation or conflict resolution. This is manifested in Taiwan’s retaliatory measures 
against the Philippines in the aftermath of the deportation case and the death of the 
Taiwanese fisherman. Recognizing the important mandate and domestic pressure for the 
Philippine government to protect its overseas workers, Taiwan implemented a longer and 
more tedious process for work visa applications and a freeze hiring of Filipinos to compel the 
Philippines to concede to its demands.  
 
4. The relative power capabilities of a small state determines the range of power 
instruments it can use during a bilateral dispute towards another. Determining a small 
state’s weak or strong behaviour is dependent not only on its power capabilities, but 
also on whether the power instruments it used have failed or fulfilled its preferred 
outcome.   
 
Relative power capabilities between states have implications on a small state’s foreign 
policy content, the power instruments used, and the actions towards the other.  In inter-state 
relations, a small state that has lower power capability relative to another tends to reflect a 
normative foreign policy. It typically employs diplomatic and symbolic means to influence 
another small state to compensate for its less-advanced military and economy. These are the 
means in which the state espouses to persuade others towards its preferred outcome.  
 
Such diplomatic and symbolic actions involve calculated tactics and strategic 
alternatives, which do not cost high resource commitment from a small state’s limited 
aggregate structural power. For instance, the Philippines utilizes high-level diplomatic 
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channels and symbolic instruments by relating Veloso’s case to the plight of Indonesian 
overseas workers, which resulted in the temporary reprieve of her execution.  
 
Meanwhile, a small state that has higher power capability relative to another can 
afford to project a forcible foreign policy. It generally has a wide array of power instruments 
it can use at its disposal, including military and economic statecraft to influence another state. 
These power instruments, along with other diplomatic and symbolic means, can be utilized 
by the small state to convince or coerce others, if necessary, towards its preferred outcome. 
However, the use of military and economic statecraft involve risks that may require high 
resource commitment from the small state’s aggregate structural power.  
  
While small states with higher power capability is commonly presumed to project a 
strong behaviour, it is not always the case. This also applies to small states with lower power 
capability that is usually assumed to manifest weak behaviour. It is thus important to note 
that relative power capabilities is not the sole consideration in determining weak or strong 
behaviour. It is in the OUTCOME after a small state uses its power capabilities that determines 
if a small state acted weak or strong.  A small state that failed to achieve its preferred outcome 
is viewed to have displayed a weak behaviour. Whereas a small state that is able to fulfil its 
preferred outcome, no matter what power instruments are used, is deemed to have 
manifested a strong behaviour.  
 
In the deportation case with Taiwan, the Philippine government used diplomatic and 
symbolic means to ease political tension by dismissing the Filipino immigration officials 
involved, without giving an official apology that may violate its One-China policy. Its actions 
persuaded the Taiwanese government to lift the sanctions imposed against it that led to the 
normalization of bilateral ties.  These resulted in the fulfilment of its preferred outcome that 
is largely favourable to the Philippines, which essentially reflects its strong behaviour.  
 
5. The asymmetric bilateral relations of a small state determines its dependence and 
interdependence with another. Evaluating its dependence/interdependence hinges on 
the government and its leader’s perception of the costs and benefits of the bilateral 
relation with the other small state. A small state that has dependent relations 
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manifests weak behaviour; while a small state that has interdependent relations is 
inclined to project strong behaviour.  
 
Despite the seeming power parity between small states, their relationship is not 
always on equal footing. Thus a small state’s relation with another is affected by bilateral 
asymmetry that impacts its foreign policy posture and its response towards the other’s action.  
 
In an asymmetrical relation, a small state that is more dependent on another typically 
manifests a vulnerable foreign policy. It tends to demonstrate an acquiescent reaction 
towards the influence of the superior state with more power instruments, and thus project a 
weak behaviour.    
 
 During the illegal occupation of Sabah, the Philippine government has to consider 
Malaysia’s more advanced military forces and its important role as a facilitator in the peace 
process in Mindanao. Thus, the Philippines is compelled to consign the Sabah crisis into the 
hands of the Malaysian government. Meanwhile during tensions over the death of the 
Taiwanese fisherman, the Philippines has to cope with the Taiwanese government’s various 
economic sanctions. It views itself as dependent on Taiwan’s trade, investments, and labour 
market for Filipino migrant workers. Eventually, the Philippines displayed an acquiescent 
reaction towards Taiwan. It conceded to most of Taiwan’s demands to resolve the homicide 
case that escalated into a political row.         
 
But a small state that is less dependent on another is able to project a more resolute 
foreign policy stance in response to any coercive influence. This tends to result in a defiant 
reaction towards another small state on critical issues. In an interdependent relationship, a 
small state can afford to demonstrate defiance, which essentially manifests a strong 
behaviour.  
 
During its labour issues with Kuwait, the Philippines led by Duterte displayed defiance 
by imposing a deployment ban of Filipino workers. It took into account the Kuwaiti economy’s 
reliance on migrant labour and was thus emboldened to implement the ban. And because of 
their interdependence with each other, the Philippines and Kuwait signed a labour agreement 
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on the welfare of Filipino workers that would end the deployment ban and conclude the 
bilateral diplomatic row. 
 
6.3 Conclusion of this Study  
 
This study argues that examining states with approximate power capabilities produces 
a more interesting case for analysis rather than those with large discrepancy in aggregate 
structural power. In particular, assessing the behaviour of small states towards its peers is a 
more relevant endeavour rather than evaluating them in comparison with great or middle 
power, which has long dominated small state studies.  
 
Because of this, the discussions in this study revolved around small state engagement 
with each other based on the research questions raised in the Introduction in Chapter 1. This 
study’s conclusion revisits these questions and briefly addresses them accordingly:  
 
Recognizing a Small State’s External Behaviour towards other Small States  
 
When juxtaposing small states with each other, how does one behave when in conflict 
with its peers? According to the cases presented in this study, there is the interesting 
probability that their behaviour can fluctuate from weak to strong and vice versa. There is 
also the normal likelihood for small states to display partial or some degree of weakness or 
strength that result in semi-weak or semi-strong behaviours respectively.    
 
This essentially breaks the long-held notion of a small state as vulnerable and 
defenceless. Such general assumption of weakness in small states is derived from the heavy 
emphasis on its limited material resources or low aggregate structural power. By focusing on 
the issue power balance when evaluating a small state’s behaviour, this study promotes the 
possibility that a small state can demonstrate its strength relative to another. This implies that 
a small state’s strength is derivative rather than intrinsic, which reveals that it is not entirely 
weak. 
 
Emphasizing on the issue power balance is therefore a useful and relevant approach 
that particularly answers the question: how does one determine whether a small state 
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manifested weak or strong behaviour?  Based on this study, a weak behaviour tilts the issue 
power balance down when a small state cannot find alternatives, fail to possess control, and 
possesses low commitment on an issue with another small state. These tend to result in a 
negative issue outcome for a small state through its failure to achieve its objective, with more 
concessions to give, and with a significant change in its position on a bilateral issue.  
 
The opposite is true for a small state that projects a strong behaviour through the 
consolidation of its issue power balance. It can demonstrate strength by finding alternatives, 
holding control, and bolstering commitment during a dispute with others. These may result in 
positive issue outcome for a small state with an achieved objective, fewer concessions 
towards another, or no position change on a bilateral issue. Generally, the findings in this 
study validate a different notion of power as a dynamic causal process, rather than a static 
measure of capability. It also proves that the concept of power cannot be divorced from 
behaviour and outcome. 
 
As the cases reveal, the Philippines displayed weak and strong behaviours in different 
instances relative to its peers. On the one hand, it neglected or faltered in capitalizing its 
power balance that brought about adverse results during an issue with another small state. 
On the other hand, it effectively boosted its power balance that resulted in a favourable issue 
outcome. There are also cases when the Philippines exhibited a neutral stance, wherein its 
strong behaviour is offset by its weak action. These particular cases typically conclude with 
neither the Philippines loosing nor winning over another small state.   
 
These evaluative measures based on issue power balance and issue outcome result in 
the initial estimation of a small state’s behaviour--- weak, strong, or even neutral. However, 
its discrete external behaviours also affect the degree of weakness or strength that a small 
state manifests. How then do these external behaviours influence its overall behaviour? 
 
Essentially, the impact of these situation-based and actor-based external behaviours 
influence the overall conduct of a small state, which can either be semi-weak or semi-strong. 
For instance, while at the conclusion of the case a small state has projected a strong 
behaviour, it may also have demonstrated a reactive approach while addressing an issue with 
185 
 
another small state. This essentially diminishes its ‘strength’ and results in an overall semi-
strong behaviour. Thus, this study reveals that evaluating a small state’s behaviour with a 
clear-cut and straightforward weak or strong dichotomy may not always be feasible, since it 
has to consider the impact of its discrete external behaviours that are equally vital in its overall 
behavioural assessment.   
 
Rationalizing a Small State’s External Behaviour based on its Foreign Policy  
 
Following an assessment of a small state’s behaviour towards another, it is also 
important to examine the reasons why a small state act the way it does.   This study therefore 
concludes that a small state’s foreign policy provides the main rationale behind its external 
behaviour. The leadership, political, and bilateral determinants of its foreign policy essentially 
explain a small state actions ‘from the inside out.’ In fact, each explanatory factor from these 
foreign policy determinants essentially corresponds to a discrete external behaviour exhibited 
by the small state. Consequently, these factors also influence the weakness and strength of a 
small state’s behaviour.  
 
The leadership determinant of a small state’s foreign policy underscores the personal 
characteristics and global perceptions of its leaders. The distinct personalities and varied 
perceptions of state leaders typically reflect diverse behaviours that the country assumes. 
However, a leader’s personality and perception do not necessarily point to a clear weakness 
or strength in a small state’s behaviour. It is the leader’s keenness and dedication to attain a 
preferred outcome on an issue that results in a strong behaviour for the country. Meanwhile, 
the significant changes in the personalities and perceptions of state leadership causes major 
policy adjustments, which may consequently erode the consistency and credibility of a small 
state and weaken its behaviour. 
 
In addition, the political determinants of a small state’s foreign policy features its 
political institutionalization and national interests. A small state with low political 
institutionalization tends to display a weak behaviour, while the ones with high political 
institutionalization is inclined to project a strong behaviour. Meanwhile, its national interests 
can enable a small state to either project a weak or strong behaviour relative to another. 
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Those that generate high public opinion can be a burden and a liability for the government 
and thus weaken its position, especially when the other small state uses it as a leverage 
against it in a bilateral dispute. Whereas those national interests that spawn domestic public 
support and score political gains for the government, enable the small state to demonstrate 
a strong stance towards its counterpart.   
 
Meanwhile, the bilateral determinants of a small state’s foreign policy highlight its 
relative power capabilities and asymmetric relations towards another small state. Despite 
their approximate power parity, small states have disproportionate capabilities and unequal 
relations that could influence its interactions with each other.  
 
For instance, a small state with lesser power capabilities relative to another has limited 
power instruments it can employ, which may constrain its external behaviour. Whereas a 
small state with wider power capabilities compared to another has more power instruments 
it can use at its disposal, which can result in a more empowered behaviour. However, relative 
power capabilities by itself do not entirely determine a small state’s weakness or strength. 
Instead, it is dependent on whether a small state has failed or fulfilled its preferred outcome 
on an issue with another state using its power capabilities. This would essentially reveal its 
weak or strong behaviour respectively.   
   
In addition, a small state with dependent relations is inclined to concede to the 
influence of another and thus project a weak behaviour. Whereas a small state with 
interdependent relations may be able to defy pressures from the other and hence manifest a 
strong behaviour. Establishing dependence/interdependence is subjected to the costs and 
benefits of the bilateral relation to the small state as perceived by its government and its 
leaders.  
 
These factors that belong to the leadership, political, and bilateral determinants of a 
small state’s foreign policy significantly influence its external behaviour with some regularity. 
They have consistent and recurring effects that create patterns of state behaviour. The 
variations in them affect the weakness or strength of a small state’s behaviour in different 
cases towards different parties. Thus, an analysis of these factors behind its foreign policy 
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determinants can establish a general description of what a weak or strong behaviour from a 
small state looks like.   
 
Predicting a Small State’s Weak or Strong Behaviour  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the explanatory factors in each of the foreign 
policy determinants can similarly be used as predictive indicators to determine the potential 
weakness or strength of a small state.  
 
Based on the analysis of the Philippines’ case, this study can foresee a weak behaviour 
from a small state if it possess these general characteristics. For one, a small state will tend 
to project a weak behaviour if it has significant policy adjustments between consecutive 
leaderships. This is typically brought about by their differing personalities and perceptions, 
which tends to reduce the stability and credibility of the country’s international position. 
Secondly, a small state is likely to demonstrate a weak behaviour if its government is less 
institutionalized, which exposes a less strategic, inconsistent, and fragmented foreign policy 
process. Thirdly, a small state is inclined to manifest weak behaviour if it is constrained by the 
heavy weight of advancing national interests, which generates high domestic pressure from 
its constituency. In some occasions, these national interest can be used by other small states 
as leverage against it during bilateral disputes. Lastly, a small state may be predisposed to 
reflect a weak behaviour when it is inhibited by the limited power capabilities it possesses; 
and impaired by its political and economic dependence with other small states.    
 
Meanwhile, it is also highly probable that small states can project a strong behaviour 
towards its counterpart, which the Philippines has proven in some instances. A strong 
behaviour by a small state can be demonstrated through its leader’s dedication to achieve a 
goal or a preferred outcome regardless of the type of personality he/she may hold. It can also 
be exemplified through his/her prioritization and high regard on a bilateral issue based on 
his/her perceptions. And with highly institutionalized political institutions, a small state can 
project a strong behaviour towards others. Its strength is also manifested in its emboldened 
and committed stance to advance its national interests that are consistently backed by 
staunch support from its domestic public. And despite its lower power capabilities compared 
with others, a small state can also demonstrate a strong behaviour through its persuasive 
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actions that can fulfil its objective with less resource commitment. Moreover, its 
interdependent relations with other small states can bring about defiance and a strong 
posture if its government and leaders perceive such conduct will produce more gains for the 
country.   
 
Given the diversity of these foreign policy determinants and their impact in external 
behaviour, this study suggests that analysing a small state is a complex process, even for small 
states such as the Philippines. Yet despite its complexity, an analysis of state policy and 
behaviour may provide useful insights to other small states, which also possess developing 
economies, inadequate militaries, and less established institutions. 
 
6.4 Future Directions Related to this Study 
 
By examining the Philippines and its interactions with fellow small states, this study 
hopes that it can contribute to the academic discussion on small states. There are insights 
into the country’s external behaviour and foreign policy that may also be relevant to other 
small states. In addition, the power dynamics as revealed in the case analysis between the 
Philippines and its counterparts may well inform small states in particular, and other states in 
general, on how to predict a weak or strong behaviour. It is hoped that this study can serve 
as an insightful analysis that can enable small states to offset one’s weaknesses or strengthen 
one’s behaviour in a specific issue relative to another.  
 
Essentially, this study on the Philippines aims to be a preliminary work in 
understanding a small state’s behaviour and policy towards its peers. Since there are limited 
studies concurrently focusing on these topics, going through this research is a challenging 
endeavour. This challenge consequently exposed various shortcomings and limitations in this 
study, which hopefully future scholarly works on small states will be able to address. The 
following are some of these limitations with particular suggestions for potential consideration 






1. From One-Country View to Two or More Countries’ Perspectives 
 
Though this study featured the dyadic interactions between small states in its case 
studies, it emphasized only on one country’s perspectives. This study is limited to only the 
Philippines’ view of the cases, which did not include other small states such as Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Kuwait. Thus, a comparative analysis between two small states is a 
good proposal for future scholarly endeavours. The literature on small state interactions can 
benefit from further studies equally assessing the behaviours and policies of two or more 
countries in their engagement with each other. This can be a good comparative basis in 
determining which one displayed a weak or strong behaviour relative to another.  
 
2. Development of Evaluative Measures in Small State Behaviour  
 
Since there are only a few literature determining a small state’s weak or strong 
behaviour relative to its peers, it is thus necessary to further cultivate or add more evaluative 
measures to be used. This study resourcefully borrowed the variables in issue power balance 
from the field of international negotiations. And to complement them, this study also 
invented the variables for the issue outcome. Both were employed as improvised 
measurements in assessing small state behaviour.     
 
With more awareness on small state interactions through this study, other scholars 
and observers can contribute to the further development of these evaluative measures by 
enhancing the application of the existing variables used in this study, or adding more variables 
in the issue power balance and issue outcome. These improvements are expected to produce 
more precise determination of either a weak or strong behaviour of a small state.  
 
3. Conception of a More Generic Predictive Factors to Understand Small State 
Behaviour 
 
While this study on external behaviour and foreign policy may resonate and have 
significant relevance with other small states, it is unsure whether or not the behavioural 
measures and the policy determinants may be fittingly applicable to all.  Since this study 
highlights a one-country perspective, it essentially generated important principles and 
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insights that are unique and distinct to a single small state, particularly that of the Philippines. 
While these insights can be pertinent preliminary guidelines in rationalizing or forecasting a 
small state’s behaviour, it may not be consistently applicable to other small states with its 
own set of peculiarities.          
 
 The Philippines’ political institutions or national interests, for instance, may not be 
similar to other small states. As a result, the level of influence of these factors in determining 
and/or predicting the Philippines’ behaviour may be different from that of other small states. 
Thus, it is uncertain whether or not the principles and theories developed in this study may 
likewise influence other small states, in the same manner that it affected the Philippines.  
  
In proposing the future direction on the literature of small state, this study then 
recommends more case studies on small states in all its diversity and idiosyncrasies. Since 
they form the largest group in the international system, small states have the most diverse 
membership. Thus, the more there are varied case studies on different small states that 
analyse their individual policies and behaviours, the better the chances of generating more 
enduring theories that can be applicable or generic to majority of small states. Essentially, 
further studies on the small states, which examines both its individuality and its comparisons 
with other small states, are necessary to expand and deepen our understanding on inter-state 
relations.   
 
Despite the abovementioned limitations, this study on small states featuring the 
Philippines is admittedly an explanatory venture, yet an important initial contribution to the 
literature. It essentially lays out the groundwork in promoting scholarly interests and 
advancing the literature on the power dynamics between small states. It is expected that the 
future direction on small state studies will focus more on their behaviour, policies, and 
bilateral interactions, rather than comparing them with other states. This is a long-overdue 
spotlight on small states that merits more academic attention. Going beyond its fixation on 
great powers, the field of International Relations can be further enriched by acknowledging 
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